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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
DOES U.S. COUNTER-DRUG POLICY AFFECT NATIONALISM IN THE
ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEAN? A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF
COUNTER-DRUG POLICY ON NATIONALISM IN JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD
AND TOBAGO.
by
Krystel Ramdathsingh
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Eduardo Gamarra, Major Professor
This dissertation examined the effect of United States counter-drug policy on
nationalism in small states, focusing on Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The states
were selected for their roles and geostrategic importance in the illegal drug trade; Jamaica
being the largest drug producing country in the Anglophone Caribbean and having strong
links to the trade of Colombian cocaine, and Trinidad being a mere seven miles from the
South American coast.
Since U.S. counterdrug policies have frequently been viewed in the region as
imperialistic, this dovetails into ideas on the perceptions of smallness and powerlessness
of Caribbean nations. Hence, U.S. drug policies affect every vulnerability faced by the
Caribbean, individually and collectively. Thus, U.S. drug policy was deemed the most
appropriate independent variable, with nationalism as the dependent variable.
In both countries four Focus Groups and one Delphi Study were conducted
resulting in a total of 60 participants. Focus Group participants, recruited from the
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general population, were asked about their perception of the illegal drug trade in the
country and the policies their government had created. They were also asked their
perception on how deeply involved the U.S. was in the creation of these policies and their
opinions on whether this involvement was positive or negative. The Delphi Study
participants were experts in the field of local drug policies and also gave their
interpretations of the role the U.S. played in local policy creation. Coupled with this data,
content analysis was conducted on various newspaper articles, press releases, and
speeches made regarding the topic.
In comparing both countries, it was found that there is a disconnect between
government actions and the knowledge and perceptions of the general public. In Trinidad
and Tobago this disconnect was more apparent given the lack of awareness of local drug
policies and the utter lack of faith in government solutions. The emerging conclusion
was that the impact of U.S. drug policy on nationalism was more visible in Trinidad and
Tobago where there was a weaker civil society-government relationship, while the impact
on nationalism was more obscure in Jamaica, which had a stronger civil-society
government relationship.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION OF RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION
For the islands of the Anglophone Caribbean, nationalism has been thought of as a
construct emanating from their colonial past and their postcolonial struggle. In general,
scholarship has recognized their nationalism as something established by past forces and
for the most part very little has been done to acknowledge how their nationalism would
have changed after its initial postcolonial incarnation, indicating that nationalism in the
region has largely been looked at as a stagnant, monolithic construct rather than as an
ongoing process of survival and consistent re-affirmation of collective identity.
For these small states, nationalism cannot be considered like a photograph from the
past that can continue to be referenced as relevant today. Instead, their nationalism must
be seen as a constantly evolving process that, while having its foundations in the past,
also responds to the current international climate. As such, the current domestic and
regional dynamics will also play a role in the shaping of nationalism for the individual
small states. Moreover, in a society where nationalism has been forged out of colonial
and postcolonial relationships and the reaction against the colonial hegemon, the ongoing
version of nationalism is affected by the relationship to both past and present hegemons.
Thus, the US-Caribbean relationship is of utmost importance when examining
nationalism in these former colonial states. Building on Said’s ideas about identity
formation and, by extension, nationalism (the collective identity of the nation) as
distinguishing an other from which the self can be deemed opposite, or contrasted, US-
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Caribbean political relationships not only serve to enhance cooperation among the
countries in the region but also act as a way for each side to continually re-affirm its
identity and its position in the world.
In this dissertation, I break nationalism into three components in order to examine the
process of identity affirmation more closely. I see nationalism as consisting of selfperception, perception of the other and self-projection. These three components drive the
process of nationalism forward and serve to forge and re-forge the collective identity for
a country.
To demonstrate the process of identity formation my dissertation will outline one of
the most glaring Caribbean security threats – the illegal drug trade. The states of the
Caribbean region have asserted that illegal drug trafficking poses the most grievous
collective security threat. Along with the movement of illegal drugs through the island
chain, there are also the added consequences of small arms trafficking, human trafficking,
and money laundering which accompany the drug trade. The drug trade as a security
issue is also inextricably linked to the fears of economic marginalization for these
nations, since not only is there the risk of instability in their legitimate economies at the
hands of drug lords and traffickers, but there is also the consequence of cutbacks in US
aid and investment when their counterdrug policies do not meet US-prescribed
specifications.
The fact that the US promotes counterdrug policies as a ‘war on drugs’ in itself is a
way of couching its policies in nationalist sentiments – as a direct attack on the
homeland. The framing of the issue has seemingly allowed the US to construct policy as
it sees fit rather than fostering a concerted regional cooperative effort. Anglophone
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Caribbean nations have not been able to project similar forms of nationalist sentiments in
the formation of their own counterdrug policies since they must first ensure that they
complement those of the regional hegemon. In fact, regional cooperation with US efforts
has more or less been assumed or expected by the hemispheric power, creating an ‘usversus-them’ framework. The counterdrug discourse in the hemisphere can then be
viewed in some degree as a situation of competing nationalisms where one is clearly
stronger. In effect, cooperating with US drug policies has become a means of survival for
these small states.
Rather than simply looking at the effect of the drug trade on small states, since that
research is exhaustive, the dissertation emphasizes the way in which drug policy relations
with the regional hegemon and the small states affect nationalism. Examining the
relationship between nationalism and drug policy arguably revives, the vestiges of the
colonial past that these small states have long struggled to shirk. As such, it is
hypothesized that the US-small state relations with regards to this major security issue
(perhaps the biggest collective issue for the western hemisphere) plays a significant role
in the evolutionary process of nationalism, affecting not only the strategies adopted at the
official level, but also the way that the general population perceives itself and their
country’s role in the illegal drug trade.
The present study places emphasis on the Anglophone Caribbean, specifically
focusing on two states – Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (which will subsequently be
referred to as Trinidad). These states were selected on the basis of their roles and geostrategic importance in the illegal drug trade. Jamaica is the largest drug producing
country in the Anglophone Caribbean and possesses strong links to the trade of
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Colombian cocaine, while Trinidad is the country closest to the supply nations, a mere
seven miles off the South American coast. The counterdrug policies of the US have in
many instances been viewed as invasive or imperialistic following Jacqueline BraveboyWagner’s (2004) ideas on the perceptions of smallness and powerlessness of Caribbean
nations. Thus, securitization of the illegal drug trade and resulting policies affect every
vulnerability experienced by the Caribbean, as individual nations and as a collective. In
light of the drug trade-security-vulnerability connection, drug policy is deemed the most
appropriate independent variable to use in examining nationalism in the selected
countries as the dependent variable.
To gain a deeper understanding of the impact of US drug policy on the selected cases,
the sub-questions of the present thesis examine the aspects of nationalism in each
country. First, it must be determined if US drug policy actions have deepened ethnic or
class tensions in Trinidad and/or Jamaica. The second task is examining whether or not
US drug policy actions have been met with anti-US sentiments in each country. The third
task is to ascertain whether official statements from each country reflect cooperation and
complementarity with US drug policies, or instead show an assertion of independence in
their policy actions.

US DRUG POLICY
According to former ambassador to Colombia, William R. Brownfield, “If your
drug policy is an exclusively ‘hard side’ negative policy, it will not succeed…there has to
be a positive side: providing alternative economic livelihoods, clinics, roads – the sort of
things that actually give poor communities a stake in their future so they do not

4

participate in narcotics trafficking.”1 From this quote, there seems to be a shift in the
rhetoric of the ongoing drug war, ostensibly away from the heavy emphasis on
interdiction and military presence, to capacity and social building. Additionally, there is
evidence that cocaine usage in the US is on the decline. In spite of this information,
federal monetary allocations and performance measures outlined in US government
documents show that the main objectives and traditional strategies still attract the most
funding.
Yet, there has been an undeniable shift in rhetoric. Under the Obama
Administration, and even prior to his election, the reframing of issues in Latin America
and the Caribbean, which have traditionally been labeled security issues, has been visible.
In the lead up to Obama’s election in 2008, he criticized the Bush administration for
being “negligent toward our friends, ineffective with our adversaries, disinterested in the
challenges that matter in people’s lives, and incapable of advancing our interests in the
region.”2 On his electoral platform, he this vowed a ‘fundamental commitment’ to the
Latin American region. The difference in rhetoric relating to illegal drug policies has
likely occurred in response to changing attitudes within the American public and also at
the state level to certain drugs, like marijuana. According to the Pew Research Center,
support from the general (American) public for the legalization of marijuana has showed
a marked increase, with 52% of respondents in its national survey. At the state level,
1

Former Ambassador to Colombia William R. Brownfield quoted by Damien Cave, Charlie Savage, and
Thom Shanker, in The New York Times “A New Frontline in the US Drug War” May 31 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/americas/honduran-drug-raid-deaths-wont-alter-uspolicy.html?pagewanted=all
2

Barack Obama, “ Embargoed for Delivery: Renewing U.S. Leadership in the Americas,” Remarks to the
Cuban American National Foundation, May 23, 2008.
http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2008/05/obama_latin_america_speech_in.html
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there has also been considerable relaxation on the laws against marijuana, with some
states legalizing the use of medical marijuana or enacting various degrees of
decriminalization (see Figure 1). In Uruguay, President Jose Mujica has enacted law
which legalizes marijuana at the end of 2013. He states that his decision comes from the
recognition of the failure of prohibitionist regimes and the resulting repression that
ensues.3

3

Matt Sledge, “How Uruguay Legalized Marijuana Dealing” Huffington Post, December 12, 2013.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/12/uruguay-marijuana-legalization_n_4433971.html
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Figure 1: Marijuana Law in 50 States

Source: “Public Opinion and Marijuana: Shifting Attitudes, Events and Laws,” Pew Research Center for
the People and the Press, April 4 2013. http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/04/marijuana-timeline/

According to Buxton, the Obama Administration has approached the war on drugs
in much the same way as its predecessors with only the minor adjustment of directing
more attention to domestic and overseas demand-reduction strategies. In every other
respect she argues, the Obama Administration has merely continued the past supplyoriented strategies without much interest in creating a new one.4 The traditional strategy
4

Julia Buxton, “Forward Into History: Understanding Obama’s Latin American Policy” Latin American
Perspective, Issue 178, Vol. 38, No. 4, July 2011, 29-45.
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involves the formation of a “Plan”, be it the Plan Colombia, the Merida Initiative, or as
relevant to the region under study, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, which is
directly modeled after the two formerly mentioned plans. Thus, despite Brownfield’s
comments and the changes to public opinion, the US government has maintained a
singular war on drugs strategy in the region.
Moreover, it has been suggested that US officials are anticipating a shift in the
transshipment routes and are already reinforcing its monitoring of the Caribbean5 because
of the success of DEA actions like those of the Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team
(FAST) in Central America which have disrupted the air transshipment routes (to
Honduras for example where there have been successes in cocaine seizures).
The US’s assumed regional hegemony provides the context in determining
whether US-Caribbean relations shape nationalism of the smaller states in the postcolonial setting. Arguably, the US assumed this mantle upon declaring the Monroe
Doctrine in 1823. Dent asserts that this role was expanded to include the policing of the
region with the addition of the Roosevelt Corollary.6 The new terms added by the
amendment now meant not only keeping potential foreign colonizers out of the
hemisphere, but also asserted that that the US would guide the ideology in the region.
Authors such as Griffith7 and Thoumi8 support the idea of a hegemonic role in that

5

See and Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S.
Policy, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005)

6

David Dent, The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S. Involvement in Latin
America and the Caribbean, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999.

7

Ivelaw Griffith, “Drugs and Crime as Problems Without Passports in the Caribbean: How Secure is
Security and How Sovereign is Sovereignty?” 13th Annual Eric Williams Memorial Lecture, October 8
2011, Florida International University.
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counter-drug policies within the hemisphere have an element of directionality – they are
shaped mostly by US efforts. Griffith further elaborates on this directionality in his
discussion of US-Caribbean security relations. To him Caribbean security is not only the
traditional threat of war or invasion, but he also adds the components of marginalization
and increased vulnerability because of small size and underdevelopment. In looking at
the post-9/11 impact on the Caribbean, he notes that happenings in the more powerful
state and the resulting policy decisions have a prominent effect on the smaller states.

CONTEXT & SIGNIFICANCE
Four key elements establish the foundational context for the research question:
the independence of Jamaica and Trinidad in 1962; the declaration of the “war on drugs”
by President Nixon in the early 1970s; the relaunching of this war on drugs under
Reagan; and, the end of the Cold War in 1989/90.
These nations are relatively young, which means that at the time of asserting their
sovereignty, they were immediately plunged into the Cold War politics of alignment. As
such, for almost the first two decades of independence, the attention they received from
the hemispheric hegemon was mostly aimed at encouraging and maintaining democratic
governance and was far from comprehensive, which exemplified the ad hoc nature of the
attention that the region received from the hegemon. Robert Pastor (1994) refers to this as

8

Thoumi, Francisco. “Paris International Symposium on Global Drug Policy: Local Innovations and
International Challenges” from The Senlis Council Drug Policy Advisory Forum. November 2004.
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the whirlpool effect in which the smaller nations are only cyclically important to a
hegemon based on its own policy objectives at a given time.9
By the 1970s, drug trafficking through the Latin American and Caribbean region
into the US grew to be perceived as a more threatening hemispheric opponent for the US
than the nearby communists. Opinion polls for the US conducted in the mid-70s showed
that people were becoming more afraid of the cocaine problem than the possibility of war
against Soviet forces.10 Increasingly, the US began dealing with its neighbors not only in
terms of the battle against communism, but as allies (or enemies) in the “war on drugs”.
The limited attention narrowed even further at the end of the Cold War, when the politics
of alignment receded and many newly independent nations lost the political leverage that
flirtations with the communism could bring.
According to Andres Serbin (1998) the end of the Cold War marked the end of a
strategic relationship between the Caribbean and the US.11 The dynamic of bipolarity
presented Caribbean political elites with a bargaining chip with which to negotiate for
better trade arrangements (such as the Lomé Convention with the European Union). It
also provided the option of alternative political systems for the region and gave it the
notorious ‘Cuban card’ as a way of making the politics of alignment work in their favor.
However, the end of the Cold War meant the end of these intricacies in the US-Caribbean
relationship since with the ushering in of the period of US unipolarity, there was no

9

Robert Pastor, Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy Toward Latin America, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

10

Paul Gootenberg, Cocaine, (New York: Routledge, 1999).

11

Andres Serbin, “Globalization, Regionalization, and Civil Society in the Greater Caribbean,” in From
Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment, by Michael Desch, Jorge I.
Dominguez and Andres Serbin, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998).
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longer the ability on the part of the islands to leverage their ideological leanings to attract
trade and aid.
At the same time the Cold War was drawing to a close Caribbean states were
faced with marginalization in the increasingly open international economic system.
Economic liberalization, especially during the decade of the 1990s, became a challenge
for the region as it increasingly saw its preferential trade with former colonizers recede
into the framework of the new trade regime proposed by the WTO. Here again, the end of
the Cold War mattered, because it became more difficult to bargain for economic
assistance. Thus, issues such as illegal drugs and the related problems were integral parts
of not only Caribbean security agendas, but also a way of once again attracting US policy
attention in the post-Cold War setting and preventing them from drifting out to the edge
of the whirlpool, in keeping with Pastor’s metaphor.
Basdeo and Mount argue that until the late 1980s, the threat of communist
subversion left Caribbean leaders unaware that 70% of illegal drugs trafficked from Latin
America to the US traveled up the archipelago.12 Though DEA activities were already
underway at that time, like Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT)13 begun in
1982, the general perception throughout the region was that illegal drugs were not really
a “Caribbean” problem. Likewise, the “war on drugs” at the time was being fought
primarily in the production zone with less attention on the transit countries.

12

Sahadeo Basdeo and Graeme Mount, The Foreign Relations of Trinidad and Tobago 1962-2000: The
case of a small state in the global arena, (Lexicon: Texas, 2001), 101.

13

OPBAT is a joint effort among the US Coast Guard, DEA and Government of the Bahamas against drug
trafficking through these countries and into the US.
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Interestingly, the war on drugs provided an opportunity for the renewed
importance of the region (and countries like Jamaica and Trinidad) – allowing them an
opening to re-enter Pastor’s proverbial whirlpool. Jamaica was arguably more in a
position to do this since it was both a production and transshipment zone. During the
1980s Jamaican drug dons diversified from marijuana cultivation and developed a strong
Colombian connection, becoming an important player in the transfer of cocaine from
Colombia to the US. This was more profitable for the dons since marijuana was less
profitable, bulkier and more difficult to conceal than cocaine.
Trinidad, on the other hand, was initially deemed a more popular transshipment
point for illegal drugs headed to the UK, according numerous US State Department
International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSRs). However, the Scott Drug
Report commissioned by the Trinidad government in 1985, found instances of regular
movements of illegal drugs to the US with many local police and customs officials
complicit in facilitating the exchange. When the report became public in 1987, the
Commissioner of Police immediately resigned in response to the allegations of his
corruption.
Past and present governments of both case countries assert that the illegal drugs
trade has become endemic to their societies accounting for a considerable percentage of
internal crime and instability. Trinidad’s current Prime Minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar,
has blamed recent drug seizures (estimated in excess of TT$20 million) for the surge in
violent crimes.14 In 2002, then Minister of National Security, Peter Phillips, claimed that

14

Reshma Ragoonath, “PM Declares Limited State of Emergency,” Trinidad Guardian, August 22, 2011.

12

Jamaica was at the center of the cocaine trafficking flow which he averred to be the main
cause for the high level of crime.15

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
For the purpose of the study, nationalism should not be considered merely as a
harmonious sense of belonging to a territorial space. “Nations are not natural features of
the geopolitical landscape.”16 Instead, they are imagined collectivities promoted by states
to enable the formation of a shared identity, which legitimizes that political construct of
the state.17 Therefore, nationalism can be defined as those processes and practices, which
combine the values, histories, myths and symbols of the nation with the appeals to
sovereignty and territoriality necessary for political recognition.
More specifically, in each country, one can see that defining moments, that helped
galvanize the transition from slavery/colonization to citizens of independent countries.
For Trinidad, this is very clearly espoused in the “Massa Day Done” speech given by Eric
Williams, who would become the nation’s first Prime Minister in the following year. The
speech was delivered in 1961, outdoors, in a town square, which by that time had become
a popular soapbox for national discussion. Williams dubbed this the University of
Woodford Square, at a time when education was accessible only to elites. Therefore, he
forcefully elevated the grassroots culture to the elite status. As the title suggests,
nationalism for the country meant an overt intellectual and ideological assault on colonial
15

Lloyd Williams, “Jamaica’s cocaine story” Jamaica Gleaner online edition, Sunday July 4, 2004.

16

Lars Erik Cederman and T. Camber Warren, “Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization and
the Severity of War,” forthcoming International Organization, (2011), 4.

17

Using Benedict Anderson’s understanding of a nation.
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rule and an acceptance that many once enslaved or dominated ethnic groups were now
the true representation of the nation. Trinidadian nationalism relies on the recognition and
harmony of the multiplicity of ethnic groups (perception of self), the freedom from
oppressive inter-state relationships (perception of the other) and its recognition as a valid
member of the international community (projection of self).
For Jamaica, these second and third factors also provide the basis for its
nationalism. Regarding self-perception, both Bogues18 and Thomas19 identify the notion
of the “creole negro”20 as the starting point from which to measure Jamaican-ness. From
the late 1930s21 Norman Manley, founder of the People’s National Party, began pushing
the idea of the Jamaican as essentially a creole nationalist – a westernized black person,
both educated and aware of his politics and his nation. Though Manley has been
criticized for emphasizing the post-colonial while underplaying the history of slavery and
ties to Africa, this was his way of mobilizing Jamaicans as a unified and politically
mobilized mass vying for self-determination. The sense of elevation (as educated and
politically conscious) of formerly oppressed masses unifies Jamaicans and is the
foundation of their self-perception. Together with his cousin Alexander Bustamante, who
went on to become the first Jamaican Prime Minister, he created the impetus for

18

Anthony Bogues, “Politics, Nation and PostColony: Caribbean Inflections,” Small Axe, No. 11, Vol. 6,
(March, 2002).

19

Deborah Thomas, Modern Blackness: Nationalism, Globalization and the Politics of Culture in Jamaica,
(Duke University Press: Durham, 2004), p. 5-6.

20

This term comes from Anthony Trollope’s The West Indies. In the same way that Europeans born in the
colonies rather than their homeland were called creoles (French creole, Spanish criollos etc.), the term
creole was applied to black people not born in the African continent.

21

Particularly, Manley’s “This Jamaica” speech from 1938.
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nationhood, leading first to universal suffrage in 1944, and eventually independence in
1962.
Much research has been conducted on Caribbean nationalism,22 and also on the
operations of the drug trade in the region.23 Many of these analyses center on US
assistance in counter-drug efforts, and the unequal relationship purportedly favoring US
interests. The clash here is important since it broaches the issue of sovereignty, which is
of utmost importance to these states and a main component of nationalism for the case
countries. Sovereignty may seem to be an outdated concept, but Krasner shows
otherwise. He states that, “although sovereignty might provide little more than
international recognition, that recognition guarantees access to international organizations
and sometimes to international finance.”24 There is profound complexity present in the
relationship between sovereignty and drug policy for these countries. While the
international signaling that goes hand in hand with sovereignty is important in attracting
foreign investment or qualifying nations for IMF assistance, the nations are under threat
of decertification25 by the US if their drug policies are not complementary with US drug
policy objectives. Thus the resulting impact (if any) on nationalism overall in light of this
paradox may be an interesting aspect of the relationship between the hegemon and the
smaller states.

22

See works of Selwyn Ryan, Ralph Premdas, Deborah A. Thomas, Holger Henke and Frank Reno

23

See Maingot, Griffith, Bagley and Walker,

24

Stephen Krasner, “Sovereignty,” Foreign Policy No. 22 (Jan-Feb 2001), 20.

25

Decertification refers to the loss of aid and foreign assistance from the US for any uses other than
counter-drug activities in that financial year.
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Foreign assistance for development is particularly important for nations which
only gained independence in the 1960s, as is the idea that the state should be free from
intervention in its affairs by another state. After colonial rule, the idea of intervention not
only possesses political, but cultural elements which makes these states acutely averse to
interference from other nations and indeed makes issues of sovereignty relevant to their
foreign policy and international relations. Escaping the vestiges of colonialism has been a
primary struggle since independence and US counter-drug policy is to some extent
viewed as an infringement of sovereignty. While Jamaica and Trinidad would not prefer
to combat the illegal drugs trade without assistance, there is some indication (Jamaica’s
reaction to the Shiprider Agreement26 for example) 27 that there is a desire for a more
reciprocal policy relationship, which is not necessarily conveyed by DEA operations
named “Conquistador.”28
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The Shiprider Agreement refers to the US-proposed bilateral agreement on maritime surveillance and
patrol entered into between the various Caribbean countries and the US between 1996 to 1998, in light of
the key role that the island chain’s territorial waters played in the trafficking of illegal drugs from South
America into the US.
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Jamaica held out on signing the Shiprider Agreement the longest out of the islands in the archipelago. As
a result, Jamaica faced decertification by the US. Its refusal to sign was a clear blow to US-Jamaica
relations and necessitated an emergency meeting of CARICOM heads of government to ascertain how this
action might affect overall US-Caribbean relations. The sticking point was that the lack of reciprocity in the
terms of the agreement equated an infringement of Jamaican sovereignty. It eventually signed after the US
amended the terms to reflect more reciprocity in search and seizure activity conducted between Jamaica
and the US in the Caribbean Sea.
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Conquistador translates to “conqueror” and is also the label for the soldiers of the Spanish Empire
between the 15th and 17th centuries, which arguably stirs up notions and memories of colonialism that are
perceived negatively by these Caribbean nations. Operation Conquistador was a joint operation between the
DEA and 26 nations in the Caribbean, and Central and South America executed in March 2000. It was
aimed at reducing the trafficking of cocaine in the region and resulted in the seizure of over 5 tons of
cocaine, 120 pounds of heroin, approximately 100 arrests and the seizures of over $2 million dollars (USD)
in property. After the operation, DEA agents noted that during the exercise the price of cocaine shot up
from between $8,000-$14,000 per kilogram to up to $24,000 per kilogram. (Source: Los Angeles Times,
“Operation Aimed at Drugs for the U.S. is Cited as a Model,” March 30, 2000.
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/mar/30/news/mn-14294).
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In examining the effects of these policy exercises and their labels, the linkage
between counter-drug policy and nationalism has been vastly under-theorized. Rather,
emphasis has been on statistics – tonnage of seizures, number of arrests, acreage of illegal
crops destroyed and crime or arrest rates. Yet, successive reports continue to note the
glaring shortcomings of all policy efforts to significantly curb the flow of illegal drugs.
Arguably, the policies need to be examined on a different level, not simply to look at its
impact on the trade, but also the impact on the country in which it is implemented. Thus
the study aims to determine what the impact on nationalism is, whether the policy
relationship affects nationalism in the two case nations differently, and what this may
ultimately mean for regional cooperation in counter-drug initiatives.
Anderson posits that the imagined nature of the nation is what inherently forms
the basis for a national consciousness.29 However, national identity is not necessarily the
singular identity that a person or group can have. The multiple identities of groups and
individuals are an especially important concept for such ethnically diverse nations as
Jamaica and Trinidad. Which layer of identity gains primacy within the territorial space,
becomes an important dynamic to examine when looking at the impact of policies from
the outside on the nationalism of each country. For instance, if the ethno-local identities
outlined by Premdas are stronger then it makes a cohesive nationalism less likely and as
such, weaker. However, there is evidence to suggest that given certain circumstances or
environments, nationalism will stand out over the ethnic or group affiliation. Braveboy-
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Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,
(Verso: New York, 2006).
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Wagner alludes to this when relating the transnational nature of Jamaican-ness.30 Outside
of the national space, the macro-level of identity is adopted. Hence outside of Jamaica,
the individual may no longer self-identify as primarily from a specific class or
community, but from Jamaica, his home country. Likewise, Trinidadians outside of
Trinidad identify as such rather than cleaving to their Indian or African heritage.

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
The main question of how US drug policies have and are affecting nationalism in
the case countries is primarily a descriptive task. This is a necessary undertaking since
most explanatory undertakings of why the war on drugs has failed, have themselves
failed to incorporate all sides of the illegal drugs problem. Indeed, there is exhaustive
discussion of the international political economy side and the public health aspect, but
little attention has been given to the most basic elements of nation, power and politics at
the very heart of the issue. As such, examining the effect on nationalism in the face of US
drug policies towards the countries will provide that starting point to examine what that
could potentially mean for good policymaking in the future.
The drug policy of the US presents a challenge to the ideas of sovereignty and
territoriality that work in concert with myth-symbol complexes and histories to create
identity. Therefore, this challenge can either act as an obstacle against which the already
formulated nationalism is reinforced or even fortified, it can erode those existing ideas of
nationalism for the particular territory, or it can result in a changed idea about
territoriality/sovereignty which gradually alter the myth-symbol complex and change
30

Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, Small States in Global Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2004).
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nationalism altogether. Granted, US drug policy is not the only variable that may impact
nationalism and nationalist responses to policy in these countries, but given its label as
the most pressing Caribbean security issue, it is worth examining whether this impact
exists and what form it takes. It is on the basis of their similar histories, strategic
positioning, and roles in the drug trade, that the case countries were chosen. Recognizing
that the nationalism is based on internal dynamics such as collective history, language
and religion, as much as it is a reaction to that which is deemed ‘other,’ the cases were
selected with the aim to control for these internal dynamics. In comparison, the countries
have similar colonial histories and ethnic compositions which can be taken as a point of
departure and make it easier to look at the external dynamics impact nationalism.
The cases also lend themselves well to contrast since their attitudes towards US
policies have differed at various points since independence. Their contrast is most clearly
evidenced by their initial attitudes to the mid-90s Shiprider Agreement. While Trinidad
readily signed it, Jamaica fervently refused on the grounds that the agreement infringed
upon its sovereignty. Only after the agreement was revised to include stipulations of
reciprocity did Jamaica acquiesce and sign. It did not matter that Jamaica was never in a
position to utilize this reciprocity, it is merely important to note how it slowed down and
altered the terms of the policy exercise. It must also be noted that public opinion in
Trinidad differed considerably to the official decision to sign the Agreement as proposed
by the US. Then Prime Minister, Basdeo Panday, faced a blow to his popularity for
signing, as he was criticized for too easily bending to the will of the US.31 The national
31

Panday himself is noted as saying that the media had a particular role in condemning his signing of the
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outcry against the official decision shows that that there is some causal linkage between
US drug policies and nationalism since the public opinion disagreed with what was
deemed a projection of weakness on the part of that administration.
Given the definition of nationalism as processes and practices, the aim of the
research is to see what US drug policy does to them. Does it reinforce them so they may
be continually reproduced, weaken them so the practices disappear, or change them in
such a way that new processes and practices are instituted in order to affirm nationalism?
We have some evidence of an impact on national values from Trevor Munroe who notes
the reification of US culture portrayed in movies among deviant youth in Trinidad,
showing a replacement of Trinidadian nationalism with ideals of the American-ness.32
But one example alone cannot decide the relationship; so further examination is required
to see if this holds for both nations. Moreover, Munroe examines this phenomenon from
the side of the illegal drug trade and not necessarily the policy side, so a consideration not
only of the deviance (or acting out against the policy) is needed, but whether this acting
out is caused by the policy or the trade itself.
To be more broadly comparative, Bolivia also provides an example of the
relationship between US drug policies and the impact on nationalism that this thesis
explores. In Bolivia, Evo Morales epitomizes nationalism, given his close ties with civil
society and his continued role in the coca union. Additionally, since he comes from the
where he quotes the Trinidad Express’s (March 8 1997) view that the Trinidad leadership displayed “the
most supine of postures towards the so-called Shiprider transaction” (Ferguson, “Shiprider Revisited:
Security and Transnational Crime in the Caribbean.”) See also, Darius Figueira, Cocaine and Heroin
Trafficking in the Caribbean: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Guyana, (Lincoln: iUniverse
Inc., 2004).
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Aymara Indian ethnic group, he represents a previously marginalized group that has
gained a political voice in Bolivia, which has strengthened his ties to the poor and the
rural populations. According to Gamarra (2007), Morales’s rise to leadership is not only
because of these ties to the civil society and working class, but also because of the
aggressive supply-side policies used by the US in the Andean region.33 The croperadication strategies employed by the US in the region were viewed as particularly
unfavorable in Bolivia, especially since coca is widely grown and a part of the culture.
Hence, a surge in Bolivian nationalism is clear in that Evo Morales was jettisoned to
power because of his strong opposition to US drug policies.
Likewise for Venezuela, Petras has argued that the US promotion of neoliberal
political administrations in the country during the 1980s and 1990s led to economic
policies which created pockets of wealth, privatized important sectors such as natural
resources, finance, transport, and telecommunications, and generally reversed 50 years of
social policy.34 These perceived negatives resulted in public disenchantment with
neoliberalism and the clientelistic administrations which emerged in this time period.
Disenchantment gave way to populist uprisings and the advent of nationalist populist
figures, namely Hugo Chavez. These two preceding examples show a wider pattern of
US policies perceived as unfavorable resulting in the strengthening of nationalism and
nationalist responses from smaller countries.
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Thus the simplified hypothesis here is that: US drug policy affects nationalism in
Jamaica and Trinidad. The addendum to this is that it affects nationalism with one of
three possible outcomes: reinforcing existing nationalism; changing nationalism (in the
sense of the processes/practices) while retaining a national identity that is very distinct
from that of the US; or eroding nationalism to the point where it is no longer clear what it
means to be Trinidadian or be Jamaican (Figure 2).
Nationalism of both countries consists of three components: 1) self-perception; 2)
perception of the other; and 3) projection of self. The issue of self-perception in each
country is somewhat different since the issue of ethnic difference is an important aspect
of notions of Trinidadian-ness, while class and political division is the key concern in
Jamaica. Component 1 for Trinidad will be level the harmony among the ethnic groups,
and for Jamaica it will be the level of political and class consciousness. Harmony here
refers to whether they primarily self-identify as Trinidadian rather than cleaving to ethnic
differences. Political and class consciousness refers to whether Jamaican identity is given
primacy over party or community alignment.
For both countries, parts 2 and 3 are the freedom from the inordinately coercive
inter-state relationship which existed during colonialism and the recognition as a member
of the international political community respectively.
Figure 2
Reinforced
US Drug
Policy

Causes

Nationalism in case
countries

To be

Altered
Weakened
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Three sub-questions, which follow the components of nationalism, will clarify the
relationship between US drug policy and nationalism in each country:
•

Self-perception – Has there been a deepening of inter-ethnic tensions in Trinidad
or inter-class tensions in Jamaica in response to US drug policy actions?

•

Perception of Other – Have anti-US sentiments increased in response to these
policy actions?

•

Self-projection – Have government statements emphasized each country’s
cooperation and complimentary drug policies with the US, or instead has there
been an assertion (or exaltation) of independent policy formation?

Each question is intended to examine the impact of US drug policy on the components of
nationalism with the aim of better understanding the nature of the relationship between
the variables and ascertaining which one of the outcomes (altered, reinforced or
weakened) most aptly fits.

HYPOTHESIS, EXPECTATION, METHOD
It is broadly hypothesized that US drug policy affects nationalism for the selected
states in some way. But the main hypothesis here is that in each state, there is a different
effect on nationalism which is due to the cohesion and strength of the dependent variable,
nationalism, in the first place. Thus it is being hypothesized that nationalism in Trinidad
is more greatly impacted by US drug policy because that country’s nationalism is more
susceptible to influence as a result of the deep ethnic divisions that have become
embedded throughout its history. Arguably, Jamaica does not have these same types of
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divisions or has managed to transcend them in such a way that it can put forth a stronger
and more cohesive national front than Trinidad when dealing with the regional hegemon.
The method that is used to examine this hypothesis is multi-layered. Respondents
at both the general and elite level were asked to participate in group discussion sessions
(focus groups and a Delphi study) in both countries. The responses from these groups are
partnered with archival documents and speeches which are emblematic for each country’s
nationalism and/or drug policies. Additionally, US documents which outline their own
drug policy towards these countries and their reports on the levels of cooperation (or
difference) are also used to concretize the linkage between the issue of policy influence
from a hegemonic state and nationalism in a small state. The chosen method applies
multiple layers of analysis to the question – individual/group level, official (political)
level and professional level (epistemic community level).

CHAPTER OVERVIEW
Chapter Two provides an in-depth review of the literature pertaining to
nationalism and frames this literature in a way that can be examined in relation to drug
policy. The chapter also provides more detailed background about the illegal drug trade
in the three countries as well as the history of US drug policy in the hemisphere.
Chapter Three gives a detailed account of the methods used in this thesis,
explaining the research framework, the data collection, and the analysis.
Chapter Four is the first analytical chapter dealing with Trinidad and will provide
an overview of the roots of nationalism for the country and go on to examine the
operations of the illegal drug trade, the policies constructed to deal with it and the
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findings from the group sessions conducted in the country and the archival data
examined. Chapter Five covers this same ambit with regards to Jamaica.
Chapter Six concretizes the comparisons that can be drawn from the two case
studies and demonstrate the conclusions that can arise out of this comparative exercise.
The chapter also provides a general summary the findings and illustrates how they have
answered the question of the impact of US drug policy on nationalism being stronger in
Trinidad than in Jamaica. From this, generalizations can be drawn on the impact of US
drug policy on nationalism in small states. It is not the expectation that an impact on the
nationalism of the case countries will merit a grand revision of drug policy for the US,
but in light of the ongoing claims of failure in the drug war, it is possible that some
attention to the way these countries are affected may reveal a nuanced policy position that
may be more successful on some level.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
“And so everywhere they went they turned it into England; and everybody they met they
turned English. But no place could ever really be England, and nobody who did not look
exactly like them would ever be English, so you can imagine the destruction of people
and land that came from that.”
- Jamaica Kincaid, A Small Place, London: Virago, 1988.
________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
The intent of this chapter is threefold; to examine the literature which has shaped
the theoretical structure of the dissertation, to showcase the different schools of thought
relating to the variables, and to highlight the gap in the literature which the present
dissertation intends to address. It will start with an explanation of the terms used
throughout the project and proceed with an outline of the literature surrounding the
variables under study. The following section of terms will simply provide their
definitions. Later in the chapter, their meanings will be discussed further to clearly denote
what these terms mean when used throughout the text.

Terminology
Nation: A politically sovereign collective established on the basis of the shared
experiences, beliefs, and/or qualities of its members.
Nation-state: A national group that is recognized as a sovereign territory and political
entity.
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Ethnicity: “A set of ideas concerning a group's real or imagined cultural links with an
ancestral past” (Baronov and Yelvington, 2009).35
Ethnic Group or Unit: A group bound together by the belief of shared ethnicity.
Ethno-national: A sub-state level form of identification wherein the individual locates
himself first as a part of his ethnic group and then as a part of his sovereign collective.
National Identity: The perception of self wherein individuals see themselves as
belonging to a national collective, which is shaped by the political, social and
institutional practices and conditions. According to David Campbell, “the identity of any
particular state should be understood as “tenuously constituted in time…through a
stylized repetition of acts,” and achieved, “not [through] a founding act, but rather a
regulated process of repetition.””36 For the purposes of this project however, national
identity is posited as resulting from both a founding act (or series of actions) as well as
the repetition. This interpretation is useful later on when looking at the distinction
between civic and ethnic nationalism (as outlined by Hearn) in the case studies.
Nationalism: The practices and processes wherein cultural elements of nation are melded
with the notions of territoriality and sovereignty necessary for formation of the state and
its survival.
US Drug Policy: This term specifically refers to the drug policies and policy initiatives
constructed by the United States, which are geared at stemming the flow of illegal drugs
across its borders and into its territory. It may also be used at certain points to discuss the
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prohibitionist regime in place within the US, but in those cases, the context will be
emphasized to clarify the distinction.
Prohibition: refers to severe penalties for possession, distribution, use, and production,
which essentially follows the notion of deterrence.
Harm Reduction: utilizes a public health approach, emphasizing drug prevention
education and safer usage practices in place of incarceration.
Legalization: implies the creation of a regulatory regime around the use of drugs much
like the regime constructed for alcohol and tobacco. However, the noticeable problems
are that prolonged tobacco use can have deleterious effects to the health such as cancer
and likewise alcohol also affects the health, impacts judgment and behavior, and can
cause linked problems such as drunk driving.
Decriminalization: pertains to no longer using criminal law to deal with individual users.
Mostly used in reference to marijuana, not ‘harder’ drugs like cocaine and heroin.

PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONALISM
Özkirimli explains nationalism as “the fundamental organizing principle of the
inter-state order, as the ultimate source of political legitimacy, as a readily available
cognitive and discursive frame, as the taken-for-granted context of everyday life [which]
not only forms the horizon of international and domestic political discourse, and the
natural framework for all political interaction, but also structures our daily lives and the
way we perceive and interpret the reality that surrounds us.”37 His definition lines up
perfectly with the intention of the present thesis to look at nationalism not only in the
37
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context of the domestic level but at the higher, international level in which perception
plays a significant role for policy interaction. Nationalism is not often a main concern in
the study of inter-state relations, but that has a great deal to do with the notion that it is
taken as a given, which in itself is a myth upon which many analyses of state-to-state
relations are founded. Thus, a problem arises when looking at the relationships between
stronger and weaker states, because nationalism as an influencing characteristic tends to
be overlooked in the stead of the “more important” qualities such as economic or military
strength. In fact, nationalism has generally been overlooked as a necessary field of study
unless there is some level of conflict surrounding it (and this conflict is usually intrastate), which means only the extreme cases are examined, giving nationalism as a quality
of states somewhat of a bad name – dangerous, irrational, and conflict inducing.38
Ideas from the main scholars of nationalism will be acknowledged here to
enhance the understanding of the dependent variable. Particularly the notions of national
identity as a segment of nationalism are instructive as this sheds light on the issue of selfperception which is the most abstract component that will be measured in this study. The
views of nationalism only provide a partial fit for the selected countries, since these
theorists tend to describe the formation of European nations. The existing literature on the
nation and nationalism generally fall into two major categories – the view of the nation as
a product of social and historical processes (modernists), and the nation emerging from
the cohesion of ethnic ties (primordialists). Literature falling into the first category and
discussed here comes from Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm, who cleave to the idea of
nationalism as part of modernization of the society. Situated in the second category, are
38
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authors John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. Benedict Anderson also falls into the
first category, but his assertion of linguistic based ties forming following the advent of
the print capitalism suggests that he may tread close to the line between these two camps.
Gellner’s defines nationalism as “a principle which holds that the political and
national unit should be congruent.”39 He goes further to explain that in this definition he
is giving primacy to the political unit since it is the main thrust of modern nationalism as
opposed to more primitive forms of collective identification. Hobsbawm tends to defer to
Gellner in his definition of nationalism since he does not see the point of divorcing the
concept of nation from that of the territorial state.40 Indeed, the primordialist endeavor to
claim some sort of chicken-and-egg ordering between nationalism and nation is
unnecessary to the modernization camp, since they cleave to the idea that the construction
of these two concepts (nation and state) coincide too closely to be analyzed individually.
Keep the concepts of nation, the social construct, and state, the political construct,
together is useful in the present thesis since the objective is to asses how events in the
political realm impact the national realm. Ultimately however, Gellner’s idea that there
must be some kind of homogenization of culture for a state to be considered a nationstate, is not a universally applicable concept and cannot be used to aptly describe the
dynamics of Anglophone Caribbean nation-states.
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Anderson argues that national identity comes from imagining a political
community which is both ‘limited and sovereign.’41 His idea is founded upon thinking
first of a space upon which “nation-ness” can be layered. Gellner too, has argued along
similar lines as Anderson, saying that nationalism does not awake nations to selfconsciousness, but creates nations where they did not before exist.42 The logic behind
imagined communities, is that an individual will feel a sense of belonging and collective
membership, and be confident in this such that it makes up a part of their personal
identity, despite only having an abstract idea of who the other members of the community
are. Anderson uses the illustration that Americans may not all know one another, yet one
American man can be sure that he is in fact one person out of many other Americans, and
this knowledge becomes an integral part of how he understands himself.43 Hutchinson
criticizes these ideas by taking the primordial route, saying that while they tend to think
of national identities in too functional or instrumental terms or as some type of
modernization process, this leaves behind the importance of ethnic communities.44 The
matter of ethnic communities is particularly important for looking at the composition of
nations in the Anglophone Caribbean.
The issue with these differing theorists, however, is that while aspects of their
theories of nationalism are useful in describing the Caribbean, they cannot singularly or
completely explain it. Anderson’s idea of nationalism as a form of attributing meaning
41
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upon a territorial space is indeed useful, especially given the clear boundaries of that
space for Caribbean islands. Gellner’s idea of nationalism coming before nation does not
especially hold true for the Caribbean experience, nor does his idea that cultural
homogeneity is a necessary component of this nation formation, but his
acknowledgement of the role of modernization in the formation of nations can help in
understanding why so many Caribbean nations began vying for independence in the late
1950s to early 1960s.45 Hutchinson’s emphasis on ethnic communities in the emergence
of nationalism is also important, but not quite in the way that he intended; for him the
difference of ethnic community allowed for explanations of continued ethnic and civil
conflicts.46 For the Caribbean experience, however, the ethnic difference is what has
ultimately forged each nation’s identity.
In discussing the underlying assumptions of the breadth of nationalism literature
Hearn notes that there have been varied starting points for the conceptualization of
nationalism – as a feeling, an identity, an ideology, a social movement and a historical
process.47 He cleaves to the idea that nationalism can at once be all of these things.
However, for the purposes of this research, the focus is on the idea of nationalism as an
identity and ideological process (albeit both historical and ongoing). Therefore,
nationalism is viewed as a way of distinguishing the self and others to fulfill the human
need for this type of labeling as well as a particular system of “beliefs about the world,
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which sees the world as naturally made up of discrete nations, each with a natural right to
self-determination.”48 The notion of self-determination is especially important for
understanding the linkage between nationalism and sovereignty, a concept of utmost
importance to the small states in the present study.
Chatterjee discusses nationalism using a post-colonial framework, criticizing
previous work on nationalism as failing to recognize the nuances of nation formation in a
post-colonial setting. His work highlights nationalism built on difference rather than
collective identification as a better description of the post-colonial world.49 He asserts
that “Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our
behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our
anti-colonial resistance and post-colonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain
forever colonized.”50 Here, he is saying that the former colonizers have largely been able
to ascribe their own meaning to Third World nationalisms and this has left the picture
incomplete. By saying that the post-colonial nations ‘remain forever colonized’ he
insinuates that the descriptions that they have been given of themselves by the former
colonial (now) outsiders, has indelibly affected their own sense of self-perception.
George Beckford also recognizes this quality in former plantation societies, stating, “until
we decolonize the mind, there is little hope that genuine independence can be achieved.
Genuine independence is the ultimate objective of the process of decolonization which
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today characterizes the struggles of all colonial peoples.” 51 In demanding the
“decolonization of the mind,” he is asserting that this is the only way to eke out and
project a truer sense of self. Chatterjee and Beckford are acknowledging that within the
processes of nationalism there are already the interplays of power – of a hegemonic state
or former colonizer ascribing an interpretation to a ‘lesser unit’ to which it is expected to
adhere. The difficulty is that there is a contestation of the interpretation ascribed from the
outside, and the self-perception of the less powerful nation and the projection of self that
it wants to achieve.

Self & Other
It is essential to examine the identity component of nationalism in the chosen
cases since the dichotomous relationship of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ which is so pivotal in
identity consolidation plays an important role in the way in which otherness is understood
in the foreign policy realm, and also the way in which it affects internal dynamics for the
case countries. According to Thomas Hylland Eriksen the case countries would fall under
the category of proto-nations, which are groups arising out of two or three of his other
categories and politically organized to actively pursue statehood.52 If ethnic identity is
sharpened by competition between groups, then shifting this idea to national level means
that foreign policy relationships can also serve to consolidate a country’s nationalism.
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Nationalisms in any country thus arises out of the “interactions of ethnicity-making and
state-making processes.”53
Thus, it is clear that in studying nationalism, the notions of self and other and
their interrelation are major concerns. The interrelation is precisely why nationalism as a
variable in the present thesis was broken down into three categories and analyzed through
that lens – self-perception, self-projection and perception of the other. These qualities are
theorized as creating a full picture of nationalism and closely follow Taylor’s ideas on the
self which he sees as following three dimensions – the obligation to others, the assertion
of self as superior to others, and the presentation of self.54 The point of departure for this
idea comes from Said who used his Orientalist framework to explain how meanings of
self can be applied from both the outside and the inside in an instrumental way. Said’s
understanding helps to build the conceptualized linkage between nationalism and policy,
since the perception of self and other, and the impression of self that a state tries to
promote will undoubtedly have an effect on its behavior towards another state. Said
shows a classification of the other as coming from outside and being imposed on a
territory that is described as an exteriority of representation.55 Exteriority of
representation serves two purposes. Aside from the obvious descriptive purpose of
classifying and categorising an Other, it also serves as a point from which the self can be
understood. It is a form of self representation through creating a contrast to something
else. Therefore, the discourse of Orientalism which shows the difference between the
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West and the Eastern other is a process of distancing one territory from another. Out of
this distancing, Said argues that constructs of power have emerged which have indelibly
become linked to ideas, cultures and histories of both the West and the East.56 He
proffered that the historical Western dominance over the East had allowed for the West to
create a discourse of the East which rather than being actually representative, has been
more purposive, to show the usefulness of the Eastern territory for the West. Going
further with this idea, this form of ascribing meaning or ‘othering’ is multidirectional.
Thus in looking at the small state relationship with the US, the attribution of meanings of
self and other happens both ways – although one certainly has more ability to make
meanings stick.
In international security classifying an other has become a habitual and necessary
task, and an example of this can be found in examining drug policies. Campbell argues
the importance of this connection between identity and policymaking stating that, “the
construction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as
political the very terms through which identity is articulated.”57 Said’s idea of the pattern
of relative strength that emerged between the East and the West can now be moved into
the discourse between the North and the South (between the US and Trinidad and
Jamaica in the current thesis). It can be argued that another characteristic has been
attributed to the Southern other. In much the same way as Gregory saw an expansion of
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the other to encompass the concept of the axis of evil;58 it is evident that there has been
an othering of these countries by the US in order to create a consistent drug policy
discourse through which to address them. However, the othering process is reciprocated
by the small states which in turn affects how they react to US policies and subsequently
in this co-constitutive relationship of self/other, how their own sense of collective identity
is affected.

Caribbean Nationalism
Recalling Caribbean history and the influx of slaves from dissimilar African
tribes, then the brief experiments with Chinese, Syrian and Lebanese indentureship prior
to East Indian indentureship; the multiplicity of partial communities re-distributed
throughout the Anglophone Caribbean poses an obvious challenge to the emergence of a
supra-ethnic nationalism. The nations were still able to achieve this however, not
because of their collective identity or past experiences, but their lack thereof.
Nationalism was therefore asserted as a completely ‘original’ quality of these newly
sovereign nations. Waters suggests then that their nationalism does not come from
‘collective identification’ but from the stripping away of the collective memories of these
redistributed peoples by the colonial influences.59
The focus of authors who write on nationalism tends to be on how a society can
collectively shape for itself, a unique identity. For example, Anderson’s noting how print
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capitalism brought together as a nation, people who spoke the same language, while at
the same time distancing them from the Latin-speaking clerical elites. However, when
examining small states such as the Caribbean nations, it is indelibly important that this
identity be seen as something more reactionary than local dynamics becoming prominent
and that the socially constructed nature of nationalism itself be acknowledged. In forging
the post-colonial nations under study, it is possible to see this social construction and how
malleable it can be. Aligning with Waters’ notion of nationalism emerging as a reaction,
the notion of social construction brings the understanding that nationalism is redefined
and renegotiated from one generation to the next upon the basis of the changing
circumstances which surround a population. Seeing nationalism as a socially constructed
phenomenon, then implies that there are fluid boundaries of the concept that are
constantly being remade in response to both in-group and out-group stimuli. As such,
nationalism can be understood as both the practice/replication of its constituent elements
and the processes which impact these elements. As such, nationalism can be defined for
the purpose of this thesis as the practice or process wherein cultural elements of nation
are melded with the notions of territoriality and sovereignty necessary for state formation
and continued existence. If the preceding definition is accepted, then a cohesive supraethnic national identity becomes the result for the countries under consideration.
Therefore, national identity is the sense of self that develops from practicing and through
the processes of, nationalism.
Therefore the aim of my thesis is to ascertain the impact of policy on nationalism,
‘practices and processes’ must be identified and examined. Perhaps the most obvious of
these will be the rhetoric that builds up that notion of national identity. Rhetoric can be
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traced through the years since independence by looking at the major newspapers in each
nation, the Guardian and Express in Trinidad, and the Gleaner and Observer in Jamaica,
specifically regarding how they represent the strength of the nation. Speeches made by
Prime Ministers are also incredibly valuable since they often attempt to stir national
feeling in order to sway the general population. Practices such as the observance of
national holidays also fall under nationalism since they helps to reinforce cohesive
national identity by celebrating milestones such as independence and becoming a
republic (representing the political achievement and survival of the nation), emancipation
(collectively sharing a historical struggle) and the various ethnic holidays (including all
groups). Even subjects broached in Trinidadian comedy talk tents60 and Jamaica stage
clashes can be deemed part of these processes.
According to Miller’s survey of nationalism authors’ attention to Latin America,
the region (under which the Caribbean is subsumed) has been relegated to a mere
footnote in these works which more aptly describe European nationalism.61 They are
acknowledged as not fitting into the neat theory boxes which have been outlined by
previously mentioned scholars such as Gellner, Hutchinson and Smith. While these
authors acknowledge that regions outside of the developed world do not fit their theories,
they have not adjusted them to suit or attempted an alternate explanation. Granted, each
theory fits Latin America and by extension the Caribbean in some fashion, but only
60
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through a piecemeal picking of each model, can an alternate version which suits the Latin
American and Caribbean region come out. For example, the aforementioned
characteristic, language, is seen as an integral part of nation formation. Anderson’s
example of print capitalism linking people who shared English as opposed to the
alienating and elite Latin that previously dominated printed literature readily comes to
mind. In controlling for other variables which may affect nationalism such as language, it
is necessary to note that language for Trinidad and Jamaica was not instrumental in
creating a sense of national unification like in early state formation in Europe. Moreover,
it is a point of commonality among the case countries, so it is not a quality that
distinguishes the nationalism in either small state.
Thus, language (in its institutionalized form) cannot be applied as a causal factor
in establishing nationalism for the islands in the Anglophone Caribbean. While it serves
as an easy characterization of them here, it is not major factor which initially linked the
people of these countries together. English was an imposed language/institution and thus
not something that these transplanted populations held in common, nor did it help them to
feel connected to one another. In fact, it may rather have been the opposite – a source of
shared derision, but the only form of common communication which they possessed.
While the English language has developed localized nuances in both countries considered
here, this evolution was not a crystallizing factor in either nation’s development.
Moreover, the Jamaican patois has become more so a modernized identifying factor
rather than an initial unifier on the path to nationhood.
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Regarding nationalism today, the language component is arguably more important
today for Jamaica in that Jamaican patois62 is regarded as the key identification
characteristic for Jamaicans abroad, is used as the common language throughout the
island, and is recognized internationally as an official dialect. The distinctiveness of the
patois coupled with the Jamaican accent has proliferated as not only a main identifier for
the country, but also the Caribbean as a whole. Many foreigners have approached nonJamaicans and attempted to adopt the Jamaican cadence fully believing that this is the
accent of all Caribbean peoples. Thus demonstrating that Jamaica is quite big for a small
country since it has become the ambassador to the region as a whole on the global stage.
In Trinidad (and outside as an identifying factor), the creole does not occupy such a
space. While Trinidadian creole has drawn on West African, Hindi and Amerindian
words, the language has not traveled well, meaning that it is more or less invisible outside
of the country. Even in the country, you will generally not find Trinidadian creole used in
formal settings. You will more often encounter surprise from outsiders at the ‘singsong’
tone of the Trinidadian accent rather than a lack of understanding of the actual spoken
words. Additionally, Trinidadians have proven very susceptible to losing their accents
after spending time abroad, such persons being labeled ‘freshwater yankees’ for their
speedy adoption of the American accent.
Only Hobsbawm (1995) has seemed to acknowledge the region, using the Latin
American experience to support his claim that the nation must be seen as primarily a
political construct which can therefore transcend ethnic divisions or changes. Yet in
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applying Hobsbawm’s idea to the Caribbean region, it is not comfortable to say that the
political construct has taken primacy over ethnic divisions since the ethnic distinction,
maybe more for Trinidad than in Jamaica, continually colors the relationship it has with
the rest of the world. But Hobsbawm’s general position does indeed lend support for the
idea that in order to awake the nations in quest to nationhood, the leaders of the time
utilized the voice of political awareness as a way of unifying the masses (though along
with a healthy dose of distinguishing ‘self’ from the white colonizer).
Hearn talks about mobilization of the civil society happening as a result of power
relations within a societal hierarchy, as a distinct form of nationalism to that created out
of linkages to the past/idealization of a fatherland, not necessarily rooted in political or
social reality.63 In forging nationhood in Trinidad for example, the path outlined by
Selwyn Ryan (who points out that icons like Arthur Andrew Cipriani, Uriah “Buzz”
Butler and eventually Eric Williams were able to transcend the notions of racial and
ethnic difference to mobilize the middle/working class masses), is vastly different to the
nationalism postulated by primordialists wherein ethnic groups are the primary form of
identification prior to the national level, because nationalism for these post-colonial states
came as a reaction to an external phenomenon.
Chatterjee’s version of anticolonialism then is probably the closest way to
describe the dynamics of nationalism in the case countries. He determines that in the path
to independence and the post-colonial era, colonies did not have the task of creating
“institutional space” for their nationalism. In that respect, the language, economic and
political institutions were already in place and instead needed to be redefined to fit the
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postcolonial populations. Chatterjee deviates from Anderson’s idea of imagined
communities in that the institutionalization of cultural traits such as language or religion
do not create nationalism if there are no other conditions which facilitate its development.
In the Trinidadian case, while the institutions which linked the different ethnic
populations did in fact exist, each population was so repressed in the colonial era that it
was difficult for cohesion to be achieved. Instead, Chatterjee posits a dichotomy which he
calls the material and the spiritual.64 The material refers to those institutions, practices or
constructs which are modeled after the colonizer, while the spiritual carries the
distinguishing features of cultural identity. Thus he hypothesizes that if a country can
replicate the Western skills in the material domain (i.e., economic style, politics etc.),
then the greater the need will be to sure up the spiritual domain (i.e., cultural identity) –
what makes it distinct to other societies.

Policy & Identity
To explore fully the question of the thesis it is necessary to establish the
relationship between policy and identity in the Caribbean. Braveboy-Wagner asserts that
the core identity for Caribbean states is one of smallness,65 while Premdas argues that
many layers of identity exist in the Caribbean ranging from the ethno-local to the
national.66 Both authors find agreement in that the insular structure and unambiguous
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borders of Caribbean island states are a primary factor in shaping identity, but their
opinions of how size and geography meld with race and ethnicity to form a national
identity are vastly different. Braveboy-Wagner sees the size component as taking
frontstage in the expression of identity and translating accordingly to foreign policy
strategies and situations. She argues that other identities become secondary to this.
However, she further states that each state perceives its size and vulnerability differently
depending on the presence of resources and relationships with more powerful nations.67
As such, nations which perceive their smallness as less of a constraint, will naturally have
more space in which to express a national identity. Premdas on the other hand, sees the
differing cultures among ethnic groups as sometimes superseding nationalism and as a
result, national identity. He seems to suggest therefore, that more homogenized
Caribbean nations will have a stronger expression of national identity.68 His idea also
implies that transnational ethnic linkages are significant elements in identity formation.
Each author’s view holds merit in explaining why national identity and nationalism may
seem stronger in one Caribbean nation and weaker in another. Looking at Jamaica and
Trinidad, specifically allows us to more fully explore the identity and nationalism
dynamic since both nations are considered to be the more developed ones in the region.
As such, there is space for the expression of a national identity beside their purported
core identity of smallness and Premdas’ ethnic nuances of national identity can be
analyzed more closely. Premdas’ assumptions of national identity suggest that in more
ethnically plural societies, identification with the ethnic group takes prominence over the
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formation of a unified identity at the national level.69 The primacy given to ethnic
identification may translate into ethnic groups at home feeling more association with
similar ethnic groups abroad or with the ‘motherland.’ If applying this idea to specific
countries for example, it can be posited that nationalism and national identity may be
more stable in Jamaica because it is more culturally homogenous than Trinidad, which
has a somewhat more diverse ethnic composition (consisting of people with Amerindian,
African, East Indian, Spanish, French, English, Chinese, Syrian, and Lebanese heritage).
John LaGuerre alludes to this idea, arguing that cultural awareness in Jamaica is more
developed because it possesses a “less complicated social structure” than Trinidad.70
Braveboy-Wagner presents evidence supporting this idea in her analysis of US felons
deported back to their countries of original nationality and their impact on crime.71
While in Jamaica criminal deportees are considered to contribute significantly to
increases in gang populations, this is not true in Trinidad. In fact, it has been noted that
deportees to Trinidad have had difficulty re-integrating into society, which might be an
indication of the strength of these countries’ nationalism abroad. Jamaican nationalism
can be deemed stronger since deportees can get re-situated into society well enough to
affect the crime level whereas deported felons in Trinidad are not seen as significantly
elevating the crime rate nor re-integrating in the society, not only because there are less
of them, but also because they identify less with their Trinidadian nationality after having
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spent a long time abroad. In that sense the notion of Jamaican-ness seems transnational
and persists beyond the nation’s borders, while the Trinidadian identity seems more
constructed along ethno-local lines and as such nationalism becomes weaker when
influenced by an external force.
The question then becomes, how the operations of drug policy designed by the US
in its “territorial space” affects the espousal of identity. It is quite possible that national
identity may be reinforced by the perception of policies from the outside as an unwanted
‘other’ but given that the US is the hemispheric hegemon, it is equally possible that
national identity may be suppressed in order to maintain cordial relations with the
hegemon. In either case, the achievement of policy objectives can be impacted since it
would likely require the use of more (or less) coercive measures. At the basis of the
analysis lies the question of which is more important in identity formation – the self or
the other. Said’s thoughts on the interaction between the self and the other explains
national identity as not an internal creation projected outward, but rather an external one
which is attributed to an entity.72 This corresponds to the idea of nationalism and identity
in small states as being reactionary since it suggests that these nations project the image
according to how they perceive themselves based on their relationship with more
powerful states.

US-CARIBBEAN RELATIONS
Robert Pastor examines how the Latin America and the Caribbean in the past has
been drawn into the US "whirlpool" by its preoccupation with small countries, only to
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drift later to the edge of the whirlpool in what he terms a repetitive "neglect-panic"
cycle.73 He notes that US-Latin American relations have largely been influenced by the
personality and leadership styles of the presidents involved. Pastor saw deepening
nationalism within Latin America in particular as diminishing US power in the region,
since the Latin American version of nationalism very closely resembled antiAmericanism. After the Cold War, the US lost sight of the region as a whole until the
drug war. This alternating cycle of fixation and inattention is a central characteristic of
the whirlpool metaphor. Another attribute is that all actors in the crisis tend to stereotype
one another or project motives (an othering process which creates boundaries) – some
view the US as Satan and others view it as Savior but few see it as an actor which is
driven by circumstance. The whirlpool metaphor is an important contextual element in
this dissertation because it underpins the discussion on the US policy attention that has
been given to the Anglophone Caribbean region since its independence.
Dent has argued that the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was the
main announcement that the US was taking on the responsibility to exercise policing
power in the Caribbean region, an area which would later be labeled its “third border.”74
Roosevelt recognized the increase in anti-US sentiments in the region due to the high
level of intimidation and interventionism that they had pursued so in 1933 he introduced
the Good Neighbor Policy. The policy did not mean that the principles of the Monroe
Doctrine were abandoned but instead of the heavy handed policy position that had been
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followed up to that point, the US switched to less confrontational ways of pursuing their
policy objectives such as diplomatic pressuring and economic leveraging.75
The Roosevelt Corollary has set the stage for US-Caribbean relations since then,
but it also served a major identity forming process by creating the sense of the US as not
only the protector of the region, but the enforcer of order. In that respect, the Caribbean
was placed into the role of receiving the security that could be afforded by the hegemon.
However, security is not a universal concept for all states, thus Pastor’s metaphor of the
whirlpool works perfectly to denote that while at certain stages the Caribbean region has
been more or less significant to US interests, the US has always been important to the
Caribbean because their security is structured by lines of economic development and
survival rather than security, in the traditional sense. By that token, the US is consistently
at the center the “Caribbean whirlpool.” Blasier asserts that the governments of Latin
America and the Caribbean have historically been expected to conform the US foreign
policies, stating that in view of the rivalry between the US and “extra-hemispheric great
powers…security interests justify hegemonic behavior.”76 This leaves the Caribbean
region very little space within which to assert their own interests, especially if they do not
align with the primary hegemonic interests.
In Sigmund’s comparison of the policy approaches of the Reagan and Carter
administrations, he notices that while the rhetoric coming from each camp was very
different, there was not a great deal of fundamental change in actual policy, a criticism
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which is still made today.77 Both administrations had remained having seemingly
aggressive policies towards the region in terms of solutions being military driven rather
than focusing on the social, economic and political realms of assistance. Given that the
Reagan Administration heavily criticized the policies of the previous Carter
Administration, it was indeed contradictory that its own policies tended towards the same
military bent. Sigmund also maintains that the main reason for the very small changes in
the foreign policy approaches between the two administrations was really a result of the
lack of clarity in what the US hoped to achieve by its involvement in South America and
the rest of the region. As such, the policy prescriptions remained centered on traditional
efforts rather than the non-traditional approaches. Despite this lack of change however,
there was indeed a change in the political culture of Latin America around this time.
Many nations moved closer towards democratic governance. Latin American democracy
was far from consolidated at this point but there was definitive evidence of movement.
Therefore, this could also be the reason for the limited changes in US policy towards the
region rather than an actual pointed effort by the Reagan Administration to change the
way things had been done previously. If Sigmund postulates a change in Latin American
political culture in response to US policy, it is then not unlikely that there would be a
similar corresponding effect on Caribbean political culture, which would affect the
perceptions/identities of the small states in the region as well as their perceptions of, and
reactions to the hegemon.
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Cottam argues that the image held by US policymakers of Latin American and
Caribbean states as dependents has distorted their perception of these countries' political
situations and predisposed them to resort to coercive methods. 78 Thus a picture of USCaribbean relations emerges wherein the inequalities of power are very clear. The
difference in relative power and the resulting interactions affect perceptions in both
directions, the US of the smaller states and vice versa; and this is ultimately what has
shaped the drug policy discourse and informed the formation of drug policies.

DRUG POLICY
Prior to the twentieth century, governments did not view drug flows as an
international problem. Now illegal drugs were first used as legitimate prescriptions for
pain or used as additives to beverages. In 1906 the Pure Food and Drug Act was the first
measure towards problematizing drugs. The legislation acknowledged that drugs should
no longer be considered harmless and mandated that doctors label their medicines to
show the potentially harmful ingredients. In 1914, the Harrison Narcotics Act became the
first prohibitive federal drug policy in the US, restricting the sale and manufacture of
heroin, cocaine, marijuana and morphine.
The first international agreement on illegal drugs, the Hague International Opium
Convention of 1912 was proposed by the US and began what is now an accepted counterdrug regime globally. The League of Nations then established an Opium Board and a
Drug Supervisory Board in 1920s but in an international climate where regulating drug
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flows was not of much concern. These bodies were later absorbed by the UN
Commission on Narcotic Drugs after WWII. In 1961, the Single Convention on
Narcotics Drugs established the International Narcotics Control Board and concretized a
global prohibitory regime for illegal drug flows.

United States
Often the Latin American and Caribbean region is associated with the thriving
and pervasive drug trade. As far back as the 1970s, countries like Colombia and Jamaica
especially, had been classified as narco-economies. On the heels of the artistic and
‘hippie’ movements of the 1960s, the region became a mass exporter of marijuana and as
the decade progressed, cocaine. The involvement of the US in regional affairs at the time
is blamed for the proliferation of narcotics and crime syndicates in the territory today. It
is posited that US anti-drug policies implemented in the early 1970s to eradicate the drug
problems in Jamaica, Peru and Bolivia under the Nixon Administration, actually pushed
the drug industry to migrate to Colombia where it seems to have become deeply rooted.
Escobar has pointed out that First World involvement usually comes couched in terms of
salvation or humanitarianism,79 a notion which is reiterated by critics who posit that the
US anti-drug efforts while proposing to magnanimously re-legitimize the affected
economies, worked hand in hand with their Cold War politics of the time, to ensure that
their presence in the newly independent Caribbean states enforced the ideals of
democracy and dissuaded the spread of Communism.
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The ties forged between the US and the southern part of the region were
intensified with a dramatic re-declaration the ‘war on drugs’ by Reagan in the early 1980s
which was again expressed through initiatives involving significant US intervention.80
The proposed remedies involved substantial US presence in the territory as a means of
controlling and limiting the actions of narco-traffickers. The US strategies however, have
been constantly criticized and viewed with suspicion since the programs implemented
have involved very limited financial and development assistance and rather a strong
military presence in many countries, namely Jamaica and Colombia in this time period.81
The Reagan administration in particular was harshly criticized for only dealing with the
supply-side of the drug problem leading to the establishment of the Omnibus Anti-Drug
Abuse Act in 1988. The legislature was geared towards reducing the addicted population
in the US but with it came intensified supply-side efforts such as crop eradication and
crop substitution. The 1988 Omnibus Anti-Drug Law passed by Congress noted the
demand dimension of the drug problem, but also went on to stipulate death penalty for
traffickers. The law seems like an anachronistic way of treating demand, since it is still a
supply side effort. It raises the question of why there is such a disconnect between
rhetoric and action within policy especially policy surrounding the drug issue in the
hemisphere
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The first Bush administration’s decision to increase the militarization of the war
on drugs has also been interpreted as a way to gain military access to the countries as a
means of furthering US objectives for its own hemispheric and international security.
The perceived motive is largely because of the difference in the interpretation of the drug
trade as an international problem from the demand-side and the supply-side. Production
and transit nations tend to interpret the drug problem as foreign, blaming the demand
coming from the north as the reason for its existence. They assert that their smallness and
powerlessness against transnational criminal organizations should primarily be addressed
through capacity-building and economic development assistance before military
exchanges and cooperation. The demand-country interpretation however, is that the flow
of illicit goods is the main problem which needs to be addressed prior to their infiltration
into their own borders. The difference in viewing the problem of illegal drugs thus yields
differing policy objectives on each side, leading to the interpretation of US policies as
one-sided and imperialistic. The disparate perceptions of the drug problem on either side
have not been helped by the naming of some counter-drug operations in the region, which
unintentionally highlight the process of ‘othering’ that permeates the policy creation – for
example, Operation Conquistador and Operation Creole Storm.
Eric Nadelmann, founder and head of the Drug Policy Alliance organization has
asserted that this ‘war on drugs’ has failed. He goes further to criticize its “moral and
ideological bankruptcy” and claims that it is a policy driven by rhetoric more than reason
and practicality.82 The rhetoric he is referring to is the framing of the illegal drug issue as
a security problem rather than one of public health (for example), which in turn justifies a
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greater deal of collateral damage or higher level of military involvement and violence.
Nadelmann provides comprehensive criticisms of the flaws of drug policies both on the
domestic and international fronts. However, his proffered solution to find the “zone”
where illegal production causes the least problems and somehow confine it there, is not
very realistic.83 Problematizing the issue as a “war” has also been detrimental for the US
in coming up with effective policy solutions, since essentially, the rest of the hemisphere
must adapt to being “at war” with the US, even though the term war applies to the issue
of illegal drugs and not the countries involved. The framing of the problem with the US
in the role of the policing state has also meant that it is looked upon to also be the largest
financier of counter-drug efforts, even though there is discontent with the way in which it
chooses to allocate these funds.
The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) established in 2009 under the
Obama administration has taken small steps towards changing the tune of the war on
drugs. It is meant to help the US partner with the regional leaders to create joint solutions
for regional security. Additionally, along with the traditional efforts of law enforcement
and military cooperation, the CBSI has put development assistance and economic support
on the same level as objectives of the policy strategy. These two latter elements represent
an alignment of US drug policies with those of the rest of the Caribbean region and
suggest an important shift in the shape of its policies.
Within the US, the prohibitionist regime, established through domestic drug
policy means that certain harm reduction strategies such as rehabilitation clinics are
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generally not accessible to the wider addicted population, nor are there enough
mainstream harm reduction facilities like methadone clinics. Only those nonmarginalized persons, belonging to a certain income bracket can afford a stay at a rehab
facility, which has fueled a great deal of criticism of the domestic approach to illegal
drugs as well. Thus the general public’s clamoring for a change in domestic drug policies
has seemingly reached a critical mass resulting in legalization and decriminalization in
some states. The state-level changes within the US allude to an eventual federal-level
relaxation of the prohibitionist policies, at least surrounding marijuana. The main issue
that will emerge as a result of these changes however, is – in what way will they be
reflected at the foreign policy level.

Trinidad & Tobago
According to international reports from the UN and the US Department of State,
the illegal drug trade operating in Trinidad bears no significant impact on the global
illegal drug market.84 Yet, national reports reveal a completely different picture. While in
international reports Trinidad is mentioned in passing as one of the many transshipment
points for illegal drugs moving into the US and Europe, these reports do not consider the
severe impact the trade has on the nation. As such, there is very limited detailed study of
the illegal drug trade actually in Trinidad. It is likely the result of what Van Schendel has
referred to as ‘arrow disease’ – the tendency to focus on cause and effect at the source
and destination points on the map of drug routes rather than the happenings at each stop
84
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along the way.85 There is scant consideration about what happens from the time illegal
drugs enter a nation until they leave for another destination. However, the illegal drug
trade has indeed had a significant impact on Trinidad development. According to
Thoumi, the structure of the illegal drug industry becomes most concentrated at the
smuggling level before opening once again in the retail distribution stage.86 Therefore,
Trinidad enters the trade at the pinnacle of its functioning and where the most is at stake.
In light of factors such as its small size, its proximity to the source and target
countries, and the relative youth of the nation, which only gained independence in 1962,
the illegal drug trade has been able to affect Trinidad and Tobago security at the social,
institutional and economic levels. Coupled with this, is the way in which globalization
and technological advancement has afforded transnational crime many more spaces to
operate. For Trinidad and Tobago, the most visible effect of illegal drugs has been the
drastic increase in violent crimes, especially those involving guns. Deosaran points out a
366% increase in the homicide rate from 2000 to 2008, 87 while successive Ministers of
National Security have labeled the trafficking of illegal drugs as the main motivator of
violent crimes and as responsible for the number of illegal weapons present in the nation.
Thus it is easy to surmise that the elevated crime rate is highly representative of the
extent to which the illegal drug trade operates in the nation. It is necessary to conduct a
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deeper examination of the trade within Trinidad in order to explain why it has produced
such shocking results. Indeed, the illegal drug trade seems to be the largest issue
threatening the nation’s stability. In the broader Caribbean context, Trinidad is an
important supplier of petroleum and petrochemicals as well as many other products, for
its Caribbean neighbors and is also lobbying to host the headquarters for the proposed
FTAA. The illegal drug trade is a rogue element, which if unchecked, has the power to
damage the nation’s role in the region and derail its long-term policy objectives.88
While Trinidad is not a significant grower or producer of drugs, it has become the
perfect middleman in the illegal trade since its petrochemical industry produces many of
the precursor chemicals necessary to refine cocaine. The INCSR has stated that precursor
chemicals originating in Trinidad and Tobago have in fact been found in drug labs in
Colombia. In 1999, the INCSR stated that Trinidad and Tobago supplied approximately
one third of the precursor chemicals to the Colombian drug trafficking organizations.89
As such, the trade moves in both directions with Trinidad and Tobago acting as a possible
supplier of precursor chemicals and receiver of finished products for northward
transshipment. It is estimated that 85% of the drugs that come into Trinidad and Tobago
come from Venezuela while the remaining 15% comes from Guyana. 90 These drugs are
mostly cocaine and marijuana but there is also some heroin. Seizure figures convey that
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heroin is shipped in considerably smaller amounts than cocaine, most likely because the
market value for heroin is much higher. Also, as the INCSRs state, Trinidad and Tobago
is more popular as a point for transshipment to Europe, whose heroin market is more
readily satisfied by the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle.91 The Venezuelan
Tucupita cartel purportedly has the strongest linkage to criminal organizations in
Trinidad and Tobago and acts as the liaison for Colombian suppliers.
The core objectives of Trinidadian drug policy reflect that there is a greater
emphasis on domestic harm reduction than in stemming the flow. The focus on harm
reduction is because the country has noted that its smallness prevents it from fully
addressing that dimension of the illegal drug problem without considerable assistance
from the developed nations. The report on its drug policy plan states that instead, illegal
drugs are recognized “as a major developmental and public health threat to the nation,
and has economic, social and political implications.”92 In fact, the overall plan includes
not only the Ministry of National Security, but also the Ministries of the Attorney
General, Social Development, Finance, and Health, showing that even though there is the
acknowledgement that illegal drugs have caused a considerable upsurge in violence, the
problem is primarily a social one (see Figure 1 for an organizational chart showing the
branches of government partnering in Trinidad’s Anti-Drug Initiative). Thus, at the head
of the policy priorities for the Trinidadian drug plan is Institutional Strengthening, geared
at increasing the individual efficiency of the branches of government involved in the plan
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as well as, their levels of cooperation. Statements contained within the plan assert that it
is meant to be available to the public and subject to its scrutiny however, it is unclear if
there has been sufficient advertisement of the availability of the Plan to make the general
public aware that is exists for public review.
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Figure 1: Organizational Chart of Trinidad and Tobago’s Anti-Drug Initiative

Source: National Anti-Drug Plan of Trinidad and Tobago 2008-2012, p. 43
http://www.cicad.oas.org/fortalecimiento_institucional/eng/National%20Plans/Trinidad%20and%20Tobago%202008-2012.pdf
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Jamaica
Thorburn and Morris posit that Jamaica is “fundamentally and utterly
disadvantaged by the international system, and that much of what happens, especially
with regard to our economic performance, can be explained as having happened to (their
emphasis) us because of system forces which overshadow national level efforts, are
beyond our control, and which inevitably work to the disadvantage of small, less
developed, post colonial economies. In this context one can readily understand the
sentiment behind Georges Fauriol's infamous statement that "small states do not have a
foreign policy, they merely have a policy of existence.””93 The preceding quote implies
that the sense of smallness is a pervasive quality of Jamaica’s foreign policy. With this in
mind, Jamaica’s national security policy statement has outlined its understanding of its
role in the illegal drug trade as the connecting point between South American suppliers
and North American consumers of illegal drugs. Thus its emphasis is on reducing its
attractiveness as a transportation hub for transnational criminal organizations rather than
on stemming marijuana production or use in the island. Though these are noted as
secondary concerns, the general interpretation of the problem as one in which the
middleman becomes a pawn at the hands of two larger players highlights two major
points – the ever-present perception of smallness and the externalization of the drug issue
which is in itself a form of distancing itself from the ‘US other.’ Moreover, the national
security policy statement assert that the country attributes its high levels of violence and
homicides to political tribalism and drug/gang related conflicts, which upset the social
93
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order and that the operation of transnational criminal networks of drug traffickers directly
challenge the survival of the state.94
Jamaica has become one of the key trafficking routes between South America and
the United States because of its convenient geographic location. Both air trafficking
utilizing prop planes and making sea drops as well as “go-fast” boats (powerboats) are
popular methods used by traffickers in the territorial space of the island. There is also the
vulnerability of large container ships and cruise ships docking at Jamaican ports which
are capable of bringing a much larger quantity of products into the country. The gang
problem in Jamaica is closely associated with the issue of illegal drugs. Linkages have
been noted between ‘dons’ and major transnational criminal organizations and drug
cartels, primarily Colombian cartels. Additionally, it is surmised that gangs finance their
local operations mainly by smuggling illegal drugs and extorting individuals complicit in
their operations. Unlike Trinidad, it is clear that Jamaica has framed the issue of illegal
drugs as primarily one of security rather than a mainly social and developmental issue
that results in security problems. Jamaica’s framing is more aligned to the way in which
the US frames the issues, but perhaps because both countries are so focused on their own
relative security, this is why they have had a somewhat contentious drug policy
relationship (discussed later in Jamaica case chapter).
Successive INCSRs have reported that Jamaica is both a major production and
transit country. In the early 1990s, these reports generally pointed out the problems with
Jamaican drug enforcement efforts, stating that they should be more closely aligned with
94
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the regional policies guided by the US in order to achieve better results. However, in
1998, after the country finally signed on to the Jamaica-US bilateral maritime agreement
proposed in 1995 (the Shiprider Agreement), there is a difference in the tone use to
describe Jamaica’s counter-drug efforts, coupled with praise for its valuable contribution
to regional anti-drug activities, like assuming operational control and headquartering the
Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Center (REDTRAC).95 In 1998,
precursor chemicals are also first noted as a growing dimension of the country’s illegal
drug trade, as well as the shift from airborne to sea transport, which made the US air
surveillance endeavor, Operation Prop Lock, a failure in that year.
The 2011 INCSR notes that Jamaica’s usually prompt execution of extradition
requests was not upheld in the extradition issue of Christopher “Dudus” Coke, a situation
which became a major local issue as well a sore point in the history of US-Jamaica drug
policy relations. Coke’s extradition was processed in May 2010, nine months after the
request was made. In the following reports however, there is once again praise for
Jamaica’s alignment to the regional policy efforts, but acknowledgement that the level of
violence has led to a dangerous breakdown in the public trust for the government which
may eventually lead to unwanted forms of vigilante justice that threaten the general
stability of the island.96
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CONCLUSION
The guiding idea of the current study is that there even though foreign policy has
been linked to nationalism in the causal direction of a country’s nationalism shaping its
own foreign policy, there is an under-examined relationship between policy influences
coming from the outside impact nationalisms of country and the power relations involved
that may make the impact on nationalism stronger or weaker. For this reason it was
important in this chapter to examine the breadth of nationalism literature and locate the
Anglophone Caribbean in this body of knowledge, as well as highlight the linkages that
have already been made between policy and nationalism relating to the countries under
examination. From this point, the hypothesized relationship of US drug policy affecting
nationalism will be added to the widely accepted notion that nationalism informs policy
to create a more complete picture of the circular nature of the policy and nationalism
relationship when it is played out on the bilateral level between a hegemonic and small
state.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHOD

INTRODUCTION
My research proceeds from the notion that small-state nationalism is affected by
strong policy influence from a hegemonic state. The present chapter seeks to explain the
process of interrogating that claim through the small-n country comparison conducted
using Trinidad’s, and Jamaica’s nationalism as juxtaposed with U.S. drug policies in the
region. The first task of this project was to find the views on collective membership that
exist in each case country and then trace the fluctuations in this notion against policy
influences to find a progression or evolution of each country’s nationalism as a direct
response to policy. Cases were selected on the basis of the most similar systems design
following Przeworski and Teune,97 to control for variables outside of US drug policy that
may also affect nationalism, given that there are other known influencers on nationalism
such as collective history, political system, culture and language. Ethnic composition has
also been deemed a factor which can impact nationalism based on explanations of nation
formation given discussed in Chapter 2; but in this case since ethnic composition has not
been the basis for the formation of post-colonial nations and given the variety of
ethnicities present in both nations (though in different proportions), ethnic composition is
taken as an already given factor for nationalist expression which cannot be divorced from
the overall discussion. Thus the important [independent] variable (or difference) between
97

Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, (New York: WileyInterscience, 1970).

65

the countries to examine is their attitudes to US drug policies and the subsequent impact
on nationalism. US drug policy for the purpose of the study is defined as those policies
constructed by the US which directly pertain to counter-drug strategies in each country
and its ambit. Examples of such are the Shiprider Agreement, Extradition treaties, mutual
legal assistance treaties and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Many of these biand multi-lateral agreements have been expressly created with the acknowledgement that
illegal drug trafficking has become the biggest security threat for the small states of the
Anglophone Caribbean. The dependent variable, nationalism, is broken into three
categories – self-perception, self-projection and perception of the other. In defining
nationalism as having a fluid quality of being both process and practice, it means that
these components of can be measured and their development tracked over time from the
path to nationhood and immediate post-independence era through its development to its
present incarnation.
The present chapter will therefore explain the rationale as well as the process of
data collection and the method of detecting the patterns within the data which were used
to formulate the conclusions of the project.

DATA COLLECTION
The primary research approaches guiding this study are Content Analysis and
Process Tracing98 as a techniques of matching wherein the collected data is examined to
find the patterns which emerge to support or refute the hypothesis over the period from
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independence (1962) to present day.99 Content Analysis here can be understood as a
method of identifying important aspects of the data in order to build support for the
hypothesis. According to Berg, Content Analysis is useful for making oral data from
interviews and text-based data such as newspaper articles systematically comparable.100
The sequence of analytic activities that make up Content Analysis have been employed
here; through, the transcribing of recorded data to make all data text-based, the creation
of themes and the sorting of the data into these themes, and the isolation of meaningful
patterns which relate to the research question. The patterns here have then been studied
among the breadth of existing literature surrounding the research questions to come up
with the conclusions of the project.
Collier explains process tracing as “the systematic examination of diagnostic
evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by
the investigator.”101 Thus indicating that there is a particular lens through which the data
are examined, meaning that the themes are pre-decided and the data are engaged in a way
which organizes it into these themes. These themes are the three previously mentioned
components of nationalism – self-perception, perception of the other, and self-projection.
Process Tracing as an analytical tool is meant to assist in the formulation of causal
inferences. Primarily, it involves the examination and description of events over time as a
means of achieving this. The events examined in this thesis are the path to, and
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independence of Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago; the Shiprider Agreement and the
resulting official and public reactions; and instances of major upheaval deriving from the
issues related to the illegal drug trade (e.g., The Christopher “Dudus” Coke Affair in
Jamaica discussed in Chapter 4). These particular events show the relationship to the
hegemon from the inception of the nation up to the present. In the current project, process
tracing and content analysis were meant to occur in a fluid manner as soon as data came
in, with additional detail being added as it became available. The method was meant to
maximize the findings and level of detail that could be applied to the subject under
examination.
The study takes its units of analysis at the group level within the general
population (focus groups) and at the expert level (Delphi group) with four focus groups
and one Delphi study being conducted in each country. Coupled with this elite-ordinary
binary, there is also the use of archival data from the national newspapers, past speeches
from government officials and previously conducted opinion polls and survey data where
available. The aim of utilizing these sources was to gather a multi-layered span of
information from which to compare the perceptions at the levels of the general
population, experts in the field – considered the organic intellectuals responsible for the
creation and implementation of the local policies. Sampling from these two levels would
also add multiple dimensions to the notion of identification that makes up the foundation
of nationalism. Archival data such as newspapers and speeches are meant to fill the gaps
that might exist in the general population and official data actually collected given the
limitations of the researcher to conduct a larger number of focus groups in both countries.
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The varied data sources allowed for access to personnel working with national
ministries who are responsible for the construction and implementation of local counterdrug policies, academics who have promoted strong political views on the topic, and
members of the general population with varying levels of knowledge and perceptions of
the illegal drug situation. The interaction with these subjects provided a partial picture of
the present day. Furthermore the archival data collected builds upon these three levels
and provides important information on past events pertaining to the issues of illegal drug
policy, nationalism, and relations with the hegemon.

Archival Data
Archival data for this study span the period leading up to independence (as far
back as the 1930s where necessary) to September 2012 when the data collection period
ended. The path to independence, which occurred in 1962 for both case countries, is an
important spotlight on the formation of a strong political nationalism which provided the
thrust for the local populations to clamor for independence from their British colonial
leaders. As chapter one indicates, this was a crucial time for the nations and given the
global Cold War context, it was an ideal time for them to assert independence, as it
ensured that every new nation would become an important cog in maintaining the
ideological balance of power. Newspaper articles, speeches of past leaders and writings
of intellectuals on the subject of nationalism at this time are therefore pivotal in gaining a
complete picture of the initial incarnation of nationalism, and its evolution for both small
states. Archival sources were the following:
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Newspapers
Newspapers are an important source of historical and factual information.
Additionally they can provide an account of both elite and public perceptions, reveal
important notes on social context, and show linguistic markers which can be used to
explain the general mood of the population at a frozen point in time.102 The main
nationally circulated newspapers in the case countries were used in this study: in
Trinidad, The Guardian, The Express, and the Trinidad Newsday; and in Jamaica, The
Observer and The Gleaner. Apart from Newsday and The Observer, both of which were
launched in 1993, the other newspapers in this sample go back several decades, and are
staples in the daily-circulated news scene for their respective countries. The Gleaner is
the oldest of the lot, having been established in 1834, The Guardian in 1917, and The
Express in 1967.
Searches of the online databases of these newspapers were conducted using the
keywords “nationalism,” “drug policy,” and “illegal drugs”103 in order to retrieve articles
relating to the subject under study. Additionally, these newspaper websites also allow for
community comments on the posted articles, so the comments sections of relevant
articles were also useful in providing information on the perceptions of the general
public, albeit only those with internet access. From these sources, the wording of the
articles provided clues as to the perception of the hegemon and the public perceptions
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relating to the scope of the illegal drug problem in the country and the role which the
country played in the drug trade.

Speeches and Policy Papers
As far as possible, speeches from notable past leaders such as Eric Williams,
Norman and Michael Manley, and Alexander Bustamante were accessed using the Digital
Library of the Caribbean and printed collections of speeches or excerpts of such. These
were useful in tracing the level of nationalism expressed at the official level as well as
examining the way in which leaders communicated with the general public. They further
show the perception of the other(s), in this case the outgoing British hegemon and the
perceived potential new hegemon, the US. These leaders were the main figures in the
independence movement for the case countries and as such were able to sway public
perceptions (of self and other) in an important way.
Policy papers released by the Ministries of National Security and Foreign Affairs
in the case countries were collected, as well as reports pertaining to the drug and crime
situation. Additionally, these were cross-referenced with reports from the UNODC, the
US State Department’s INCSRs, CICAD, CARICOM and the OAS. These reports
showed the level of assistance from the US given to each case country based on their
individual proposals for local drug policy. They further indicate how deep the level of
cooperation and compliance is in each country with the policy objectives of the US
towards the region.
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Focus Groups
Another data source was the focus groups conducted in each country consisting of
subjects from the general population. Focus groups can be defined as an assembly of
individuals meant to – using their personal experience and not expert knowledge –
discuss amongst one another, the topic under research.104 These were included in the
research design to add a dimension other than text-based data – which would gauge not
only the personal responses on the topic, but also the revelations about the topic that
could only come from the interaction of the subjects. This is the main idea behind the
usefulness of focus groups in social research, that the interaction among subjects in a
focus group provides a deeper level of insight than the classic interview method. Subjects
are encouraged to clarify their opinions by their peer group as opposed to the
investigator, to whom they may feel somewhat inferior due to the lack of topic-specific
knowledge. Therefore, the potentiality of subjects being more self-deprecating and not
answering fully for fear of being ‘wrong’ can be avoided through using this method. The
design called for finding a small numbers of people (6-8 persons) who would agree to
participate in a group setting and talk about the illegal drug situation in their country and
their perceptions on nationalism and the US resulting from that. Respondents were
chosen on the basis of their willingness and availability to participate, and with a degree
of variability (meaning that they were different ages, ethnicities, levels of education,
professions and socio-economic levels). It was hoped that the variability would reflect the
differences in perceptions, social contexts and experiences that would lead to rich
discussions in the group sessions. Respondents were gathered by using the investigator’s
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social connections in Trinidad who would publicize the need for participants at their
various places of work and social settings. This yielded a selection of adults ranging from
the 18-25, to the 65+ age categories, with varying professions, ethnicities, social
backgrounds and levels of education.

Figure 1: Focus Group Participants
Country
Trinidad
Jamaica

Male
12
12

Female
11
18

Age
18-25

26-35

36-45

46-55

55-65

65+

2
15

9
3

6
2

2
5

3
4

1
1

In Trinidad, the common assumption is that alignment to one political party or the
other is determined by ethnicity, therefore it was important that this be representative in
groups as this was a main tension within the population. This tension would also result in
a subject perceiving government action as favorable or unfavorable depending on
whether or not their political party was in power. The levels of education and/or
professions cannot necessarily be divorced from these positions since this ethnic
alignment to politics has become an inherent part of the socialization process in the
country (young adults tend to vote for the same party that their parents vote for regardless
of political ideology).
In Jamaica, the respondents were collected in much the same way as in Trinidad,
using social connections to bring in willing participants. Respondents were recruited from
Kingston, the capital city. Given that most of the investigator’s social connections were
very religious, many respondents came from church youth groups and bible study
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classes,105 but again managed to span the age groups, social backgrounds and education
levels. However, the religious characteristics of my hosts did not skew the study overall
by resulting in the recruitment of solely deeply religious participants. Kingston
purportedly has one church per square mile, and church is not only used as a religious
meeting place, but also as a site for coming together as a community for various
activities. From observations of Kingston life, it seemed that going to church on Sunday
morning was, by rote, the accepted thing to do. Had all participants in the study been very
religious, this would raise the question of whether people are more likely to have a strong
sense of nationalism if they are religious, but there was not enough information to
address this question in the present research. In Jamaica, ethnic diversity was not as
major a factor in societal tension as in Trinidad. One focus group was conducted at the
University of the West Indies Mona Campus again using social connections and word of
mouth (the draw of food as compensation was a key factor in attracting students to
participate). In this group the age range was more or less the same, but it was possible to
gain opinions from persons who came from parts of the island other than Kingston.
Respondents were first given consent forms, followed by a questionnaire which asked
specifically along what lines the individual identified themselves (ethnicity, religion,
nationality). The questionnaire was meant to get them thinking about where they fit in the
spectrum of national identification. The last two questions asked about prior knowledge,
first of the drug trade as it exists in the country, and also the policies implemented to
combat the trade. These final questions would get participants to start thinking about the
topic and formulating their perspectives but without being provided any substantive
105
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information about the topic. People are not likely to think about drug policy regularly
with any specificity, so these questions served as a form of framing in order to usher
them more smoothly into the discussion.
An unintended consequence of this part of the research design was that
respondents tended to look to the investigator for verbal cues, agreement, or disagreement
with their points of view. These instances were handled, with the researcher reassuring
the respondent that their contribution was valued, but also reminding them, that as per the
statement in the consent form, the investigator was not meant to participate in the
discussion. Many respondents asked for the personal views of the investigator, but this
always occurred after the conclusion of the discussion so it did not affect the session.

Delphi Studies
An additional data source were the two Delphi studies, one conducted in each
case country. According to Turoff (2002)106, the original intention of a Delphi study was
to seek consensus on an issue from a group of experts. His idea of a Delphi study
however, and the method applied in the present thesis, was to gather the strongest
possible opposing views on the issue in order to gain the richest and most well-rounded
understanding of the problem. Thus consensus was not the aim of gathering the group of
experts in the field of drug policies and the drug trade in the case countries. For this
reason, subjects were recruited from different government ministries as well as the
University of the West Indies to avoid homogeneity in the group. Recruitment of persons
from these organizations was added to the research design to bolster the input deriving
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from live interactions. It was also meant to add to the component of expert knowledge,
which would otherwise only be available in text-based formats. Subjects were asked to
discuss the questions based on their personal opinion and deep understanding of the
issues. As a result it was interesting to see how the balance between personal opinion and
the desire to reflect the stance of their respective government bodies or institutions played
out at the conference table.
There are many Delphi methods which utilize an iterative process in which
subjects are asked to respond to a questionnaire, followed by a meeting in which a
moderator asks guided questions for group discussion. On the basis of the outcomes of
the initial meeting, participants were asked to again answer a questionnaire following up
on the first meeting and use the guided discussion process multiple times to satisfy data
collection. These styles were impractical for use in the current project given the limited
window in which all subjects were available at the same time (since they were ministry
officials or university professors). Thus the approach used here was a conference style
Delphi in which respondents were asked to engage in a long guided discussion process.
All respondents were approached through email or phone call directly to the
Ministries of National Security and Foreign Affairs, and the International Relations
Departments at the University of the West Indies St. Augustine (Trinidad) and Mona
(Jamaica) Campuses. In Trinidad unfortunately, there was no response from the St.
Augustine Campus, but the investigator was able to gather participants from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, National Security and the Special Division of the Police Force which
dealt with narcotics. These participants were able to comment on both the construction
and implementation of drug policies and the level of cooperation with the hegemon.
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Respondents were recruited in the same way in Jamaica, this time with the participation
of representatives from the Mona Campus, the Ministry of National Security and the
Jamaica Constabulary Force. These respondents were also able to discuss the finer points
of the construction and implementation of policies and the level of cooperation with the
US.
An obstacle encountered in this component of the research design was during the
recruitment period, the subjects contacted, requested further information on the project in
order to decide if they would participate. The investigator handled this by sending a
shortened version of the proposal to these participants in order to convince them of the
value of the project. Sharing the document was generally enough to generate the subjects’
willingness to participate in the project as they were happy to input their views after the
investigator showed willingness to share information given that a main concern was how
the information would be used and in what light they would be painted.

DATA ANALYSIS
Upon collection, data from the focus groups and Delphi sessions were transcribed
and examined by the investigator to find elements which fit into the three previously
mentioned themes. For example, comments on the magnitude of Trinidad’s role in the
illegal drug trade, were sorted into the self-perception theme since this directly relates to
the issue of conceptualizing the country’s identity. Utilizing these themes as the starting
point for analysis of the focus group and Delphi data allowed for the general picture to
take shape, but also led to the generation of additional themes which related to them.
Some of examples of these themes are, Corruption and Distrust of Government,
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Idealization or Denigration of Foreign Solutions and Disconnection Between
Government and General Public. Upon establishing these themes and sub-themes, it was
possible to go back through the focus group and Delphi data and consolidate the
conceptual picture of the hypothesized relationship between nationalism and US drug
policy. Additionally, these themes were applied to the other data sources (newspapers and
speeches) to complete the conceptual pattern. This type of analysis utilizes an approach
which moves top-down with the data, first categorizing data into the broad themes, then
moving on to the narrower themes in order to generate the “big picture.” The process
itself happened in several rounds as all data were compared and related multiple times to
ensure that the themes were well-developed and finely tuned. During the analysis, the
temporal context was consistently taken into account, to explain for example, the nature
and evolution of the aforementioned disconnect between government and general public
over the years under study.
The data collected for this project have attempted to combine insight from various
qualitative sources. The main analytical steps followed here have been those relating to
Content Analysis and Process Tracing which involved a long process of engaging with
data in order to sort the data into the pre-set themes and also to establish new sub-themes
from which the key explanatory patterns of the proposed causal relationship could be
identified. In this case, the causal relationship is that US drug policy has had some impact
on nationalism in the case countries. Thus the ultimate endeavor here is a descriptive
process to explain this relationship and its directionality. In this sense, the research did set
out with the pre-conceived notion that the causal relationship existed but there was no
formal conceptualization of how nationalism was affected in each country. Thus it was
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the aim of my investigation to uncover how nationalism might be re-affirmed, re-defined
or eroded by the pressures emanating from the unequal power relations. However,
through not allowing the data to be examined in the limited sense of the three initially
determined themes, and allowing it to ‘speak’ for itself and generating additional themes,
a more detailed picture emerged from the analysis.
A second feature of the analysis was the comparative task of documenting how
the relationship between US drug policy and nationalism was the same or different in
each case country and what in particular yielded these outcomes. The objective was to
show the variation between perceptions in each case country which led to nationalism
being expressed more strongly in order vis-à-vis the other, and the rationale behind this
difference in expression. For example, a main pattern that emerged in the present thesis
was that the relationship between government and civil society was a factor in the
projection of a cohesive nationalism. The finding that this pattern differed across case
countries thereby making the ultimate notion of collective membership to the national
fold strong for one but weak in the other, then was indicative of why US drug policy
influence could have a greater impact on nationalism in one case but not the other.

Conceptual Patterns/Themes
The analytical process began by categorizing data first into the three predetermined themes, and then identifying additional themes that arose along the way. The
current section will offer some clarification and discussion of these themes.
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Self-Perception
This conceptual category comes from the definition of nationalism discussed in
Chapter One. The notion of self-perception is an important part of the construction of a
national identity. The term refers to the way in which citizens of the respective case
countries, as represented by the sampled population in this project, view themselves in
the collective sense.

Self-Projection
This term refers to the way in which the case countries promote their image to the
world. Again this is completely a social construction which directly indicates the way in
which the country wants to be perceived.

Perception of the Other
This theme relates to the way in which the subjects in the case countries
characterize the US, and the way in which the US affects their quality of life. Perceptions
of the Other are an important way of affirming identity according to Samuel Huntington,
who argues that it is only through knowing the other, that one can determine what he is or
is not.107

Corruption and Distrust of Government
In the course of conducting the focus groups in both countries, this theme became
clear. Respondents acknowledged or perceived a high level of corruption at the official
107
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levels which in turn led to a distrust of the police forces and the government to really
handle serious security issues. This meant that a chasm existed between the official levels
and the wider society which has a direct impact on the notions of collective membership
which make for a cohesive form of nationalism.

Idealization or Denigration of Foreign Solutions
This theme came through and relates directly to the category of Perception of the
Other. The data reflected that there was both a desire for and a sense of trepidation at the
general public level, related to assistance from outside sources, especially the US. The
balancing act that people have to inwardly achieve became a major part of the way they
discussed their perceptions of what stake the US had in their nation’s drug policy and
what involvement they had in the island, whether it was an overt physical presence or
merely providing economic assistance.

Disconnection Between Government and General Public
This emerged as a theme throughout the breadth of data analysis from both
interactive and text-based data sources. In particular however, was the focus group data
that revealed not only a lack of knowledge about drug policy plans implemented by the
government and their results, but also the impression that the government either did not
care or did not want the general public to know what these plans were. People
commented on the lack of accountability that resulted since without the information,
there was no way to know if there had been any successes. They also implied feelings of
distrust of media reports celebrating big drug confiscations or destruction of large local
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marijuana plantations since they believe that even these purported successes might not be
to the scale that authorities would have them believe and that they are merely publicity
stunts to keep the masses satisfied.

Division
This theme refers to the societal tensions within the populations of each case
country. As discussed in the data chapters, these divisions made a strong impact on
collective identification and hindered nationalism in its strongest sense. This particular
theme however, must be broken down into two sections since the source of division was
different in each case – Ethnicity in Trinidad and Class/Social Stratification in Jamaica.
Ethnicity
Trinidad being a multicultural society has a great mix of ethnicities – Whites
(persons of British, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Dutch descent), Black, East Indian,
Chinese, Syrian and Lebanese. This melting pot as it is often called, can sometimes boil
over in that there is not always smooth mixing along the boundary lines of these
ethnicities. The large majorities of the population are Black or East Indian, and this is
reflected in the composition of the two major political parties in the island. Division
along ethnic lines has led to individuals or portions of certain ethnic groups feeling a
closer affinity or trying to build an affinity with their “motherland” populations and
privileging this identity over the national identity. As a result, this makes the foundation
of nationalism already weak and shows that there is already a pattern of its erosion by
influences from the outside.
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Class/Social Stratification
Division in Jamaica derives from the class separation that has become a pervasive
part of society. For example, Kingston is the most densely populated city on the island
and because of this anyone living outside of Kingston is attributed the label “country,” to
signify rural or non-city dweller. Conversely, those residing in Kingston are considered
“uptown,” and inherently possess some level of social superiority over their “country”
counterparts. The further divisions within Kingston itself such as “garrison” and “gully”
further designate boundaries within the population which have bled into, both literally
and figuratively, the politics of the nation. As a result, party affiliation has become a
matter of life and death among certain lesser-privileged groups in the society and this can
ultimately tie back into the notions of self-perception and projection.

LIMITATIONS
The major limitations to the study were the timing of the research (which was
conducted in the July-September 2012 time period) and the size of the sample. With
greater funding for the time frame spent in each country, more focus groups could have
been conducted which would have increased the sample size. Upon reaching to Jamaica,
travel to Montego Bay to conduct focus groups as originally planned was very difficult
given its distance from the metropolitan are of Kingston and the researcher’s lack of
connections to that area. However, 25% of Jamaica’s population is concentrated in the
sampled Kingston/St. Andrew area while the remaining 75% is spread across the
remainder of the island meaning that there is no such other densely populated city center.
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With regard to timing of the research, these months were during and directly following
the 2012 Summer Olympics at which athletes from both countries earned medals.
Trinidad’s Keshorn Walcott earned the country’s first ever Olympic gold medal in a field
event (javelin) making him an instant national hero (even worthy of a huge welcome
home reception inside the airport as counter-security policy as that seems).108 Similarly,
Usain Bolt and his teammates secured medals for Jamaica, which was expected, but again
left the country on a “national” high. The Olympic successes brought out a surge of
nationalistic sentiment and pride, which is not characteristic of daily life in either
country.
Another obstacle came from the desire to avoid spurious conclusions – wherein
key variables are omitted which may instead account for the outcomes in place of the
impact of US drug policy specifically. The problem became looking specifically at US
drug policy and isolating its effect on nationalism as opposed to the effect of other
variables on nationalism. The good thing is that those influencers that sum up nation
formation such as ethnicity and collective identity are already firmly established in each
country, so these things can be taken as given influencers on the evolution of their
nationalisms. With regard to this, the study narrowed focus to asking questions in groups
that specifically related to the drug situation and drug policy and steered away from
questions that would focus on other variables.
Establishing equivalence was also another potential problem in the study in that
nationalism in each country is directly affected by in-group/out-group classifications
108
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which shape the collective identification at the national level. It turns out that two
different variables are the basis for societal division in each country – ethnicity in
Trinidad and class/social stratification in Jamaica. However, these two variables proved
functionally equivalent thus still allowing meaningful comparison. The big questions
posed in establishing this functional equivalence therefore could still be answered:
Does nationalism in Jamaica mean the same thing as in Trinidad?


Do the countries have same/similar self-perceptions?



Do the countries have same/similar self-projections?



Do they have same/similar perceptions of the other?



Does drug policy mean the same thing to both countries?

REPRESENTATION OF DATA
Before proceeding, it is necessary to explain how the shape that the following data
chapters will take in terms of the patterns discussed above. The data chapters begin with a
historical and theoretical discussion meant to set the context within which the findings
must be understood and interpreted. The findings from focus groups and the Delphi for
that country are then reported and related to the themes and patterns, and the text-based
sources incorporated to provide additional validity and robustness to these themes. This
does not mean that the collected data from focus groups and Delphi studies are viewed as
having greater conceptual weight than text-based sources, but they do manage to
articulate the objectives of the thesis more directly since the questions posed to the
groups were created by the researcher exactly for the purpose of this thesis. Additionally,
important events (like Shiprider) are discussed, once again within the conceptual frame of
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these themes to show their application as more than an abstraction. By using the group
data as the main focus of these chapters, it ensures that the framework of the thesis is
adhered to and brings greater the focus of the work.

86

CHAPTER 4
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: LAND OF STEELBAND, CALYPSO AND DRUGS?

INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the Trinidadian case will be examined. To interrogate the
components of nationalism previously identified in this study – self-perception, selfprojection, and perception of the other – four focus groups and one Delphi study were
conducted in the country and these data were coupled with secondary data such as
speeches and newspapers articles, and policy documents where possible.
The guiding questions for the Trinidad case study were:
•

Has there been a deepening of inter-ethnic tensions in Trinidad in response to US
drug policy actions?

•

Have anti-US sentiments increased in response to these policy actions?

•

Have government statements emphasized each country’s cooperation and
complimentary drug policies with the US, or instead has there been an assertion
(or exaltation) of independent policy formation?
The objective was to create a complete contextual picture of Trinidad from the

path to nationhood to present as a way of understanding the relationship with the
hegemon, how the illegal drug trade emerged as a problem, and how the policies that
have built up to combat drug trafficking have affected the country’s nationalism. The
chapter first sets the historical context showing the emergence of nationalist thought and
how this fed into the thrust for independence from the British Monarchy. It goes on to
show where the illegal drug trade fits into this context, and provides an overview of the
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US-Trinidadian relationship. Finally it details the findings from the focus groups and
Delphi study by grouping the data into the main conceptual patterns which formed in the
Trinidadian case.

BACKGROUND
Path to Nationhood
Sutton (1987) finds that small states will generally be more passive and reactive
especially when nationalism is weak.109 Nationalism in Trinidad grew out of the labor
movement dating back to the mid-1920s when Arthur Andrew Cipriani who served as a
mayor for Port-of-Spain (Trinidad’s capital city), member of the Legislative Council, and
also headed the Trinidad Workingmen’s Association (later the Trinidad Labour Party).
Cipriani was a white man of French and Corsican descent, yet he championed the rights
of the colored Trinidadian workforce and was able to foster unity amongst the middle
class. According to Eric Williams, the first Prime Minister of Trinidad, another
prominent figure in Trinidad’s path to nationhood, Cipriani is “the pioneer of the
nationalist movement in Trinidad and Tobago.”110 At this stage of history, even though
there was a certain level of distrust between the Indian and black communities, both were
willing to follow Cipriani, so this created a unity of purpose (at least for legislative
representation).
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Another prominent figure in the path towards Trinidadian nationhood was Tubal
Uriah “Buzz” Butler. By 1934, Cipriani’s efforts had lost momentum because he had
trouble uniting workers across the major industries in Trinidad: sugar and petroleum.
Even though he had managed to create a desire for greater legislative representation of
the working class, these sentiments were not as strong outside of the capital city. Butler
served under Cipriani in the British West Indian Regiment as one of his chief lieutenants.
Even though he was originally from Grenada, he moved to Trinidad after World War I
because the petroleum industry in the country promised higher wages. By 1935 he felt
that Cipriani’s efforts were too restrained. He became a ‘man of action,’111 leading a 60mile march from the oil industry area to the capital city in the same year to bring
attention to worker’s demands. In the next year, he left the Trinidad Labour Party and
struck out on his own. With his charisma he was able to gather significant support from
both the Indian and Black communities, primarily those working in the petroleum sector.
In 1937 he organized a sit-in to bring attention to petroleum workers rights. Even though
it started off as a peaceful strike, the police tried to arrest Butler which led to a riot.
Butler was imprisoned for two years. The riot was the advent of the labor movement in
Trinidad in which middle class non-whites voiced their demands for increased wages and
better conditions. The movement acted as a launching point for this class to have a
greater political voice in general and is arguably the pivotal event which accelerated
Trinidad on its path to nationhood. Personalities such as Cipriani, Butler and Williams
were the drivers of political nationalism and proved instrumental in bringing Trinidad to
nationhood
111
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Eric Williams was exceptional in giving ‘the Trinidadian’ a voice. Williams was a
renowned Caribbean scholar, having earned his doctorate in History at Oxford University
in the UK and later going on to become a full professor at Howard University in the US.
He began his political career in 1944 by serving on the Anglo-American Caribbean
Commission,112 however, his strong anti-colonial opinions led to the non-renewal of his
contract with them in 1955. By the next year he established the People’s National
Movement (PNM), the political party under which he would usher Trinidad into
independence. Williams provided the first real version of the other from which the
Trinidadian could distinguish and therefore discover himself. This came through his
description of Massa: “This was Massa – the owner of a West Indian sugar plantation,
frequently an absentee, deliberately stunting all the economic potential of the society,
dominating his defenseless workers by the threat of punishment or imprisonment, using
his political power for the most selfish private ends, an uncultured man with an illiberal
outlook.”113 The way he characterized the colonial hegemon remains an integral part of
the way in which hegemony is perceived, thus, it has also become an integral part of the
Trinidadian sense of self in that they must understand themselves as a contrast to the
above description.
What has become most evident from this research endeavor is that Trinidadian
nationalism is a reactionary phenomenon. In one sense the reactionary bent is an
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evolution of the nationalism which existed around the time of independence. If we take
Hearn’s explanation of the distinction between political and cultural nationalism,114 the
former being the type necessary for nation formation while the latter is more socially
embedded and more geared towards the longevity of the nation; then we can surmise that
Trinidadian nationalism has indeed evolved away from the political stage. However, once
the nation was established and now 50 years later, nationalism has given way from the
political to the second order cultural nationalism.

Plurality in Trinidadian Culture & Society
Premdas argues that the plural Trinidadian society has basically been forged by
the superimposition of a British veneer on imported non-western people.115 However, I
would argue that it is more a case of the whole becoming greater than the sum of its parts.
Merely having a British or westernized veneer (to use his phrasing), implies that there
would be no cross-cultural seepage. That would then be unable to explain phenomena
like the shouter Baptist religion which he discusses later in his book, or the numerous
Hindi words that have become commonplace in the everyday Trinidadian creole.
He points out that in the path to independence, the ethnic community which had
by that time, been able to most closely adopt the British colonial ways would be the
obvious choice for leadership of the country after their departure.116 The winner of this
losing battle (in that it required a loss of one’s original culture), were clearly the African
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descended Trinidadians. They had been there the longest, had the largest community, and
had been subject to the harshest cultural stripping (ritual passage). Granted the East
Indians also endured a form of ritual passage, but in keeping to the rural areas and
isolating themselves in their communities, they were more able to recreate some
semblance of their mother culture. From the very first election under universal adult
suffrage in 1946, bribery and race were used to mobilize the masses in Trinidad.
Ryan calls this event, “the event [emphasis added] which did more than anything
else to crystallize the divisions in society.”117 To this day, Trinidadian politics has not
been able to move past these divisions and it is here that ethnic tension is most overtly
expressed. During election campaigning, the dominant political parties, the PNM (AfroTrinidadian centric party) and the United National Congress (UNC – Indo-Trinidadian
centric party),118 select a mixture of ethnicities to run for different constituencies. Yet
despite parading this multicultural front, more than 50% of each party belongs to one
particular group or the other. Moreover, it is blatantly practiced that for certain seats, the
running candidate will be of the predominant ethnic background for that constituency.
Only in a stronghold seat would a political party dare to place a candidate that is not of
the predominant ethnic background. Examining ethnic division in relation to the issue of
illegal drugs has showed that certain roles (trafficker, distributor, addict) are ascribed to
particular ethnic groups. This not only comes from the perceptions of how the illegal
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drug trade operates, but the way it is handled by the local authorities, in that lower level
offences with the majority of perpetrators coming from a particular ethnic group seem to
be pursued over more large scale attempts at dismantling illegal drug organizations. This
shows that there an element of ethnic boundary formation and affirmation at work with
regard to both the illegal drug trade and the policies used to address it.
In speaking of the ethnic division in Trinidad, some authors use words like strife
or even conflict (meaning non-violent conflict). However, I would argue that these words
are now too strong to truly describe inter-race relations in today’s Trinidad. While there
is still the element which cleaves to the deep divisions among the ethnic groups, the
larger consensus shows that there is a sense of overall tolerance. Though it does not mean
that the races live together as one, it harkens back to M. G. Smith’s descriptions of plural
society as a form of happy cohabitation and interaction for commercial purposes. The
interaction has since evolved into the ‘liming’119 society that currently exists, and there
are still tensions but these tensions are more and less apparent in light of situational
factors, such as, if it is close to election time (where division will be more apparent), or if
it is close to the nation’s carnival celebration (where division is less apparent).
We can be certain that at least the current working class generation in Trinidad
has moved past the days, for example, of clubs having ‘dhal night’ or ‘golliwog’ night.120
To some extent this is an illustration of the seepage of US culture and the subsequent
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adaptation of Trinidadian culture. The country has in a sense imported the foreign taboos
surrounding race and owned them. In the past, cultural art forms such as calypso were
dominated by Afro-Trinidadians. Some of these calypsos contained verses that would
ridicule Indian communities or customs, yet this was not viewed as antagonistic. Later
on, when the Indo-Trinidadian community became more involved in carnival
celebrations, they formed their own response to this through their pichikaree
performances. Each community could take the picong.121 However, with the introduction
of US television programs and cable companies in the early 1990s, Trinidadians became
attuned to the idea that racial stereotyping was morally wrong. Thus the sensitization took
hold and the nation imported this taboo. It has even led to the re-designation of ethnic
groups as Afro-Trinidadian and Indo-Trinidadian to mimic the term African-American.
Therefore the influence from US culture has led to the problematization of difference
such that, at the end result it has eliminated the level to which racial and ethnic difference
was embedded in Trinidadian society. This sparks the idea that the country looks to the
US as not only a political and economic hegemon in the region, but also as a moral
hegemon.

CONTEXT
Trinidad as a recognized sovereign nation can be taken as a given in the global
make up (i.e., there is no doubt of its existence, nor is there a threat to its survival as a
political construct). A distinctive nationalism on the other hand cannot be taken for
121
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granted, despite the 2010 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) report on
political culture finding that 76% of respondents felt that national pride was “very strong”
among the citizenry.122 Here, second-order cultural nationalism comes in. Trinidadian
nationalism seems very muted in this sense and instead is reactionary if there is a
particular event or reason (such as a questionnaire asking focused questions on national
pride, Keshorn Walcott’s recent Olympic win,123 the Shiprider Agreement, or the recent
Section 34 controversy – which arguably is a very recent addition to what mobilizes a
national reaction). In setting the context for the Trinidadian case, the following two
illustrations are relevant for introducing some themes that emerged in the analysis of
focus group and Delphi group data.

Section 34 Controversy
Section 34 refers to an amendment made (and subsequently repealed) to the
Administration of Justice (Indictable Proceedings) Act. Then Minister of Justice, Herbert
Volney124, approached Cabinet in August 2012, seeking an early decision on amendments
to the Act, among them the Section 34 clause which would reduce the statute of
limitations to 10 years for certain offenses (excluding rape, drug trafficking, murder,
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treason and arms/ammunition possession). The timing of the tabling of this change was
highly suspicious since it would mean that former UNC financiers Ishwar Galbaransingh
and Steve Ferguson would no longer be eligible for prosecution. They were about to face
charges for fraud relating to the billion-dollar construction contract for the Piarco
International Airport which were brought in 1995. The amendment took effect on August
31 2012, the 50th anniversary of Trinidadian independence, which antagonists saw as a
figurative blow to the ideals of a democratic, independent nation.
The US government had sought the extradition of these individuals in 2006 to
face money laundering and fraud charges related to the Airport scandal. However,
Trinidadian courts ruled that the jurisdiction for these crimes lay within the country and
as such they would be tried locally. What was seen as blatant corruption on the part of the
UNC officials and by extension the PP sparked protest from the general population to
immediately repeal the amendment and have the persons involved resign from office –
the Attorney General, the Minister of National Security, and the Minister of Justice. The
US embassy in Trinidad expressed displeasure with the passing of the Section 34
amendment, which seemingly influenced the decision to repeal.125 The day after the US
Embassy’s press release, the Prime Minister convened an emergency Cabinet meeting to
begin the repeal proceedings.126 By September 14 2012, the amendment had been
repealed. Yet four days later, citizens finally organized a march in the capital city in
protest of Section 34. One participant in the march, Rhoda Bharath, lecturer at the
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University of the West Indies, poignantly writes about the purpose of the march in her
blog:
“Another argument is that this March today is about causing political
destabilisation…uhhh…YES…we don’t trust the Government. No electorate
should have to be saddled with a Government it doesn’t trust, and to argue that we
must put up with an untrustworthy government for five years is to play smart with
foolishness. That’s why it’s called a democracy…we have the right to show our
displeasure and I am going to show it.”127
The Section 34 debacle highlights two major themes that make up the Trinidadian case –
the distrust of and lack of faith in the government, and a trend of acquiescence to the
influence from the US.

Shiprider Agreement
The Shiprider Agreement is another apt illustration of acquiescence by the smaller
nation in the US-Trinidadian relationship, in that Trinidad was one of the first countries
to sign this US-proposed agreement without negotiation despite the opposition from the
general public. The archipelagic states of the Caribbean were give a Model Shiprider
Agreement proposal, which would become a bilateral treaty between the US and the
signing Caribbean country. All states signed the model with the exceptions of Jamaica
and Barbados. Thus Trinidad immediately became signatory to the Agreement Between
the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the Government of the
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United States of America concerning Counter-Drug Operations. The vagueness of this
name stands in contrast to the specificity of the formal name for the Jamaican version, the
Agreement Between the Government of Jamaica and the Government of the United
States of America concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug
Trafficking.
Watson calls the agreement a display of “the reality of unequal power between the
US and Trinidad”128 given that the model proposal not only required the Caribbean state
to enforce its laws within its territorial sea, but also required it to assist the US in
enforcing its laws outside of US territorial waters. The Agreement would essentially give
the US primary maritime jurisdiction over the region as a whole. The main issue for
Jamaica and Barbados was the lack of reciprocity in the terms of the agreement, meaning
that while the US would have the right to continue hot pursuit and maintain jurisdiction
over the vessel being chased, there was no clause allowing for the reverse situation if it
ever occurred (i.e., if Jamaica or Barbados Coast Guard were to pursue a suspicious
vessel into US territorial waters).
There was no initially a public outcry because of then Prime Minister Basdeo
Panday’s decision to sign the model agreement. In fact, there seemed to be an overall
lack of awareness about the proposal. It was only after the Jamaican and Barbados
governments refused to sign that the media houses in Trinidad took notice, and the
opposition leader, Patrick Manning, took the opportunity to criticize the sitting
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government’s decision to sign.129 Panday suffered a blow to his popularity as a result, but
discounted the criticism and defended his decision by saying: “We cant even guard the
North coast, but they (his detractors) want the right to chase traffickers into Key West.
Great. Great…And if the Americans are chasing drug runners, on reaching the 12 mile
limit with Trinidad waters I imagine that must pull brakes, stop, take the phone and ring
to get permission to come in.”130 Once again in this illustration, Trinidadian public
opinion was behind government action, however, in the trade-off between public opinion
and cooperation with the regional hegemon, systemic-level interests won, and the
government did not attempt to contest its signing. The Shiprider illustration thus further
indicates trend for Trinidadian administrations to prioritize the relationship with the US
over national opinions.

ILLEGAL DRUG POLICIES & US-TRINIDAD COOPERATION
The mid 1990s were a period of high drug traffic for the Caribbean. Dent posits
that drug trafficking really became problematic for Trinidad in 1996 in response to a
declining US aid to Caribbean nations (90% drop from the mid-1980s to 1996). He
suggests that drug traffickers filled this economic gap.131 By 1996, the US government
was celebrating that it had disrupted many preferred trafficking routes. At the same time,
they acknowledged that this success had forced traffickers to use longer routes through
129
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the Eastern Caribbean, beginning with the southernmost island, Trinidad – and that this
required the reinforcing of measures in the eastern part of the region so it did not become
“the drug trade’s dominant theater of operations.”132 Trinidad has since then participated
in Operation Tradewinds which was a training exercise conducted by the US coast guard
as well as Operation Blue Skies which is modeled after OPBAT. While it is noted that
Trinidad is a major transshipment point given its proximity to the South American
mainland, it is not considered a major point for shipment to the US. Instead, drugs
passing through the island tend to move along the island chain, and across to the UK and
West Africa.
In 1996 the country signed three major agreements with the US: the mutual legal
assistance treaty; an extradition treaty; and, the Shiprider agreement. As previously
mentioned, the agreement contained articles allowing for pursuit and entry meaning that
US coast guard or other law enforcement could continue pursuit of suspected traffickers
into Trinidadian airspace and territorial waters. It must be noted that Trinidad was the
first country to sign all three agreements and is the only country to have allowed US over
flights. Arguably the decision to sign all three agreements was a concession that Trinidad
granted in the hopes that it would be chosen to headquarter the FTAA which was being
negotiated at the time.133 With this agreement now more or less defunct, it is unclear
whether or not the country desires or even has the power to alter these terms. Also in the
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mid-90s, the US assisted the country in updating its laws regarding the persecution of
drug traffickers which led to the amendment of its Indictable Offense Act, the
amendment of the Jury Act and the Supreme Court Judiciary Amendment. These last two
amendments were deemed necessary to deal specifically with the issues of jury tampering
and witness security, which have been noted as significant problems with the Trinidadian
justice system. The witness security program is a region wide effort to which Trinidad
belongs and through which it also receives outside assistance.
In 1996 Trinidad received equipment for six radar installations which were
supposed to become fully operational in the beginning of the following year. These radar
installations were meant to monitor the waters along the south-east coast of the island in
order to intercept drugs coming from South America. The radar installations have,
however, become somewhat of a national joke since many years later it was noted in the
local news, that funds were needed to repair the radars which had been sitting inactive for
a number of years. The general public expressed humor rather than outrage to the idea
that the machinery to intercept illegal drugs (which was already being bandied as the
main reason for high levels of violent crime) had been sitting there non-operational for
such a long period of time with no previous efforts to repair them.
According to the 2013 INCSR US organizations such as the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) all maintain a presence on the island. No such note was made for
Jamaica, again attesting to not only the level of cooperation between the US and
Trinidad, but the way in which the Trinidadian government has opened itself to host these
outside agencies. Linkages have been made in marijuana trafficking to Trinidad from
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Jamaica for repackaging and reshipping through mules to the US. This is likely because
tourist visas for the US are more easily obtained in Trinidad than in Jamaica.
Trinidad has now become a port of pre-security for the US. Along with the
scanning of the container ships, South Americans who have layovers in Trinidad en route
to the US, must deplane and go through Trinidadian scans and checkpoints before
continuing on to the US since it is the last point prior to entry into the US for those
passengers. This is likely a trade-off agreed upon by the Trinidadian government since all
of the scanning equipment at the sea- and air- ports has been funded by the US. But due
to this high level of cooperation with destination countries, particularly the US, there are
offers coming in for further assistance. This illustrates that compliance breeds benefits for
the country in terms of training, technical assistance and continued funding. Therefore in
the interest of upholding its own security goals it is best to shape drug policies which are
complementary to those of the US as well as comply with requests such as the prescreening of South American individuals prior to their entry into the US. This is a
paradox that Trinidad has had to deal with since in giving up that one aspect of their
autonomy, they are being better equipped to deal with the non-state actors within its
borders that would subvert its sovereignty and security. In this sense, the trade-off is not
difficult or unexpected since on one side there is cooperation with a more powerful and
legitimate state actor, while on the other it is the frequently violent non-state actors which
make up the transnational criminal organizations that operate in the country.
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Linking Illegal drugs and Nationalism
Recalling the three elements of nationalism – self-perception, self-projection and
the perception of the other, the general population seems to perceive the country’s role in
the illegal drug trade as much larger than has been reported by international reports such
as the INCSRs or the UN World Drug Reports, speaking to the notion of self-perception.
The 2012 INCSR reports that the declaration of the 2011 state of emergency (SOE) was
due to the spike in murders as a result of international drug trafficking linkages.
However, it goes further to state that while this was the official statement, these
allegations were never actually proven. This does not take away though from the
effectiveness of the SOE as it resulted in a drastic reduction in homicides and disrupted
drug trafficking networks across the island during its time. Hey has noted a habit of overestimating a position is a common tendency for small states,134 however, it may also be
explained by the fact that local reports and statements from government officials have
repeatedly blamed illegal drugs for the hikes in violent crime over the past decade. This
may not necessarily be the actual cause for the rampant criminal activity in the country.
However, using the illegal drugs trade as the basis for crime in a sense externalizes the
Trinidadian crime problem and to a certain degree, displaces the blame from the
government. Granted, the general public does not truly believe this, but the way in which
the illegal drugs problem in perceived, illustrates that the basis of Trinidadian crime is
purportedly, not wholly internal. The illegal drugs trade is viewed mostly as an external
problem in that most people do not believe that a large amount of drugs are intended to
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stay in the country. Instead, the drugs leave and move north to the US and the UK. What
does stay behind is the guns and ammunition, which has armed the criminal element of
the country more efficiently than its own police force.
The element of self-projection is not as clearly explained. Townsend’s article in
Foreign Policy Magazine does attest to a certain projected image of the nation, however,
this image is limited to an audience who will concern themselves with international
affairs. The layman will not really glean this same image of Trinidad and Tobago, nor
may he even know where the country is located. The most popular image projected by the
country still remains its carnival and calypso music, and possibly its more renowned
sportsmen like Brian Lara and Dwight Yorke. More recently, the reality television
celebrity of former national beauty queen Anya Ayoung Chee135 has spread the country’s
image abroad as an idyllic island nation rather than a main point of drug transshipment.
In this way, Trinidad has unintentionally exerted some level of soft power through
cultural exchange. Thus there is once again a disconnect between the official and general
levels but this time on a larger scale. While travel advisories against Trinidad have been
issued by both the US and UK governments, at various points in the last five years, the
average person is unaware of these concerns.
As for the perception of the other, among the general population there is a both a
desire for a more Americanized lifestyle, yet there is suspicion of US (or any foreign)
presence in the country for official reasons. The idealization of the American lifestyle or
the desire for American products has played a role in fueling organized crime, gang
violence and consequently the drug trade in the country. According to former PM Basdeo
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Panday, it is a problem with the creative imagination in the region as a whole in that the
abilities of the human capital remains untapped and bombarded by foreign elements. He
states:
“Let us look at the extraordinary paradox in which a region endowed with such
immeasurable creative intelligence, such genius, is regarded as the region of the
world most dominated by imported cultural product. Television programming
consumed in the Caribbean region is said to have a higher imported content than
all other countries, somewhere around 95 per cent. In essence, the Caribbean has
been recolonized by the hegemony of American media, much of it delivering a
surfeit of gratuitous violence. Much of that programming also contributes to the
identity crises afflicting many of our young people.”136 (Hall and Benn, 5)

The increased crime rate and the perception that drugs are more prevalent in the
country comes directly out of the economic struggles of the everyday person and an
acceptance of the flouting of certain laws as ok, such as illegal vending, driving illegal
taxis,137 selling pirated movies and music, as well as selling drugs. The opinions
surrounding marijuana differ to the opinions on harder drugs such as cocaine, and heroin
use seems to be more or less non-existent in the country except in those persons who
have been exposed to it abroad and returned home with a desire for it. This illegal activity
and the underground economy which builds up around it, gives these persons additional
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income with which they can afford to purchase the latest fashions, electronics and go to
parties. This lifestyle, which in itself is heavily influenced by what is broadcast in the
media as the things to do, serves to fuel the illegal drug trade in some measure, since
participation in this section of the illegal economy generates the highest and fastest
returns. This is interesting because through the perception of the other, the true strength
of nationalism can really be demonstrated. While the US fashions and media are indeed
very popular138 and an influence to the entire population, members of the general
population both recognize the way in which it can potentially influence the criminal
elements, yet would not react favorably should they have to curb their own consumption.
Additionally, they distance themselves from those who would be so negatively influenced
by insinuating that they absorb different messages from the same media which makes
them want to ‘get rich quick.’ It is with this picture of the illegal drug trade in Trinidad
and the policy dynamics involved that the primary data from Focus Groups and the
Delphi Study were collected.

FINDINGS
In Trinidad, four Focus Groups and one Delphi Study were conducted. There
were twelve male and eleven female members of the general population recruited for the
focus groups. Focus Groups 1, 2, and 4 were conducted at a private residence in the south
of the island, while Focus Group 3 was conducted at a private residence in the north.
Despite these locations, participants in each group were not necessarily from the south or
the north, but found that location convenient to get to on the scheduled day. The Delphi
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group consisted of one member of the Ministry of National Security and two members
from the Special Narcotics Arm of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.
Focus group participants were first asked to fill out a questionnaire (see Appendix
I), which asked age and ethnicity along with questions intended to make them think about
their awareness of both their perceptions of self and perceptions of the illegal drug trade.
Most focus group subjects estimated that they are somewhat aware about the methods
used to address the illegal drug trade in the country. Those who selected very aware fell
into the older age groupings (36-45 and above). As for the perception of their awareness
of the illegal drug situation in the country, many subjects felt they were very aware (10 of
the 23 subjects, across all age categories except the 46-55 year grouping).
In Focus Group 3 many of the participants found a problem with the question:
How do you self identify (see Table 1 on Focus Group participants’ self-identification).
This group consisted of five young adults in the 26-35 age category and one in the 36-45
category. Most of these participants found that there was not an option on the
questionnaire that described how they would self identify. Participants in other focus
groups did not have this problem and the majority of respondents checked “by
nationality” without hesitation.
The problem for the members of Focus Group 3 however, seemed to be that they
self-identified at much more individualistic level than the respondents from other groups;
many of them mentioned that they would faster self identify according to gender or
family name rather than any of the options listed on the questionnaire. This indicates that
in the younger age range making up Focus Group 3, there may be somewhat of a
movement away from macro identification like to an ethnic group. Should further
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investigation find a general movement away from fragmented forms of identification
such as ethnicity however, this may prove to be a good thing since it may lead to a
rebalancing of the political situation which is very ethnically polarized. While the
participants who fell into the younger age category (18-25) did not voice the same sense
of discomfort with this question, one entered “name” in the other category. It is likely
that, since both participants in the 18-25 year category participated in Focus Group 2, in
which other respondents were senior to them, they may have felt more inhibited in
expressing their concerns where no one else was.
The problem of self-identification was an unexpected occurrence in Trinidad.
Going into the research, the assumption was that respondents would choose ethnicity as
their form of self-identification. However given that ethnic division is a tense point in
social relations, subjects may have avoided selecting that option because they were in a
group setting. The fact that (at least within the 26-35 age category) some respondents had
an issue with this question is also indicative that they did not consider nationalism as a
primary form of self-identification.
The questionnaire was followed by an approximately hour-long guided discussion
session (see Appendix II for Focus Group discussion questions). Respondents were asked
their opinions on government actions to combat the illegal drug problem, their perception
on US involvement in these efforts, and how they felt that the situation in general
affected the country’s image. The title of this chapter summarizes the main impression of
the country’s projected image. It comes from a female respondent in Focus Group 1, who
asserted that the national cultural elements such as steel pan, Carnival and Calypso music
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outshone the image of Trinidad as a purported narco-state. This sentiment was reiterated
by respondents in all four focus groups and speaks to the theme of self-projection.

Table 1: Self-Identifiers for Focus Group Participants in Trinidad
Age Group
SelfIdentifiers

18-25

26-35

36-45

46-55

56-65

65+

Focus Group 1

Nationality

-

-

3

1

2

-

8/9/2012

-

-

-

-

-

-

6 participants

Ethnic
Group
Religion

-

-

-

-

-

-

(2 male, 4

Other

-

-

-

-

-

-

female)

No Answer

-

-

-

-

-

-

Focus Group 2

Nationality

1

-

-

1

-

1

8/15/2012

-

-

-

-

-

-

6 participants

Ethnic
Group
Religion

-

-

1

-

-

-

(3 male, 3

Other

1*

-

-

-

-

-

female)

No Answer

-

-

-

-

1

-

Focus Group 3

Nationality

-

1

-

-

-

-

8/17/2012

-

-

-

-

-

-

6 participants

Ethnic
Group
Religion

-

-

-

-

-

-

(5 male, 1

Other

-

3**

-

-

-

-

female)

No Answer

-

1

1

-

-

-

Focus Group 4

Nationality

-

4

-

-

-

-
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-

-

-

-

-

-

5 participants

Ethnic
Group
Religion

-

-

1

-

-

-

(2 male, 3

Other

-

-

-

-

-

-

female)

No Answer

-

-

-

-

-

-

8/23/2012

*This person entered “name” as their primary identifier
**In this group, one person entered “as a person,” the second person left it blank, and the
third entered “all of the above”
In the following sections, focus group data is discussed according to the major themes
which emerged in data analysis. The Delphi Group is discussed separately since the indepth knowledge of drug policies in the country in relation to the US added different
dimensions to the themes coming out of the focus group data.
From the focus group data, three characteristics of national sentiment have
emerged – distrust of authorities and foreign assistance, cultural inertia, and latent fear
for individual safety. This has led to an endemic bystander effect amongst the general
Trinidadian population wherein witnesses to illegal acts will remain silent for fear that
speaking up will put themselves or their loved ones in danger.139

Corruption, Distrust, and Fear
In focus groups conducted in the country, members of the general population have
alluded to knowing the individuals at the top of the organized crime hierarchy, aptly
labeled Mr. Big or Big Fish, yet there has been no consistent public outcry or demand for
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the apprehension of these individuals due to the aforementioned elements of national
sentiment. According to one participant (Focus Group 4, Female, 26-35):
“There is a dealership in central Trinidad and everybody knows, this is a big
dealership, and everybody knows that the dude is involved in drugs, everybody
knows it...The man pays cash for everything that he buys. Where he getting that
from? Cash! Cash for everything that he buys… [and] the thing about it is, is that
the amount of police that this guy is involved with. He is the sponsor of crime
watch ok?”
Another respondent (Focus Group 2, Male, 36-45) adds:
“You have in the past where politicians got up in the parliament and said that they
know who Mr. Big is. Yet five years later nobody have an idea who Mr. Big is
[referring to the fact that there has not been any public statement from these
politicians regarding the naming of the so-called Mr. Big]. And if it is that you
serious about containing this illegal drug trade, and you know who Mr. Big is,
why not go after him? What are you [officials] afraid of?”
This shows that despite public suspicion (and sometimes just shy of confirmation) there
has been no overt action on the part of the general population to clamor for justice in this
area, nor does there seem to be an organized official effort to either put these public fears
to rest or deal with the individuals. Another contributor (Focus Group 4, Female, 26-35)
rationalizes that the reason for the lack of outcry is general fear:
“The ordinary citizen may, if they already know who it is, be too afraid, if they
don’t have any kinda financial backing or any kinda thing, they will be killed,
their families will be eradicated.”
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In direct response to this, another subject adds (Focus Group 4, Female, 26-35): “People
just into themselves and their families well-being. It not affecting you directly, so they
not really have any kinda passion or interest to say like I’m gonna do something about
this.”
Therefore this also illustrates the lack of public action when it comes to known
drug lords operating in their villages. One participant from Focus Group 2 (Female, 4655) noted: “Very often the known drug dealers in the community are also the community
leaders…so you had like Dole Chadee. Dole Chadee did a lot of work in Piparo and did a
lot for the people in Piparo.” Dole Chadee was perhaps one of the most well-known and
feared drug lords in Trinidad in the 1990s. He had a large estate in the village, Piparo and
there are anecdotes of him stopping his car and offering random Piparo residents a ride
home on occasion. These residents despite knowing his dealings, felt it would be better to
accept a ride with him rather than act suspicious in his presence by refusing, out of fear
for their own safety. This is ironic given the fact that they extended their time in his
presence in order to safeguard themselves. Mark Guerra was another such example. He
was frequently referred to as ‘a community leader and known drug dealer’ in local
newspapers. However, his prominence in the community led to his receiving numerous
government contracts and funds in order to continue assisting in community
development.
Similarly the public is quiet regarding past insurrectionist group Jamaat Al
Muslimeen. Despite this group almost ousting the 1990 NAR administration and
wounding then PM ANR Robinson, the group was given amnesty from prosecution for
that event. In later years, there have been numerous crimes allegedly linked to the group
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including murder, kidnapping, drug running, and bank robbery. There have been
consistent claims from the authorities that there is insufficient evidence for these crimes
to be formally attributed to the group, yet there still remains a general public fear of the
group and its associates.

Disconnect between Government and General Public
The fact that respondents in all focus groups seemed unaware of the nature of
cooperation with the US regarding issues of illegal drugs and the level of suspicion
expressed for the motives of such cooperation demonstrate the disconnect between the
government and local authorities, and the civil society. One respondent (Focus Group 1,
Male, 36-45) states: “There was a recent statement by the new minister of National
Security, Jack Warner that he's not going to talk about his policies. And I think that that
kind of thing is unsettling. I mean he just chooses to not talk about it for “reasons”, we
don't know if they're political...,” displaying his own sense of how he felt the
disconnection between himself as part of the citizenry and the government in their
decision making. Following from his statement, another participant (Focus Group 1,
Female, 36-45) says: “The government is supposed to be releasing information on the
policies they have. A lot of the information we are getting is from the media. This TV
station say that, and this newspaper say that. But if the government wants us to feel
secure, they need to release something that we could see comes from the Office of the
PM.” Rounding off this conversation, another participant (Focus Group 1, Female, 36-45)
says: “Citizens need to be aware of what the policies are, and there is no communication
between the government and the citizens where drug policy is concerned. It is just
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something that you know, that they are trying to curb the drugs that are coming into the
Caribbean and into Trinidad and Tobago, and especially because we are in such a
strategic point for the exchange of drugs. But as a citizen look at us here, we have no idea
at all. And we read the newspaper everyday and we look at the news everyday, but we are
still not aware.” The conversation from Focus Group 1 aptly demonstrates a sense of
alienation between the official and general level. While the same point about then
security minister, Jack Warner’s, statement that he would not discuss his policies was
also mentioned by participants in other focus groups, here the continuity of this
conversation succinctly showed that these average persons (participating in the group)
did not feel as though the government made the effort to share information that would
make them feel safer or build up their faith in its actions.
Without a strong linkage between the official and general level, strong
nationalism cannot exist. As such, there has been a fragmentation in the Trinidadian
identity wherein foreign ideals (read: the American Dream) are glorified in one breath
and reviled in another. Moreover, this idea of the American Dream has been distorted by
the notion of little effort with large payouts touted by the illegal drug trade. There seems
to be a division within the Trinidadian society with regards to the perception of
“American-ness.” On the one hand there is the idea that foreign things (products, foods,
media) are better in quality than the local versions, yet on the other, there is the idea that
the glorification of an American lifestyle is what motivates criminals. The belief seems to
be that the “get rich quick” attitude is a derivative of American culture and one which is
promoted through popular American music and programming. In that respect, a nuanced
opinion emerges in that Trinidadians can hold both beliefs simultaneously, and while
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they consume or aspire to consume American products, they try to distance themselves
from those involved in gangs or organized crimes with the latter as their reasoning for
their criminal actions. This speaks to a necessity for otherness that stills underpins the
Trinidadian identity in that the average Trinidadian needs to justify criminal actions as
foreign to the Trinidadian culture.

Attitude to US Drug Policy
In my focus groups, participants generally seemed to have a good understanding
of the way in which the global drug trade works. Some were able to comment on the
transportation routes with specificity, others were able to speak about the economic
aspect, and yet others were able to talk about the linkages between drug trafficking in the
region and the influx of guns and gun-related crimes. But what does this understanding
ultimately mean? In describing the nation as one in which the problem of illegal drug
trafficking has become endemic, it seems to suggest that it is inherently thought of as part
of the nation’s identity. However, there is some level of alienation in this association,
since although it is accepted as part of the islands’ dynamics, the interviewees felt the
need to affirm their own distance from this illegal industry. In Trinidad, unlike Jamaica,
there is no distinction (Van Schendel-type) between illicit and illegal. All drugs from
marijuana, to cocaine, to heroine are viewed negatively. There is no doubt that a large
number of youths, mostly between the ages of 15-30 partake in marijuana usage.
However, the use of it in public is not done, in glaring distinction to Jamaica, where
people would smoke marijuana on the streets of Kingston, even near police officers,
without punishment.
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There seems to be anecdotal awareness of a consistent US presence in the
country, based on statements made by focus groups subjects who have either heard about
training program exchanges or seen them conducting drills at one of the less populous
beaches on the island. The particular witness of the latter, expressed faith in US forces
training local personnel and swayed the members of that group to a similar opinion.
However, the group made the distinction between this type of training exchange and
more overt roles for foreign personnel, citing the assigning of non-Trinidadians to the
positions of former Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of police as (in hindsight)
grave mistakes on the part of the PP coalition government. There is the belief that even
though there is some level of inter-agency exchange with the US (and other countries),
Trinidadian personnel should ultimately spearhead any drug interdiction/counter-drug
security programs. However, even in that belief, there is the underlying collective faith
that foreign individuals who have been brought in will make a significant impact on the
drug and crime situation and a collective deep disappointment and almost anger when
these individuals fail to deliver.
Merely from conducting the focus groups it was possible to see the way in which
inertia operates in the country. From the first question on US assistance and involvement,
respondents were adamantly against outside influence even resulting in the expression of
suspicion towards the real motives US assistance, for example, “Trinidadians will never
accept an intervention from the US,” to “they are really using the radar stations to
monitor Chavez.” However, as the hour-long session progressed and the subjects began
to get into issues of local corruption, the idea that foreign assistance or strategies crept
back in as a desirable maneuver. One respondent (Focus Group 1, Female, 36-45) states:
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“I think we need to have a plan to follow. There must be some plan in another country
that has worked for them and maybe we can pattern our approach to dealing with the
problem like that, and that can only come from a foreign country.”
Contrasts in personal opinions arose from asking about US involvement or policy
relationships with the country immediately conjured the image of overt US intervention
for respondents. This type of intervention is perceived as unwelcome and generally bad.
However, respondents in Focus Groups 1 and 4 asserted that though the type of
assistance needed to be carefully examined to ensure that the sovereignty of the country
is respected, outside assistance definitely brings hope for some resolution to the crime
situation (which is seen as being fueled by the illegal drugs trade). One respondent
(Focus Group 4, Male, 26-35) expressed initial faith in the Canadian police commissioner
and deputy police commissioner who at the time of this research had just tendered their
resignations and left the country:
“I also think that they [Trinidadian authorities] don’t have the correct expertise for
this, for example when the government got in to power they brought in foreigners
for the police commissioners, the police commissioner and the deputy
commissioner, but we didn’t see anything done by these guys. Initially I thought,
my feelings about that were ok, maybe if we have some foreign help, that you
know these guys are experts in this area, the crime is going to reduce
significantly…”
This respondent however, went on to say, “…but that in itself is a problem. You bring in
foreign people, they don’t know the culture here; they don’t know the crime culture here
so how are they supposed to combat it?”
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Therefore the average Trinidadian views the promise of foreign assistance in somewhat
of a contradictory manner. While there is the initial hope that foreign personnel will
impact the crime situation, there is also almost a gleeful sense of ‘I expected it’ when
these personnel fail. Yet this is still coupled with the idea that local authorities are
incapable of overcoming the corruption within their ranks to put forth any large-scale
organized effort against crime.

Self-Perception
There seems to be a perception that while there are certain government members
and officials are corrupt – these persons being the higher up actors in the drug trade –
corruption within the ranks of the police is more prevalent. Therefore, there seems to be a
greater distrust for the police than the government, possibly due to the fact that there is
more direct interaction between the police and the general population than the
government and the general population.
There is a perception of Trinidad playing a greater role in the drug trade than US
reports or global statistics have indicated. According to participants, the country is highly
involved in drug transshipment, which they have directly linked to the presence of guns
and gangs in the country. However, it is possible that given the research topic,
participants assumed the country to be playing a greater role than they had previously
realized and tailored their answers to suit this perception. This fits into the reactionary
attitude that sometimes arises in Trinidadian society. Further questioning illustrated that
these segments of the general population perceived themselves as significantly distanced
from the drug activities (despite having seen suspicious activity at some point, or
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knowing someone who uses illegal drugs), and generally do think about it as directly
affecting their daily lives.
Focus Group participants in general seemed openly aware that the radar stations
in the south of the island meant to monitor the coastline are frequently/mostly nonfunctional, therefore, it is not difficult to conclude that drug traffickers in the country or
with ties to the country, will also know this and therefore take advantage of it.

Societal Division
When it comes to the subject of privilege or victimization of certain segments or
ethnic groups in the country, every group was able to draw the same conclusion – that
while certain groups, such as Syrians and Whites, rich private business owners and
government personnel with high positions were allowed to skirt the law when it came to
their purported drug trafficking activities, the small distributors selling on ‘blocks’
nationwide, who are mainly black male youths between 15-35 years old, tended to be
targeted and imprisoned by authorities with frenetic frequency.
The perception of drug involvement among the business elite seems to be
commonly held as there was some allusion to this in all focus groups. There seems to be
particular zeroing in on the Syrian ethnic group as the source of the large shipments of
drugs entering the islands, as one respondent (Focus Group 4, Male, 26-35) puts it, “you
ask anybody who is at the head of the drug trade in Trinidad and Tobago, you think they
gonna say the people in Laventille and Morvant? They not gonna say that. They goin’ to
say the Syrians.” In fact, a certain family of business elites was named in Focus Group
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1140 as one of the top groups responsible for bringing drugs into the country. The mention
of this name caused visible discomfort for the rest of participants, yet one subject
(Female, 36-45) added that, “these names are the most respected and reputable names in
our business community. And they have built a lot of businesses in Trinidad and Tobago,
and they are flourishing businesses and all of us partake of whatever is in their stores and
shops and so on.” Subjects went on to further link the actions of this business elite class
to the ethnically divided political parties in the country: “If you’re talking about the you
know, Afro-Trinidadian/Indo-Trinidadian politics, I think both political parties are
supported by the business elite” (Focus Group 1, Male, 36-45). This rationalizes the
perceived special treatment afforded to this sector despite their possible involvement in
illegal drug importation. The view here is that a patron-client relationship has developed
wherein the political parties find them necessary sources of funding. However, subjects
don’t see there being faith to one party or the other. Instead, ties are formed with both
sides in order for “business” to carry on as usual regardless of the party (or ethnicity) in
power.
In comparing the opinions from the focus groups, there was disagreement over the
rationale for apprehending small time drug distributors (who are usually males falling
into the 15-35 age range). While Focus Group 4 thought it was simply because the
division of labor of the drug trade as it operates in the country predisposed these smallfries to being easy pickings so the authorities could claim they are tough on drugs, Focus
Groups 1, 2 and 3 saw a deeper, more nefarious reason for the victimization of this
segment of the population. They felt that not only in an effort to look good, but in an
140
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effort to cover up sloppy police work or allegations of unfairness in their activities, police
officials would pin drug charges on all persons fitting the demographic. This speaks to
the perception of corruption within the ranks of the police force and the distrust with
which they are viewed. These focus groups took place shortly after a young man had
been shot by police and afterwards been labeled a drug dealer, so this made their opinion
and the expression of this opinion much sharper than other groups.

Unofficial Solutions
Some subjects seemed to place some level of faith in crime stopping elements
outside of the official channels, particularly Ian Alleyne, the charismatic host of a
television show named Crime Watch. This show encourages people to record crimes in
progress and send in the footage or call in and give anecdotal evidence about crimes after
which the host and his cohorts (along with police) proceed with their own investigations
of these crimes. He claims to “fight for the rights of the citizens” of Trinidad and Tobago.
However, this form of quasi-vigilantism has won over some individuals in the country
and has further eroded the faith that is placed in the police service. One respondent
(Focus Group 2, Female, 65+) believes that, “a lot of the drugs that they find are through
him. I dunno if people have confidence in the police service,” with another adding the
opinion that a lot of crimes have been solved through him. However, another respondent
stated that the television show and its undertakings are “quite superficial and just
publicity” which actually seeks to paint the police service in a negative light due to pay
offs to steer public opinion in that direction. Regardless of the motives of this personality,
one respondent (Focus Group 2, Male, 56-65) very succinctly sums up the usefulness of
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this program for the general public: “I think that people get a sense of satisfaction from
seeing things happen and that is it. He’s a showman.” This statement reaches the heart of
the public’s opinions and perception of the way in which the illegal drug trade is handled
by local and US authorities. Due to the lack of visibility of the methods and effects of the
operations carried out jointly or independently, the general public resorts to a negative
impression of the handling of the drug situation and the motives of the US in its
involvement in the country.

Delphi Group
The Delphi Group consisted of one female participant coming from the Ministry
of National Security (MNS), and two male participants from the Organized Crime,
Narcotics, and Firearms Unit (OCNFU) of the police service. According to the two police
service participants, there is a significant foreign presence in the country to assist in
issues of illegal drugs. One respondent (OCNFU) lists: “I think in developing our drug –
and of course the relationship that we have with the US government and other interested
developed countries in the region, the British have a presence here, the Canadians, the
French, the German, the Dutch and whatever interests they may have in the region would
also impact upon whatever policy we develop.” In 1998, Trinidad had requested that a
DEA office be opened in its capital, Port-of-Spain. This high level of foreign presence
and the request for it is not something which the general public seems aware of. In fact,
in comparison with the responses to the Focus Group questions, it is unlikely that these
outside influences would be very popular if the public were made aware of their
presence.
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This expert group as a whole felt that in spite of the presence of foreign personnel,
the main issue that is prioritized in formulating drug policy was the impact on the local
population. Specifically the nexus between illegal drugs and crime and issues of drug
abuse which may also influence crime. From this, maritime interdiction was mentioned
by one respondent as one of the first priorities of constructing local drug policy since this
is the first logical step in safeguarding citizens. It is also felt that there is not a large
market for drug consumption in the country, and that the drugs coming in a really
destined for the US and Europe, and even the Far East and South. Drugs that have
transited Trinidad have been tracked as far as South Africa in recent surveys and mapping
of transshipment routes.
Since the drug situation in the country is understood as one of mainly
transshipment with very little cocaine and heroin remaining in the country, it is explained
by the experts in this group that the main consumption market in developed countries is
so much larger, that it is just expected that they would have a strong influence on the
policies formed in transshipment zones to prevent the drugs from reaching their shores.
There is also the tacit acknowledgement that the country by itself does not have the
capacity to really impact the trade and traffic of illegal drugs and therefore the foreign
presence is necessary since it provides much needed funding, training and equipment.
Along with foreign country presences, however, there is also the presence and
influence of international organizations such as the OAS and the UN which seek to
influence policy directions. 9/11 was mentioned in the session as a prime example of how
Trinidadian policy as well as nationalism is influenced by the US. In the post 9/11
atmosphere there was more pressure to maintain complementary policies in order to
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maintain the relationship between the states. One example in particular is that large ships
carrying containers of goods are now subject to x-rays when they were not in the past. If
cargo ships from Trinidad do not have documentation showing that they were scanned
prior to leaving, they will not be allowed into US ports. This has encouraged Trinidad to
procure the proper equipment to conduct these scans so that legitimate trade would not be
disrupted by this new requirement. Thus Trinidadian trade policy has altered as a result of
US drug policy requirements.
One respondent (OCNFU) in the expert group states that “we mustn’t lose sight of
the fact that the US is holding the big stick and you need to do this or else.” Therefore,
this official held the impression of at least quasi-imperialism from the US. We must
understand that the views expressed by this respondent are personal rather than the
official views of the state which has historically cooperated fully with US drug policy
influences and certification requirements, even at the cost of the popularity of the
government administration in so doing. However, this respondent unlike those from the
general population focus groups is more aware of not only the illegal drug situation as it
operates in the country, but the policies of the nation to deal with it and what goes into
the construction of these policies – that is, the outside influences/international pressures.
So this response is highly emblematic of the way in which the policy relationship is
perceived. Another opinion coming out of this expert group is that developed countries
are not doing enough to stem demand and that in general they have a greater
responsibility to establish demand reduction programs to shrink the market in their own
countries.
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The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative is one of the large funding projects run by
the US to deal with the issue of illegal drugs in the region. According to one expert
(MNS), this Initiative has been reinvigorated in recent years in response to the success of
other US strategic programs in other areas, namely the Merida Initiative and Plan
Colombia. The renewed effort with the CBSI was a means of placating Caribbean leaders
since the success of extra-regional plans purportedly shifted trafficking routes back to the
mid-90s routes through the Caribbean Basin. The expert acknowledged that there was a
lack of empirical data to suggest that there was in fact an increase in the volume of illegal
drugs moving through the region, but it is noted that the purported increase in traffic
coincided with a dramatic increase in violent crimes throughout the region once again
concretizing the illegal drugs-small arms linkage.
The expert group estimates that the image that Trinidad has acquired actually acts
as a deterrent for potential mules and couriers coming from the mainland since they know
that detection is so stringent in the country. They surmise that the dominance of
Caribbean Airlines throughout the region oftentimes does not give them the choice to
avoid Trinidad when trying to smuggle drugs especially to the UK. Some may end up
trying to go through Brazil, which is mentioned as another major transportation hub but
this route is more costly for traffickers and therefore less desirable. The Trinidadian
image is further seen as affecting the drug situation for the smaller states in the Eastern
Caribbean since traffickers trying to avoid Trinidadian security checkpoints altogether,
will instead stop off further north before continuing to their final destination. While being
a longer route, this poses less risk to traffickers since the smaller islands do not have the
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same technology and security capacity as the larger Trinidad, thus, Trinidad’s image of
being more secure negatively affects the security of the neighboring smaller islands.

CONCLUSION
In the introductory chapter, a quote from the former ambassador to Colombia was
mentioned – specifically, it stated that for US drug policy efforts to be successful, it was
necessary to provide alternatives to criminal livelihoods, build clinics and roads and
generally things that would build up poor communities and give people an
impetus/incentive not to participate in the illegal drug trade. This generalized statement
does not fit for Trinidad. Yes, there is an underprivileged group within society. However,
building clinics and roads will do very little to change any illegal behavior emanating out
of these communities. Aside from road conditions at various points between elections,
that area of Trinidadian infrastructure is fairly well developed. Additionally, the public
health amenities available to the average citizen are arguably better than in the US, given
its medical insurance situation. This is not the solution for Trinidad. Capacity building
must be taken on at a different level, one, which will seriously be viewed as an
infringement of sovereignty if it were to be mandated or undertaken with overt US
influence or as a result of US pressure. It is that Trinidad requires a certain level of police
and judicial reform that will restore the integrity of its justice system. Simply increasing
the legitimate economic opportunities for the underprivileged groups is not enough. A
stronger fear of impunity must be embedded into the society at all levels in order to
redirect society away from lawless behavior.
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One question that arose out of conducting all focus groups was, why were
participants so inured to the illegal drug problem when they perceive it as such a rampant
and thriving societal ill? One respondent (Focus Group 1, Male, 36-45) summed it up by
saying; “I think we've gotten used to the drug issue being around. I think you kind of get
numb to it. The numbness that you need to stay sane has set in.” Additionally, the
government involvement in this seeming patron-client relationship with the “big fish” is
also tolerated, despite the criticism it receives in casual settings. This was summed up to
a mixture of the aforementioned cultural inertia and fear, as well as a feeling of distance
from the illegal drug problem.
It was interesting to compare the views of the Delphi group to the those of the
focus groups regarding the image of the country as a result of the way it deals with the
illegal drug issue. The average Trinidadian was not aware of the high level of cooperation
with the US and mainly interprets the image regarding illegal drugs as negative
(especially since there have been travel advisories issue against the country in the past).
However, since the expert group was privy to the level of cooperation and have probably
been made aware of the accolades it has received in US state department reports (like the
INCSRs), they believed that the country’s image was more favorable. This contrast
shows that in not disseminating information about national drug policies more clearly, the
general population segments participating in the focus groups have “assumed the worst.”
Delving further into the issue of self-perception and perception of the other, there
is the view that the US has displayed some level of hypocrisy when it comes to its
domestic drug enforcement. While Trinidad (and presumably other Caribbean countries)
have been encouraged to enforce a zero-tolerance policy when it comes to possession of
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illegal drugs,141 in certain states of the US there is the tolerance of possession below a
certain cap. This disequilibrium and lack of uniformity across states is viewed as an
unfair luxury which the US has as the bigger power in constructing the drug policy tone
for the hemisphere.
While there seems to be a distinctive cleavage amongst the general population and at
the elite level to some concept of being Trinidadian, the distinctions still remain clear in
the perceived ethnic divisions of labor within the drug trade – i.e. that “small-man” being
the black youth and the “big fish” being white or Syrian – as well as in national politics –
which are still generally acted between black and indian communities. In response to
illegal drug policy coming from the US therefore, while the feelings of discomfort and
suspicion are there, the nationalist reaction is very weak because of the idealization of
American culture and products that has become to pervasive within the country.
Therefore influence from the US regarding local illegal drug policy construction is
mostly 1) not visible enough and 2) not important enough to warrant a national reaction.
Therefore Trinidad can and has historically (and continually) displayed an extremely high
level of cooperation with the US in matters of drug policy because there is no hindrance
from either the popular, elite or intellectual level.
Thus even though in focus groups with members of the general population, they
expressed the need for the US influence in Trinidadian drug policy, it seemed important
to them that Trinidad remain autonomous in its decision-making. They also seemed to
situate the illegal drug problem that Trinidad faces as primarily a US problem that affects
the country due to its location as a convenient transshipment point. This serves to create
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further distance between the average Trinidadian and illegal drugs. However, similar
distancing is undertaken by the US in describing the problems of illegal drugs being the
supply and weak or disorganized security efforts in southern states of the western
hemisphere.
The lack of transparency about cooperation efforts is perceived as US-mandated
and results in distrust over the true motives of the hegemon in its assistance. It has even
been suggested that the reason for the presence of certain technologies, like the radar
stations on the south coast are actually for the US to monitor Venezuela rather than to
assist Trinidad in its fight against illegal drug trafficking.
It is possible to say that US drug policy influence creates a reactionary effect on
nationalism in Trinidad but to say that this effect is lasting or has strengthened or
weakened the Trinidadian identity, would be going too far. The high level of cultural
inertia makes isolated instances in which US policy influence is really visible (like the
Shiprider Agreement, or the issuing of the travel advisory) elicit an immediate surge in
nationalist sentiment from the general population. However, these sentiments tend to die
down with the passage of time and the status quo maintains. While the issue of the illegal
drug trade seems to have permanently affected the population’s self-perception of the
magnitude of its role, there is not any overt expression of this in daily life.
Increasingly gruesome crimes, like a severed head being placed on a table top at
an outdoor bar and a 21 year old’s dismembered corpse being dumped in a river are
leading citizens to draw comparisons between Trinidad and countries which have
experienced glaring illegal drug violence such as Mexico and Colombia. These
comparisons have been made despite these incidents not being reported as drug-related in
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local media. Therefore, it shows that the average Trinidadian does in fact place the
country in the same category as countries known for illegal drug operations. This speaks
to the idea of self-perception of the general population. Moreover, the consistent calls for
snap elections (not only with the current coalition government, but with the previous
administrations as well) from critical segments of the population and the derogatory
moniker of minister of national (disgrace and) insecurity given to Jack Warner142 (the
minister of national security)143 shows that there is a lack of faith in the handling of these
security issues at the official level. The lack of faith in the government further illustrates
the disconnect between the general and official levels within the country. However there
is no evidence to show that there is faith in the opposition, which leaves the question of
where are Trinidadians hoping to turn for solutions or to whom?
At the Caricom Intersessional meeting in Haiti in February 2013, PM PersadBissessar stated that crime in the country was creating a loss of $200 million per year in
tourism revenues. Given that she (and previous leaders) have specifically linked crime to
the illegal drug trade means that this is directly impacting legitimate national earnings.
The fact that Section 34 was repealed upon the issuance of a statement against it
by the US embassy, shows that at the official level there is the desire to acquiesce to US
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ideals. It was not until the input from the US came through, that action was taken by the
government to reverse the law and allay the situation. The reaction time of the
Trinidadian government shows a type of pandering to the US that truly demonstrates the
asymmetry of the power relations. It also demonstrates that the citizenry is fairly
powerless in bringing about change (the protests against the passage of the Section 34 bill
were not sufficiently large or organized, and came after the government had already
repealed the amendment) at the official level internally again showing that there is a lack
of cohesion between official and general channels. Another example of the Trinidadian
government taking cues from the US is in the recent establishment of drug courts to
reduce the clogging in the already slow justice system. The 2011 INCSR highlighted that
Trinidad required a dedicated drug court to assist in the prosecution of drug related
crimes in a timelier manner. Despite having local complaints about the inefficiency of the
justice system going unheard for many years, the current coalition government instituted
a new drug court in August 2012 for the first time. From this, it can be determined that
nationalism is not sufficiently engrained in the population to bridge the gap between the
civil society and the government, which is why the power asymmetry is so incredibly
glaring.
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CHAPTER 5
JAMAICA: NO PROBLEM?

INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the case study of Jamaica in the exploration of how US drug
policies affect small state nationalism. Recalling and utilizing the primary components of
nationalism explained in Chapter One – self-perception, perception of the other, and selfprojection – the case study will explain the conceptual pattern that emerged through the
data collection and discuss the major themes that became clear during analysis. In the
Jamaican case, I am particularly exploring the following questions:


Has there been a deepening of inter-class or community tensions in Jamaica in
response to US drug policy actions



Have anti-US sentiments increased in the country in response to these actions



Do government statements emphasize the country’s cooperation and
complimentary drug policies with the US, or instead has there been an assertion
(or exaltation) of independent policy formation?

The information for this chapter draws from four focus groups conducted in Kingston,
Jamaica which sampled from members of the general population, and the four-member
Delphi Study conducted with experts coming from the Jamaican Ministry of National
Security, the University of the West Indies, and the Jamaica Constabulary Force; along
with secondary data found in the local newspapers, policy documents and speeches.
The rest of this section explains the lead up to independence in Jamaica and the
important leaders who fostered the initial sense of Jamaican nationalism which allowed
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the country to move from colony to independent state. It also opens the discussion on
how the society became open to the illegal drug trade. The following section provides
further context on the Jamaica case before leading into the findings collected from the
focus groups and Delphi Study. The findings are further discussed in relation to two key
illustrations of the interaction between US drug policy and Jamaican nationalism, the
Shiprider Agreement, a US-proposed bilateral maritime security treaty, and the
extradition to the US of Jamaican drug don Christopher “Dudus” Coke.

Nationhood
Jamaica’s path to nationhood grew out of a labor movement in the late 1930s,
beginning with sugar workers, moving on to dock workers and then ultimately on to the
city workers, for nationwide strike and protest. This was the lower working class segment
of the Jamaican population. The middle class could also empathize with the concerns of
diminishing wages and standards of living. Enter Norman Manley, a British educated
lawyer, who crossed class lines to take up the plight of the sugar workers and help them
in their rally for a better wage. Manley’s attempt to unify these two classes to form a
cohesive anti-colonial movement, however, was not completely successful as his middle
class followers were not ready to follow him across those class lines.144
This is where the charismatic Alexander “Busta” Bustamante comes in. Though
he was Manley’s cousin and initially worked with him within the same party, they
eventually became the diametrically opposed voices leading the People’s National Party
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(PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). Under the PNP, Bustamante created the
Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU), which brought together the sugar, banana,
and port workers. Unionizing these masses had the effect of creating a multi-class
supported institution, and later this became the platform through which Bustamante broke
away from the PNP to form the JLP.145
Manley fell short in that he did not have the same multi-class support until later
on in 1952 when he created the National Workers’ Union (NWU) and employed his son
Michael to lead it and really reach the working class. This is why after universal suffrage
was passed in Jamaica in 1944, Busta’s JLP won the election. It was not until Manley had
successfully achieved his multi-class coalition through the NWU, that the PNP was able
to defeat the JLP at the polls (in 1955 and again in 1959). At this stage, even though the
political parties were both established and recognizable entities, it was really the
personalities of Manley and Bustamante that fostered loyalty from party followers.
Manley moved the middle class to political consciousness, while Bustamante involved
himself in the 1938 workers uprising and due to his dedication (to the point of
imprisonment), he became known as ‘the people’s champion.’ These two men brought
the path to nationhood to life in Jamaica.
By independence in 1962, the two political parties were healthy representations of
the entire post-colonial population of Jamaica. What developed in the fight for the polls
however, was what Clarke refers to as a habit of “partisan-political violence.”146 The poor
ghettoized areas of Kingston became regions of high political tension between
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communities as political leaders from each side granted concessions to one community or
the other in an attempt to secure votes or intimidate their opponents.
This involved a large-scale gerrymandering scheme in which housing projects
were undertaken in Kingston’s working-class constituencies which transplanted voters
for one party or the other into that area as a means of securing that area in the polls.
Political leaders therefore began arming residents of these areas so they could either
defend themselves against residents from the opposing party or so they could disrupt
party gatherings of the opponents in that area and intimidate voters on election day. This
clientelistic relationship evolved in the post-independence years and it is here where the
issue of illegal drugs crept into the national dynamics of the country. The provision of
weapons by political leaders, not only helped to secure votes, but also encouraged a wider
range of illegal activities.147
As the habit of violence became passed onto newer generations and the political
role as supplier of weapons rescinded, these groups found new ways to arms themselves.
The now organized gangs – the Shower Posse (JLP) and the Spanglers (PNP) – with the
help of some transnational ties in the US, gained the power and used their political
protection to engage in marijuana trafficking to the US.148

Garrison Communities
Figueroa and Sives (2002) characterize garrison communities as “a totalitarian
social space in which the options of residents are largely controlled.” In the period
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leading up to and directly after independence these areas were controlled by the
politicians. For example, Edward Seaga (former Prime Minister of Jamaica from JLP),
was responsible for converting Back o’ Wall into Tivoli Gardens in 1962. This
conversion was at the time a modern, government sponsored housing project which was
subsequently filled with JLP supporters. Likewise Wilton Gardens, named for former
Minister of Housing Wilton Hill, was created in the Trench Town area (also a JLP
stronghold). Arnett Gardens (also called Concrete Jungle) was a similar project
undertaken by the PNP. Politicians created, delineated and populated these areas, and
proceeded to protect them at the polls by arming its residents. This cemented a linkage
between political violence and clientelism in the garrison communities of Jamaica.
Violence became not only a form of political expression and support, but also an
expression of Jamaican masculinity as a sub-culture of the poor developed which
distorted the (national) self-perception among males in this community. Gunst explains
that these young men, influenced by the violence of their neighborhoods and the
idealization of the US “gangster movie culture” which had become popular at the time,
aimed to become “tropical bad guys acting out fantasies from the spaghetti westerns,
Kung Fu kick flicks, Rambo sequels and Godfather spin-offs that play nightly in
Kingston’s funky movie palaces and flicker constantly behind young men’s eyes.”149 This
identification with the national collective based in violence therefore, does not fragment
the underprivileged population in a way that alienates them from a larger national identity
since the strong party affiliations upon which it is based ensures that there is still a
nationalistic quality even to the distorted self-perception.
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According to Sives (2002) the high level of political violence emanating out of
the garrisons was connected to the need of these “newly enfranchised” populations to
develop a political identity that gave them a sense of belonging (to the state).150 In their
eyes, they were protecting their party, by protecting their territory and acting out against
the other.
In 1972 Michael Manley began using the Rastafarian symbols such as the rod of
correction and reggae music which once again brought legitimacy to a marginalized
population. Granted, in this same time period, there were many other social and religious
movements which were more marginalized, but Rastafarianism was the most socially
digestible of them and it gave Manley the power to push a more radical political
agenda.151
Additionally, the ideological division between the JLP and PNP became imported
from the wider context of the Cold War. The JLP became the ‘protector of democracy’
while Manley’s PNP followed a ‘third path.’ This deepened inter-party notions of
difference and fomented the political violence which very soon after worsened due to
economic hardships. While Manley is generally charged with introducing democratic
socialism to the country, Lewin argues that Manley’s third path platform was not really a
socialist experiment but rather more rooted in self-reliance but his ideological ambiguity
made it easy for the JLP to spin his words in a direction which they knew would gain US
attention and secure their return to power.
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Regardless of individual intention, this added a new dynamic to the political
identity of the average Jamaican in that the JLP became the capitalists, against the
socialist PNP. It also served as a linkage between the projection of a national identity and
Pastor’s characterization of cyclical foreign policy between the US and these developing
regions. By projecting this third path image, and through the JLP’s emphasis on the
socialist nature of Manley’s political platform, Jamaica was able to gain more attention
from the US. Granted, this attention may not have been positive in the Cold War setting,
but it is emblematic of the important role which identity projection plays in Jamaica’s
foreign policy relations with the US.152

CONTEXT & BACKGROUND
Thoumi (2002) has theorized that certain competitive advantages must exist
within a country for the drug trade to take hold.153 In looking at the potential for Jamaica
to become a major player then, we can see that there are three rationales which support
the health of the illegal drug trade: the receding of the local patron-client relationship
leading to the rise of drug dons/community leaders; the international patron-client
relationship with the US that somewhat precipitated that internal power shift; and, the
already prevalent local use and acceptance of marijuana which served as the gateway for
the illegal drug trade to grow.
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Local Patron-Client Relationship
Gunst explains that the nature of the drug trade in Jamaica has its origination in
that relationship between the government and the posses. Posses have become the
reference for the political gangs in the country, a term which in itself is a reflection of the
cultural seepage from US media (those previously mentioned spaghetti westerns). She
describes the members of these gangs as almost tribal in their affiliation to either the JLP
or PNP and as such brings to life the warring metaphor that characterized the 1980s
election process. She describes the explosion of drug trafficking through the island as a
direct result of a patron-client relationship between the government and the posses gone
horribly wrong.154
This relationship was purportedly so strong in the early post-independence years
that Gunst refers to two such posses, the JLP Phoenix and the PNP Vikings155 as though
they could be some type of sports teams playing out violence in the streets of Kingston.
In the late 1970s, an exodus of gang members to the US had already begun and ties were
being forged with Colombian and Cuban drug runners. However, after the 1980
election156 especially, the relationship between the politicians and the gangs changed and
the politicians viewed their ‘mercenaries’ as becoming too big a threat.
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This led to police raids in these garrison communities which essentially fomented
the exodus of gang members to the US and strengthened the ties with the transnational
organized crime syndicates. The complexity of the relationship between the government,
posses and the garrison communities is of particular note since the government still
maintains a somewhat symbiotic relationship with the posses in order to secure voter
support. The posses play an integral middleman role in garnering and holding political
support for whichever party they are affiliated with. However, the funds from illegal drug
trafficking has empowered posses in a way that has allowed them to replace the state in
the social contract, in terms of providing security for residents of their communities or
even loans for educational pursuits, toys, books and clothing for children.
This leads to an increasing distance between residents of the community and the
national institutions such as the police. Reactions to the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF)
entering the garrisons during the Tivoli debacle157 for example show the lack of faith and
trust awarded to the state appointed security forces. Their manner of dealing with the
Dudus stand-off is viewed by residents of Tivoli Gardens as a traumatic event and a stain
on their community’s history, with which they are still grappling to come to terms.158

International Patron-Client Relationship
While marijuana, cocaine and crack transshipment became a big business in the
mid-70s, in the early 1980s, heroin finally entered into the mix for the Jamaican drug
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trade pioneered by Eric “Chinaman” Vassell, an East Kingston posse leader who
migrated to New York. Thus the 1980s marked a dramatic change in the structure of the
garrison communities as dons no longer drew their power from the protection of the state.
Instead, the higher profits from the drug trade allowed dons to get out from under the
reins of the political parties and instead they became entities of their own. Garrisons have
been referred to as “states within a state”159 due to the fact that the garrison leaders (dons)
manage these areas almost autonomously. Even though they still serve their original
purpose of garnering votes and voter intimidation, they no longer require funding,
contracts or weapons from the political leaders as now they can provide themselves with
these things due to drug profits. This does not mean that they no longer receive boons
from the government, since dons now receive other incentives such as construction
contracts as a way of assuring their continued closeness with the political party.
Structural adjustment programs from the IMF in 1980s came with conditionalities
to end government spending on housing subsidies for the poor. Thus the IMF limited the
politician’s ability to smoothly continue the patron-client relationship which could be part
of the rationale for why illegal drug trafficking was able to so easily fill that void. Not
only had its debt relationship with these institutions changed, its relationship with
creditor nations also changed.160 It further explains why cocaine trafficking was able to so
easily transfer the power away from political leaders and to the dons, since the constraints
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from the international arena curtailed alternative actions that politicians may have taken
to secure the continued relationship.
Since the rollback of this relationship, the JCF and JDF have purportedly moved
in to fill this vacuum, with reports of police brutality and harassment, and levying of
“taxes”161 against garrison residents and other citizens for no reason. This has opened up
these institutions to allegations of considerable high-level corruption, though it is unclear
if they (the JCF and JDF) are acting independently or as proxies for the politicians in
dealing with the dons given that international bodies have criticized and somewhat
curtailed the relationships of political-patronage that have historically characterized these
garrison communities.
Most recently notorious don, Christopher Coke maintained a legitimate
relationship with the state as a businessman alongside his illegal activities.162 Dons have
also begun providing for the residents of the garrisons under their rule as noted by Gunst
in her explanation of the “treat” provided by a particular posse leader residing in the US
to his garrison back home.

Prevalence and Acceptance of Marijuana
Culturally marijuana in Jamaica was not just used for smoking. As discussed later,
marijuana had many uses outside of “drug culture.” Yet the country’s reputation as a
producer built and concretized during the rise in drug use in the 1970s as the demand for
161
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marijuana in the US increased. Thus in the following decade when cocaine trafficking
was introduced, Jamaica’s attempt at filling US demand for marijuana had already
established transshipment routes and criminal linkages which the South American cartels
could easily piggyback on to move cocaine. Gunst estimates that while marijuana has a
long history of use in Jamaica, transshipment and cocaine traffic first became apparent as
a problem in the period leading up to the 1980 election. She blames this on JLPsponsored posses who moved the drugs through the Newport West ports of Kingston with
the main destinations being Miami and New York – the areas in which the largest
numbers of the Jamaican diasporic community had settled.163
Cocaine use is also blamed in part for the explosion of violence for that 1980
election as it emboldened the garrison gunmen, arguably “[creating] monsters [their
politician sponsors] could no longer control.”164 Along with shipments of drugs, of course
there were also guns coming in to the country.165 The guns tended to stay behind as per
usual in the drug trafficking industry.166 For Jamaica, these guns were leftover vestiges of
Cold War weaponry, such as Uzis (for which a gang member was nicknamed), M1s and
M16s. These high powered weapons had basically taken over the small arms scene in
Jamaica by the 1980s.
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OBSERVATIONS IN JAMAICA
The cultural atmosphere of Jamaica is decidedly more formal than Trinidad’s. The
attachment to titles and the emphasis on church going is pointedly juxtaposed to the
violent crimes that seem to be plaguing the society. While there news reports of a violent
incident against a family of women rocked through Kingston and likely the rest of the
island, becoming a top story. 167 It was even brought up at a local church service which I
attended, wherein the worship leader, a man, began to cry during the call to worship
prayer. This is a striking contrast between the machismo often associated with Jamaican
men and the sensitivity to violence expressed in the church. It revealed a nuance of
Jamaican society, wherein there is the perception of both a strong sense of religion and
morality in the community (there being one church per square mile in Kingston, and
Jamaica purportedly having the highest number of churches per capita in the world) and
at the same time a perceived problem of gang and drug-related violence.
Prior to my travel to the island, I had been given multiple warnings of Jamaica
being a “hard” place. To date, I have not been able to fully comprehend this
categorization. There seems to be a certain level of silence or perhaps collective shame
and derision when it comes to the violence in the country. For example, in a tour of
Kingston, I was able to visit Tivoli Gardens now infamous for the 2010 police stand-off
which led to the extradition of Christopher “Dudus” Coke. However, there were no street
signs indicating that this was in fact Tivoli Gardens. Instead, there were signs directing
traffic to New Kingston and the Kingston Market. So this supposedly dangerous area was
without a city-planning label, while the exit was clearly marked. It is unknown if this
167
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omission was intentional or simply overlooked but it insinuates that the “shame” for this
area that seems to be felt at the official level.
This is not the first instance of official-level attempts to reform the identity of
this area. It was previously called ‘Back o’ Wall’ and was renamed in the 1960s when
former PM Edward Seaga168 developed the community. Moreover, from speaking to
members of the general population, I learned that while Tivoli Gardens has been renamed
officially, the residents of this area cleave to their own designations, so some may live in
Tivoli while others may reside in “Jungle,” an unofficial name for a certain area behind
Tivoli Gardens.
This shows that there is a sense of alienation from the macro level of
identification for these Jamaicans. While these residents will primarily self-identify as
Jamaicans, they have not gone along with the official naming of the area, showing that
the power of the state in this area is not sufficiently socially embedded to warrant the
acceptance of a new name, if given by an opposing political party. In looking at the
relationship between Christopher Coke and these residents, we can understand why this is
so. Anecdotal evidence shows that he has helped the community by paying for students to
go to school, assisting with the purchase of schoolbooks, offering transport and security
168
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for these residents. Therefore, Coke replaced the state in the social contract for this
community, so even though these people can identify with a macro version of being
Jamaican, this does not translate to their relationship to the government machinery as it
did prior to the 1980s before the patron-client power shift occurred. This fits with
Premdas’ views on the development of sub-national identities, yet not in the way he
describes, since he focuses on ethno-national identification. Instead, we can see here that
the community level identity replaces ethnicity in Premdas’ argument as the sub-national
factor which so heavily influences the expression of the macro-level nationalism.
There is a contradiction in the official acceptance of Tivoli Gardens at this face
value (regarding its labeling) and its significance in general elections. The Tivoli seat is
an important seat for the legitimacy of any government administration. In the past, Seaga
(JLP) had close links to the community and groomed his protégé to assume the
constituency after him. Only if the ‘community leader’ in the area accepted the successor,
would they be successful in their tenure with that constituency and this success could
make or break a political career.
The culture of violence juxtaposes the ideals and prevalence of the Jamaican
religious community. Violence has become a given in the society, insofar as popular
dancehall songs not only advocate it – violence against homosexuals, gun shot/gun
cocking sounds etc. – but they also demonstrate the normative reactions to this violence –
hitting the ground upon hearing gunshots, or running. In the local movie made to
celebrate Jamaican track athletes, the titular question is posed to many segments of the
population – “Why do Jamaicans run so fast?” It then becomes poignant when dancehall
artiste, Elephant Man, responds that this is because they have become so accustomed to
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hearing and running from gunfire, that when the starting gun at the Olympics is fired,
they are engrained with the flight response in order to survive. While these are merely
observations from touring the city and attempting to find an appropriate context in which
to fit the researcher’s own perceptions of the country, the focus groups and Delphi Study
discussed in the following section directly addressed the question of how the state’s
nationalism was affected by US drug policy.

FINDINGS
In the four focus groups conducted in Kingston, Jamaica, there were 30 adult
participants in total – 18 female and 12 male. The groups were conducted at three
locations: a local church, a private residence, and on the University of the West Indies
Mona Campus. Participants were first given a questionnaire (see Appendix I) to collect
the following basic information: age, ethnicity, self-identification, awareness of the
illegal drug problem in the country, and awareness of the methods to address the illegal
drug problem in the country (see Table 1 for a breakdown of the self-identification and
age distribution in each group). Each focus group was then asked to discuss a series of six
questions (see Appendix II) to determine their awareness of and feelings toward their
government’s methods of dealing illegal drugs, as well as their feelings about the
involvement of the US and perceptions of its role in creating solutions for the illegal drug
problem in the country. The focus groups were also asked if they thought that the way in
which the country had dealt with illegal drug issues had affected the image of their
country abroad. These questions were meant to bring out the perspectives relating to selfperception, perception of the other and self-projection.
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It was expected that participants would express an aversion to US involvement in
matters relating to illegal drug policy, even if they were unaware of what the policies
were. It was discovered that the participants were more knowledgeable about the drug
situation in their country, more so than those in Trinidad, which right away hinted that
the illegal drug problem played a role in their self-perception.

Table 1: Breakdown of Self-Identification in Focus Group Participants
Age Group
SelfIdentifiers

18-25

26-35

36-45

46-55

56-65

65+

Focus Group 1

Nationality

5

-

-

1

-

-

9/21/2012

-

-

-

-

-

-

7 participants

Ethnic
Group
Religion

1

-

-

-

-

-

(3 male, 4 female)

Other

-

-

-

-

-

-

No Answer

-

-

-

-

-

-

Focus Group 2

Nationality

-

1

1

3

1

-

9/23/2012

-

-

-

-

-

-

8 participants

Ethnic
Group
Religion

-

1

-

-

-

-

(2 male, 6 female)

Other

-

-

-

-

-

-

No Answer

-

1

-

-

-

-

Focus Group 3

Nationality

6

-

-

-

-

-

9/26/2012

Ethnic
Group
Religion

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

7 participants
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(4 male, 3 female)

Other

-

-

-

-

-

-

No Answer

-

-

-

-

-

-

Focus Group 4

Nationality

-

1

1

1

3

1

9/26/2012

-

-

-

-

-

-

8 participants

Ethnic
Group
Religion

-

-

-

-

-

-

(3 male, 5 female)

Other

-

1*

-

-

-

-

No Answer

-

-

-

-

-

-

*This respondent wrote in “Name” as their primary self-identifier.
Younger persons seemed more interested in participating in the study, while older
subjects asked for more explanation about the research. and many of those approached
seemed hesitant to get involved despite assurances that they would not be asked to
directly speak about persons involved in gangs and/or the drug trade. Respondents fell
into the Black (21) and Mixed (7) ethnic categories. One person provided “no answer;”
for the ethnicity question and another chose “other,” entering “Jamaican” as their
ethnicity thus attributing a quasi-biological quality to the idea of self-perception in the
national construct. This question was intended to spark thought of cultural division
amongst respondents in order to bolster responses to group questions.
The homogenization of the answers however, suggests that ethnicity may not play
as great a role in societal division here as it seemed to in Trinidad. In Jamaica, division is
founded not upon racial and ethnic lines as in Trinidad, but along class and political party
lines. During the focus groups, many respondents distinguished between themselves and
the supposed corrupt politicians by saying that those people lived “uptown,” or the gangs
and drug dons as ‘from the garrison.’ Thus distinctions here center on party affiliation or
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whether you live uptown, country, garrison or gully. Uptown refers to those upper and
upper-middle class residents of the Kingston and St. Andrew parish while country seems
to refer to anything outside of Kingston and St. Andrew. Garrison as previously
mentioned are those urban housing schemes set up by one political party or the other, and
gully as has been conveyed through media and music, refers to those living in the poorest
or most violence prone urban areas. What emerges however, is the idea that even the
societal division at its very base has some nationalistic origins in that party affiliation is
very closely associated to where one lives and that the political party followed is
ultimately the best one for Jamaica’s continued well being and future.
The following sections discuss the general themes that were visible in all four
focus groups. The Delphi group is discussed separately since it provides counterpoints to
some of the views expressed in the focus groups, namely the idea that the government is
very actively trying to stem the flow of illegal drugs and its effects not as a follower of
US policies, but as a collaborating partner.

Self-Perception and Attitudes to Ganja
From the focus groups sampled from the general population, their understanding
of the US-Jamaican relations with regards to illegal drugs is very apparent. Through the
spread of age groups, participants understood the nature of policy relations entailed the
constant threat of decertification and that aid for different endeavors such as healthcare
was dependent on the formation of complementary drug policies. There was also mention
of the idea that local official level perceptions of marijuana have forcibly changed due to
the pressure from the US to create and uphold complementary policies. One respondent
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(Focus Group 1, Male, 46-55) suggests that marijuana is only illegal in Jamaica now due
to the influence from the war on drugs, noting that when he was a young man it was
considered just another herb in his neighborhood which people used regularly to make tea
or season meats.169
The cultural acceptance of marijuana and the opinion that it was not necessarily
something that required US policy attention was not a major revelation in the general
focus groups. While the participants themselves chose to distance themselves from
marijuana users, they also did not see it as a big problem: “We doh have that problem like
in America where you see people on the road doing it [referring to cocaine]. Most people
do ganja. People who smoke ganja, is normal to smoke and chill. But dem stink up the
place sometimes man. And now there are some youngsters that are literally going senile
because of it. I know one in particular” (Focus Group 3, Female, 18-25).
When asked questions about drugs, they generally took this to mean marijuana
alone which is indicative of the image of Jamaica held by not only outsiders, but also the
average citizen. Therefore the perception of Jamaica as a ‘ganja’ nation is not merely a
projected image, but also one that has seemed to permeate the society and the way that
they self-identify. Subjects did express displeasure with the lack of enforcement of
marijuana use and one respondent (Focus Group 3, Male, 18-25) pointed out that there is
a certain level of ‘ganja tourism’ in that foreigners will visit the island for the purpose of
buying and smoking weed with impunity. He further cited his experience on a trip to the
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151

US, where people assumed that he would naturally partake in smoking weed simply
because he came from Jamaica.
A trip to New Kingston confirmed that lack of enforcement, as people were able
to smoke on the main streets in close proximity to the police without consequence. My
guide later informed me that while marijuana use is tolerated and more or less considered
licit, to use Van Schendel and Abraham’s distinction between licit and legal.170 I was told
also, that if a person were openly holding a very large amount, the police would take
action.
One respondent (Focus Group 2, Male, 18-25) believed that the reason
government rhetoric against marijuana has remained unchanged despite reports which
itemize the benefits of legalization, is due to the influence of the US. The US being the
major market has a vested interest in stemming the flow of marijuana through its borders.
However, the general public acceptance of marijuana in Jamaica means that there is not a
similar drive to quell cultivation and use locally.
Despite Jamaica no longer being a major exporter of marijuana to the US since
the grade is generally lower than US-grown marijuana, there is still policy pressure from
the US on controlling supply. This is a vestige of the war on drugs/drug policies towards
the Caribbean Basin as they were in the late 1980s-mid 1990s which has not changed.
Therefore, the drug policies towards the region or at least Jamaica have stagnated in such
a way that there is pressure on the country to create policies that do not necessarily match
the current social climate. This means that there will be unnecessary defense
spending/funding and policing in this regard on the part of the US coupled with
170
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inordinate pressure on Jamaica to uphold policies against marijuana which are
contradictory to its general public opinion and also not necessary given the evolved
nature of the marijuana supply chain. Marijuana consumed within the US now comes
mainly from local producers or Mexican sources.
This is generally preferred to Caribbean strains of marijuana since the growing
methods used locally (in the US) such as indoor hydroponics result in a faster maturation
and higher tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content which makes these strains more desirable
for the average consumer. According to the UNODC World Drug Report (2009), while
the cannabis plant can grow in a variety of terrains and climates, conditions such as light,
humidity, temperature and soil acidity can affect the potency of the final product. 171 Thus
with outdoor growth which is typical in Jamaica, the THC levels can vary from harvest to
harvest while controlled indoor environments will yield plants with consistently high
THC levels. Additionally, there has been the evolution of these locally produced crops to
mimic flavors such as blueberry, peanut butter, grape, and cheese (to name a few), which
hold a greater allure than the original “herb on the hill” produced in the Caribbean.

US-Jamaica Relations and Drug Policy
Some focus group participants showed a lack of understanding of the meaning of
cooperation with the US regarding the drug issue, despite showing an understanding of
the general nature of the policy relationship and the operation of the drug trade. When
asked whether or not the US should play a greater role in assisting Jamaica with regards
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to the illegal drug trade, one respondent (Focus Group 1, Female, 18-25) exclaimed that
“anytime the US helps, Jamaica plummets into further debt, so No!”
Additionally, there seemed to be a lack of awareness of if there was already a US
presence in the country to deal with the current drug situation and this lack of awareness
was blamed on the Jamaican government not reporting this information. Moreover, some
respondents thought that even though there may be snippets in the local news reporting
the current situation, that these reports are vastly overshadowed by the reporting of the
prevalence of violence in the country instead. This was deemed not only the fault of
media houses but also the fact that the general public is less interested in these features
and more interested in the violence occurring in the country. Respondents, however, were
able to link the endemic violence to the drug trade in noting that the guns which
accompany drug shipments remain and are the root cause for escalations of violence. The
participants seemed less inclined to blame drug trafficking for crime, than for the
increasing levels of violence associated with certain crimes.
They made (probably unintentionally) a separation between the levels of violence
and the acts of crime.172 This is likely due to the fact that prior to drug trafficking being
noted as a serious problem for the country, Jamaica was already accustomed to a high
level of political violence as each political party unofficially enlisted gang leaders in
garrison communities to go out and secure votes. One respondent (Focus Group 3, Male,
18-25) claimed that the effect of drugs moving from Jamaica to the US was less than the
effect of the guns which stay in the country.
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Unlike in Trinidad where this separation does not factor into the understanding or the linkage between
drugs and crime
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There also was a high level of suspicion with which the regional hegemon is
viewed. This suspicion was mixed in with a perception of rampant corruption among the
ranks of local law enforcement and politicians. The distrust of the local government
seems to be tied to the suspicion about the level of US involvement in the country. One
respondent (Focus Group 2, Male, 45-55) stated:
“I have a cousin of mine, he’s in charge of the Caribbean Immigration services in
NY, so he has links with the DEA and them. A lot of things is happen in this
country that people don’t know because the American government, they have
certain people here who are sifting through even these politicians’ bank accounts.
So a lot of arrests will take place shortly. So the policy and implementation of
systems to deal with the policies, they are here.”
This shows that this segment of the population perceived an intense level of complicity
between government and organized crimes syndicates which move drugs between
Jamaica and the US. Moreover, it indicates the perception of the depth of political
corruption as well as the penetration of the US into Jamaican affairs, along with the
premonition of a nationwide scandal brewing on the horizon.
Coupled with the suspicion when characterizing the other, was also a sense of
blame attached to the perceptions of US-assisted solutions to illegal drug issues:
“They want us to fix the US problem. They really have no addressed it from their
end. They look towards Colombia and all these countries that traffic to fix it but
they, as people they have not, and they can’t, because again it’s political. Their
whole democracy, they can’t touch it so they have allowed it to become bigger
than they can manage and because America is so pro-democracy, there really is
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little that they can do that won’t infringe on somebody’s rights. So they dunno
what to do. They dunno how to fix it. But they are the ones that created it” (Focus
Group 4, Female, 36-45).

Corruption/Distrust of the Government
Across all groups, this picture of a high level of perceived complicity between
drug dons and politicians emerged. This is a quality already discussed in existing
literature on the patron-client relationship that built up during the early stages of
independence for the country. It is clear that the general consensus coming out of the
groups is that corruption which facilitates the illegal drug trade is a big problem for the
island.
A respondent from Focus Group 3 (Male, 18-25) stated, “I think the [Jamaican]
government have too much of a stake in it [the illegal drug trade], so they don’t try to
close it down. Well as in, when you hear it on the news that this politician is a friend with
like the criminal or something, I don’t think they would readily just shut down
operations.”
Respondents from Focus Group 4 (Male 55-65, and Female 36-45, respectively)
discussed this at length: “I think really we [Jamaica in general] don’t mind it [illegal
drugs] going through because we can benefit from it, we want the money. As I said there
is a drug fund in the government system. The tax office!” In agreement, she responds:
“The drug scene has created a sort of economy which we can’t deny. They…it’s
in every area. There is cash. Most of these apartment complexes that you see are
put up by drug traffickers. They have to invest the money somewhere and so the
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easiest way to legitimately deal with it in to put up an apartment complex in
somebody’s name, a cousin’s name, a mother’s name, whatever it is. And so it
creates this unnatural boom because it is not the average Jamaican who is able to
do this and that sub-economy is…I mean even the banks, they benefit. The banks
benefit, the money has to go somewhere and so there is benefit. So I don’t know
that they are gung-ho about stemming anything and one has to say, ‘What’s in it
for me?’ You know? The age-old question. There is something in it for them and
so they’re not about to do too much. But I mean you have to have an appearance
doing something.”
The preceding quotations show that even across age categories, there is similarity in the
perceptions of the Jamaican government’s facilitation of the illegal drug trade. This ties
into the theme of self-perception that has emerged in the study.

Perception of the Other
When asked about the perception of the US’ goals in Jamaica, one respondent (Focus
Group 2, Female, 26-35) emphatically stated:
“Listen carefully, when Spain wanted to be world power, what did Spain do? Go
out on a ship, send them Christopher Columbus and go, give him a flag and say
when you land in some place, stick your flag and say this is Spanish colony.
When England wanted to take over the world, what did they do? Go around, sail
the world, get a flag and stick it in and this is British colony. Now if Spain did
own the land before, what did they do in Jamaica? They had a war and they took
up Jamaica from the Spaniards. It’s the same thing happening to us today. When
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you hear the expression ‘all roads lead to Rome,’ it don’t just mean, oh we just
make road and have technology, it means that Rome intention was take over
everything – to conquer everything. So when it’s a world power, it is not staying
in the US. It’s a modern day effort to colonize this world. But we are more
intelligent now to fight it off. We are more organized now to fight it off. But what
do you have? Subtle intention. So if I can’t take your country and call it US
Jamaica, US Virgin Islands, US whatever-whatever, what do I do? I influence
your government and your policies. I sneakily come in and make your
government make decisions that benefit me as US country.”
This statement supports the idea that the US as an ‘other’ is viewed in the same terms as
colonizers of the nation’s past. As such, it lends support to the hypothesis of this thesis
that the stronger the distinction between the self and the other, the stronger the nationalist
reaction will be. In policy terms, the result is that within the general population, US drug
policies are viewed with deep suspicion and mistrust. Another participant (Focus Group
2, Female, 46-55) highlighted the level of mistrust by describing US involvement in
Jamaica over the Dudus incident:
“They are more involved that we even know, and it panned out in the Dudus
matter. The USA was in Jamaica doing all sorts of things whether legal or illegal.
And that is the problem that I’m having, because they were gathering information
on Dudus, Christopher Coke, but they were also tapping telephones. I hear that
they even had some aerial thing, satellite thing watching operations…Some of it
is done in collusion with our own people, some of it I understand we did not know
about it, so I think they are very involved…I hear them have politicians and other
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persons in the police force that they have under scrutiny and they are watching
because of the same involvement in the Dudus matter…They focus a lot on
Jamaica in terms of drugs in the Caribbean. In Jamaica it’s a big thing. And some
of it might be legal and some might even be illegal, maybe we don’t even know
we are being watched. Because they can pick up any of us house on satellite and
they can pick up any of us conversation. So my cousin might be a drug don and I
talking to him and I don’t know I’m implicated. And then I can’t get no visa.”
This comment is likely in response to fact that CARICOM had earlier in the year, signed
an agreement with the US allowing the overflight of unmanned aircrafts in order to track
traffickers and potential terrorist threats. According to the Jamaica Observer, “this policy
of drones surveillance by Washington…[results] in indiscriminate deaths of innocent
civilians.” The article goes on to call the use of drones a violation of human rights and
rule of law which has become part and parcel of relations with the US.173 There have not
been any reports of deaths caused by drones in the Caribbean region showing that while
the public does in fact seem informed about the strategies being implemented to combat
the illegal drug trade, it is paired with a high level of suspicion of “the other” leading to a
misunderstanding of some of these operations.
Another subject (Focus Group 2, Female, 46-55) was very adamant that
cooperating with US on the front of illegal drugs would eventually lead to a tearing of the
fabric of Jamaican society, particularly with regards to the Buggery Act, which she
believed should never be repealed for any reason. The notion was expressed with feelings
of disgust that US drug policy assistance should “happen the right way [rather than with]
173
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them pushing their nastiness on us.” This point was echoed by other participants in that
particular group, that acceptance of US policy influence could lead to an undue level of
cultural influence from the country eventually leading to a greater acceptance of
homosexuality. Obviously this a great leap into a different type of transference, yet it is
important to note how the US was perceived in that instance as overly liberal and morally
weak juxtaposed with a conservative and morally upright Jamaica. Focus Group 2
consisted mainly of churchgoers, who arguably make up a large percentage of the
Jamaican public, so their view, while skewed, provides a partial basis for the overall
suspicion with which outside influences are viewed.
This sentiment is further noted at the official level in the words of the former PM
Bruce Golding’s remarks that he would never allow a homosexual to occupy a seat in his
Cabinet. In a 2008 interview, he states, “Jamaica is not going to allow values to be
imposed on it from the outside.” The perception here of the US hegemon as immoral is in
direct contrast to the Trinidadian view of the hegemon as a moral beacon which in turn
implies that the impact on nationalism is weaker for Jamaica since the ‘other’ is
perceived negatively, and not as an ideal to which they should aspire.
Tangential to this idea, one subject (Focus Group 2, Female, 26-35) noted the
general perception that US aid/assistance always comes with a cost: “You know dem not
just giving to say ‘boy dem a give.’ It comes with a price you know. Eventually then
likkle by likkle dem come in and tell you how to do this, two twos, dem a tell you say,
you must take God out of school, two twos, you go hear say, we don’t have no kinda
thing; the US has taken over.”
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While the consensus among the focus groups was that the US involvement in
illegal drug policies in Jamaica was problematic and entailed a significant level of
pressure, there was also the sense that the US presence was necessary given the level of
internal corruption. The ideas put forth were that the US authorities were monitoring high
level persons in the Jamaican government in order to quell the flow of illegal drugs which
at once shows the perception of the other as an authoritative presence, and the self
perception of high level complicity between officials and organized crime. A respondent
(cited above) predicted an imminent large-scale scandal speculating that many highranking officials could be arrested in the near future.
Expanding on this information, this respondent and others in his group (Group 2)
felt that the US had the country under intense surveillance. This again ties into the notion
of perceiving the country as highly important to US interests. The most recent INCSR
makes the note however that “as a matter of policy, the Jamaican government does not
encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking; nor are any senior
Jamaican officials known to engage in such activity.” While this does not completely
negate the respondent’s comment, it does give some indication that the US recognizes the
existence of Jamaica’s anti-corruption rhetoric and may not be conducting the level of
surveillance estimated by the group. The report further states however, that there is a
need for greater anti-corruption legislation and that the country has not complied with the
stipulations of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption to create an AntiCorruption Agency. It also notes that there is some level of support for organized crime
activities at the level of the police force thus confirming multiple statements from focus
group participants on police corruption.

161

The meeting with the groups of experts also showed that there is somewhat of a
distrust of an external presence. The representatives from the Ministry of National
Security, while very friendly and willing to participate, also took their own recording of
the session without notifying the host or the other members in the room. While they did
not take this recording covertly, it was also not done in a way that allowed question and
their participation seemed dependent on their ability to make their own recording.

Self Projection
It is unclear how much this aspect of nationalism is really created by the self, here
Jamaica, and how much is the responsibility of the local and international media outlets.
One respondent (Focus Group 1, Female, 18-25) says that she was out of the country
during the Dudus affair and from watching the reports through US news, she believed the
country to be embroiled in an all out civil war. She continued to state that friends and
family living in the US and also watching the situation unfold in the media, contacted her
to ask if she needed refuge in the US given the bleak turn of events at home. Other
respondents in this group who were in the country at the time of the incident explained to
her that the situation was mostly contained to the Tivoli area, and yes, the entire country
was on high alert, but outside of Kingston, the violence related to this issue was minimal
and the situation was generally blown out of proportion. It shows that while respondents
viewed the Dudus affair as a serious security issue experienced in the country, they did
not understand in the same way as it was projected to the rest of the world.
Given the religious culture in Jamaica which lies in stark juxtaposition to the
violence which has been escalated by drug trafficking activities, it is ironic that Coke was
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apprehended in his vehicle at a security checkpoint riding along an evangelical preacher,
who assumedly was accompanying him en route to turn himself in at the US embassy.

Delphi Group
Among the Delphi group participants, there were two representatives from the
Ministry of National Security, one from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), and one
from the University of the West Indies (UWI). This particular mix of persons was
fortuitous given that the UWI participant has published much research on the drug
situation in the country both for academic and political bodies. The inclusion of this
individual was thought to be a good counterpoint to the presence of those representatives
from the Ministry of National Security and it was the hope that this would create lively
discussion of issue areas that were lacking or a source of national pride for the country in
the eyes of the experts. Though it was expected that there would be potential for
disagreement between these two parties, it was discussion between the JCF and the
National Security representatives where the main problem issues in Jamaican security
policy came to light. The JCF participant noted that the main obstacle for the proper
functioning of security forces in the country was the lack of comprehensive anti-gang
legislation which was promised under the rule of the previous government. When asked
where Jamaican drug policy was most lacking and why this policy direction may not have
been followed, the respondent stated:
“We believe that the reluctance of policymakers in enacting such policy is the fact
that there is a link between the drugs, gangs and politics. We believe that the
politicians use these gangs in gross ways and an Act that would make it illegal for
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gangs might in some way appear to be a betrayal of that trust that they have with
each other. And with that relinquishing of that link, then I think that the
politicians from pressure and advocacy from civil society would push them in the
right direction to have anti-gang policy. We know that we have had traps, traps
that we have been integral in putting together, but we have not seen that push
from the policymakers to have that…”
The representative from the Ministry of National Security responded to say that anti-gang
legislation was a number one priority which had been stalled by an election and the new
government’s decision to re-examine the terms of the proposal. The main issue to be
grappled with now seems to be the working definition of “gangs” for the Jamaican
government and this is what has prevented the enacting of this legislation. The slowness
of the proceeding of this policy was again commented on coupled with the notion that the
emphasis on definition was a trivial case of “semantics.” While the UWI representative
noted the importance of definitions in creating policy, they also believed that drug
policies have not been adequately implemented due to the lack of this anti-gang
legislation. This portion of the discussion was summarily put to rest by the Ministry
representative stating: “You going to get the anti-gang legislation, so don’t worry about it
at all. So we can move on from here. That’s the good news.”
In this group (and also noticed in the focus groups), there seemed to be hesitation
to outrightly say anything negative about either the Jamaican or US governments.
Particularly with the expert group, rather than use the names of countries or government
agencies, the term “key stakeholders” was used early on in the discussion and kept
throughout the session. In further talk on the lacking policy areas, one MNS
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representative believed that; “Far too little emphasis [is] placed on precursor chemicals
and a lot of persons in the area right now are just coming up to speed as to why this really
is. And even some key stakeholders haven’t even, there is no buy-in from them to support
the efforts, to strengthen our efforts against diversion of precursor chemicals ‘cause we
right now at the Ministry and other key stakeholders such as NIB174 [and] Customs, we’re
trying to have implemented the necessary legislation and control mechanisms that are
needed.”
There was also hesitation when the group was asked if they believe that there was
a significant level of pressure from the US to create complementary drug policies. Instead
the UWI representative preferred the notion that there was “strong advocacy” from the
US that did not constitute “pressure.” Later on in the discussion another word choice for
this was “convergence and divergence of interests.” The MNS representatives referred to
the policy relationship as “mutually beneficial.” The JCF participant also felt pressure too
strong a word and while the power inequality was recognized, it was felt that the
partnership and cooperation between the two countries was not limited in any way. The
direction of answers to this question led to the notion that due to the lack of resources,
there is a sense of gratitude for US involvement in the country’s counter-drug affairs
since important equipment, intelligence and training would have not been available to it
otherwise. This was a stark contrast to all the focus groups conducted in which the
answer to how the US role in the country was perceived, was a consensus across groups
that the US assumed a position of authority over the island and more or less dictated what
the policies should be. This difference may not necessarily be that the experts chose to
174
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wear rose-colored glasses or that they did not accurately describe the relationship in order
to be politically correct, but instead it might indicate that the only times where the general
public is included in the discussion of drug policy and US partnership is when the
government wants to stir public opinion in a way that will elicit a reaction that can be
used as leverage in the negotiation process, as implied by the details the media acquired
about the terms of the Shiprider proposal early on or Peter Phillips of the PNP175
releasing news of the Dudus extradition deal to the public, which previously was unaware
of its existence.

SHIPRIDER REACTION
The initial Jamaican reaction to the Jamaica-U.S. Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking (Shiprider Agreement) was
considerably different to that adopted by the Trinidadian government. In this case, the
cohesion between that official and general population level was clearly evident. In fact, it
is alleged that the public outcry against the Agreement was used as a tool by the Jamaican
government to negotiate for terms of reciprocity to be included.176 According to the
Jamaica Gleaner the country remembers the initial proposal as “a virtual stand-off
between the United States of America and this nation over the issue of safeguarding
national sovereignty.”177 This shows that despite the Shiprider proposal being merely a
175
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maritime interdiction agreement on the part of the US, Jamaica being the smaller state
felt that the stakes were much higher.
For the country, this was a matter of sovereignty, not just security. The agreement
was portrayed in local media as “Uncle Sam being his big, bad, bullying self”178 using the
threat of decertification to make islands in the Caribbean Sea conform to the standard
form of the agreement. Jamaica did not sign on to the agreement until 1998, two years
after most other Caribbean countries. The pressure felt from the US was not necessarily
just imagined however, since there were tangible “encouragements” from members of the
US diplomatic core. At the opening of the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement
Center in 1997, a join US-UN-Jamaican endeavor tasked with training magistrates,
police, military and customs officials across the entire region, Patricia Lansbury Hall
(then Director of the Office of Latin America and Caribbean Programs, Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) addressed the crowd briefing them
on the recent developments in international drug trafficking. She then proceeded to say
“We (the US) urge the Government of Jamaica, which has not yet signed a maritime coopertaion agreement with the US to seriously consider the ramifications of remaining
outside this co-operative effort especially the possibility of becoming a safe-haven to
traffickers. We further urge Jamaica to enter into similar agreements with other
Caribbean states and our Canadian and European partners.” This was viewed as a
vocalized veiled threat from the US government to decertify the island if it continued to
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reject the agreement. It is referred to as Landsbury Hall “throwing a punch”179 for her
country which was definitely the heavyweight in the ring.
In an interview with one subject matter expert,180 it was revealed that the details
of the Agreement might have been purposefully leaked to the media at the time as a
means of incensing the Jamaican public. This maneuver was instrumental since the
negative public reaction and the visible protests against the initial proposal, gave the
Jamaican government the leverage it required to refuse to sign even under the threat of
decertification. It was posited that the obvious possibility of instability that would be
brought to the administration if they signed, signaled to the US that is was more
important to negotiate the terms rather than risk national unrest on the island. This shows
that there is somewhat a symbiotic relationship between the general Jamaican public and
its officials. Thus in this case the policy proposal elicited a nationalist reaction that was in
fact able to influence the outcome. Granted this may be considered a moot win since the
clauses of reciprocity included are more symbolic than pragmatic. The fact is that
Jamaica does not really possess the resources to take the same level of maritime
interdiction actions as the US. However, the inclusion of clauses based on the principle of
reciprocity assuaged the Jamaican public and maintained the faith that they had in their
government’s ability to uphold the nation’s sovereignty.
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DUDUS EXTRADITION DEBACLE
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the extradition of Christopher “Dudus” Coke
in 2010 caused a crisis in Jamaica, involving the police and army storming Tivoli
Gardens and engaging in a violent clash with residents, a nationwide manhunt and state
of emergency, political upheaval and a temporary breakdown in US-Jamaica relations.
Coke was charged with running a large scale cocaine, marijuana, and firearm smuggling
operation and was required to face these charges in New York. The request for his
extradition in August 2009 was not immediately made public information and in
September 2009 the Jamaican government responded to the request saying that
insufficient evidence was provided to follow through with Coke’s extradition; further
stating that wiretapping evidence cited by the US government was illegally obtained
according to Jamaica’s Interception of Communications Act 2002 which holds that
wiretapping information can only be gained by local security forces and for such
information to be shared with a foreign source, there must be an official request.181 The
JLP then hired the US law firm Manatt, Phelps and Phillips to navigate the legality of the
extradition request. This is where the issue becomes murky in that the firm was
seemingly under the impression that they had been contracted as a representative of the
government, not the party, which appeared a glaring conflict of interest. The lack of
cooperation with US was mentioned in the 2010 INCSR which states:
“The [Government of Jamaica’s] GOJ’s unusual handling of the August request
for the extradition of a high profile Jamaican crime lord with reported ties to the
ruling Jamaica Labor Party, which currently holds a majority in parliament, on
181
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alleged drug and firearms trafficking charges marked a dramatic change in GOJ’s
previous cooperation on extradition, including a temporary suspension in the
processing of all other pending requests and raises serious questions about the
GOJ’s commitment to combating transnational crime. The high profile suspect
resides in and essentially controls the Kingston neighborhood known as Tivoli
Gardens, a key constituency for the Jamaica Labour Party. Jamaica’s processing
of the extradition request has been subjected to unprecedented delays,
unexplained disclosure of law enforcement information to the press, and
unfounded allegations questioning U.S. compliance with the [Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty] MLAT and Jamaican law.”
Whether or not the response of the Jamaican government was legitimately a concern for
the upholding of domestic laws throughout the extradition process or stalling effort to
keep Coke free, given his deep ties to legitimate Jamaican businesses and the JLP became
a contentious issue within local government, and through Wikileaks communications
released to the major newspapers and the opposition’s spokesman on National Security
Peter Phillips’ statements, the public was finally made aware that the plan to extradite
Coke was in motion. Bringing the public opinion into the matter along with the US
actions at the same time such as the delayed sending of a new US ambassador to the
country and the cancellation of US visas for certain Jamaican artistes, put great pressure
on the government to act quickly to resolve the matter. After nine months the government
acquiesced to the extradition request in light of US communications regarding the
concern over the drawing out of the process and the seeming lack of cooperation, but on
the domestic front, this decision resulted in chaos as the Tivoli residents began violent
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protests in order to keep police and military search parties out of Coke’s community. This
was the May 2010 standoff between the JDF and JCF, and the residents of Tivoli,
resulting in the deaths of 73 civilians. Coke eventually turned himself in and made a
public apology to the country for the violence that resulted from his manhunt. The sitting
JLP government however was not so lucky. An enquiry into the hiring of the Manatt,
Phelps and Phillips law firm was demanded in order to bring to light the true purpose of
this firm’s counsel.
The year following the Coke extradition, the Jamaica Gleaner conducted an
opinion poll in which the general population showed a high level of distrust in the local
government with 45% responding that they felt (then) PM Golding had been untruthful in
the Manatt-Dudus Enquiry and 15% responding that they believed he deliberately tried to
mislead the commission; 48% felt then Justice Minister, Dorothy Lightbourne was
untruthful, with 15% responding that they believed she had deliberately withheld
information. Only 12% of respondents thought that Golding was truthful in his
testimony.182 The tactics used in this instance wherein sensitive information was leaked
to the public in order to create pressure from public opinion clearly did not have the same
effect as it did in 1996 with the Shiprider Agreement. In the Dudus case, the tensions rose
to boiling point domestically but it did not alter the terms put forth by the US. In fact, the
Jamaican government was instead forced between two immovable forces neither of
which would compromise. In the end, the US interests won out over domestic interests in
spite of the violence erupting on the streets of Kingston. This shows that the bargaining
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position of the country was not the same as it was during the 1990s and that the US does
not view the nationalist reactions in the country in the same way as in past – there was no
possibility in this instance of democracy being destabilized in the country for example.
Following the Dudus affair, the anti-US sentiment from the general public became
much more apparent through the local media, letters to the editor and comments on the
online forums for the major newspapers (Jamaica Gleaner and Jamaica Observer).183
During the crisis however, opinions on the government and security forces followed two
extremes of either total support for their actions or harsh criticism for not stemming the
violence (or adding to it).184 Thus the public opinions coming out of the Dudus affair
demonstrate that not only is Jamaica in a weaker bargaining position with the hegemon,
but also that in crisis times, the disconnect between the official and general level is more
visible.

CONCLUSION
From both the focus groups and the expert group, it was possible to see that all
three components of nationalism (self-perception, self-projection, and perception of the
other) are strongly expressed by participants. While the perception of the other seemed to
favor notions of imperialism on the part of the US, survey data shows that the US is still
183
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an ideal type for a large portion of the population. Gallup survey data reveals that
approximately 17% of the Jamaican population would actually like to relocate to the
US.185
Other patterns that emerged from analysis of the focus groups were the perceived
level of corruption within the local government which not only added to the selfperception of illegal drug dons being a pervasive part of the fabric of Jamaican society
but also led to ideas that the solutions created internally would not be effective. Thus,
there was an acknowledgment that policy influences coming from the US were in fact a
necessary part of coming up with solutions to the illegal drug trade problems, but the
understanding of the problem itself amongst Jamaicans was that it derives from the US.
The attribution of blame, therefore, affects the perception of the other and the motivations
behind the solutions that are US-led or influenced.
In comparing the responses from the Delphi group and the focus groups, the stark
contrast in the perception of the relationship between the hegemon and the small state
emerged. While the focus group consensus seemed to be that there was some level of
dictating coming from the US, or at the very least linking financial assistance and
complementary drug policies, the Ministry of National Security, JCF and UWI
participants who made up the Delphi group felt that this is too strong a sentiment and that
instead the relationship is better described as a partnership. This difference in perception
of the problem hints at a disconnection between the official level and the general level.
However, in Jamaica, this disconnection was not strong enough to alienate the general
public enough so that they did not still actively utilize their political voice, which
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evidenced by the Shiprider and Dudus illustrations can be strong enough to impact or
slow down policy directions.
Jamaica does not have the same type of political leadership today as it did in the
1970s and 80s. There is no figure that approaches Michael Manley’s ideals in such a
powerful way as to once again risk good relations with the US. Despite the fact those
focus groups’ opinions were generally that the US uses undue diplomatic pressure and
creates economic hardship for the country, at the official level the feeling is that there is a
partnership with the US that does not operate on the basis of political pressure. In the
present day, there is a certain lack of political charisma among the politicians which
surpasses the inter-party rivalry. This means that the US will not find another Morales or
Chavez (or Manley or Bustamante or even Seaga) in Jamaica. Yet, this does not indicate
that the nationalism in the country is weakened. In fact, focus groups and the Delphi
group sessions revealed these persons to have a strong sense of distinction between the
self, cohesively as a nation, and the other. In some instances this meant that certain
limitations were emphasized – geographical limitations through consistent reference to
Jamaica as “the island” in place of other terms like “the country” – as were perceived
strengths – the morals of the citizens.
When looking at the issue of illegal drugs in the country the sense of nationalism
shows through the way in which participants understood the country’s role in the illegal
drug trade. Many participants expressed ideas that should Jamaican marijuana production
become legal, it would pose considerable competition to any US produced marijuana.
Thus there is even a sense of national pride surrounding the quality of the illegal product

174

despite the personal distance from illegal drugs that participants tried to emphasize in the
group discussions.
In addition, it became clear that with regards to the illegal drug issue, participants
viewed Jamaica as occupying a much different space in Pastor’s metaphorical whirlpool.
Despite the diminishing US budget allocations and more extensive media coverage of the
Mexican side of the illegal drug trade, participants still felt that the quality of Jamaican
marijuana made it a forceful contender today and a priority for US counter-drug interests.
This reveals a stark difference in perceptions of the country’s role and stake in the illegal
drug trade in the eyes of both countries. It also shows that within the focus groups, the
country was still perceived as a major producer of marijuana rather than a transshipment
hub for cocaine. While the INCSR does list Jamaica as a major producer of marijuana in
the region, it also notes that most of this production is for domestic consumption and
inter-Caribbean export rather than trafficking into the US territories.
In the mid-90s when Jamaica refused the initial Shiprider agreement and then
signed only after the reciprocity clauses were added the country was a much more
significant player in the illegal drug trade. At that time, the cartels were newly dismantled
and the Caribbean archipelago was still the primary transportation route for illegal drugs
coming into the US. As power shifts have occurred within the structures of illegal drug
organizations transferring power away from the South American cartels and to the
Mexican cartels, the land route through Central America has become more significant.
Thus, Jamaica today cannot abide the same threat of decertification and choose not to
sign on to a US proposed agreement should this situation come about again in present
time even though the national reactions are likely to be the same. The Dudus standoff is
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proof of this since even though there were numerous concerns from within the
government and opposition that legal channels had not been followed to acquire evidence
against Christopher Coke, the government eventually proceeded with the decision to
extradite Coke to the US, despite the predictable uprising in Tivoli Gardens.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION
Summary of Research Question
The purpose of the thesis was to uncover whether or not US drug policies towards
Jamaica and Trinidad had an impact on the nationalism in these countries. The
assumption from the outset was that it did in fact have an impact due to the asymmetrical
power relationship between these countries since their independence from colonial rule.
The sub-questions of the research interrogated the three components of nationalism –
self-perception, perception of the other (the US), and self-projection. The first question
was intended to look at the notion of self-perception, particularly whether the influence of
US drug policy altered the inter-ethnic or inter-class relations, thereby changing the
overall self-perception of the nation. In both case countries there is evidence that drug
policy has in fact affected self-perceptions. In Trinidad this comes from the apparent
division of labor186 that whether real or not, has become pervasively perceived
throughout the country. This has resulted in members of the Syrian and White
communities being labeled as the main puppeteers of the drug trafficking and distribution
(the so-called big fish), while the Indian community is viewed as the source of the
middlemen who physically bring the products into the country via fishing boats along the
south Trinidad coastline, and parts of the black community as the small time distributors
(on the block), enforcers, and largest pool of users. This ethnicity based division of labor
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also runs along the general lines of social division in Trinidadian society and harkens
back to the divisions within the population established during the plantation society. Thus
self-perception in the island has in fact become more fragmented in the sense that ethnic
unity, though never before concretized in Trinidadian history, has further broken down as
entire ethnic communities are placed into categories with clear boundary lines according
to the narrative of the drug trade and the methods used to combat it.
In Jamaica, the inter-class relations are affected in a similar way, wherein people
from richer or poorer communities are attributed their own perceived labels or roles in the
illegal drug trade. Again this perception largely comes from the way in which the
problem is handled and narrated in the country, for example, which people are sought out
and arrested in relation to drug crimes and trafficking, and from which communities.
Therefore, the separations of spaces like garrison community, gully, and uptown become
salient features of the self-perception landscape, leading to assumptions from individuals
in the general population such as, “you turn up your car windows when driving down
Lemon Lane,” or “the person who lives in that big house in Cherry Gardens will never be
touched by the police.” This symbolizes an internal division in the population based on
societal stratification. However, the division does not seem to surpass this sub-national
level preventing a cohesive nationalism from being expressed, which indicates that this
type of division does not necessarily make up the core of identity formation upon which
an individual’s understanding of his own national identity is expressed. At the national
level, there does indeed seem to be a cohesive sense of Jamaican-ness, regardless of class
which highlights a major difference between nationalism in Trinidad and Jamaica.
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The second sub-question focused on the perception of the other, mainly
examining if the perception of the US had changed in response to drug policy initiatives.
Trinidadian perceptions of the US seem to be mostly positive – given the sampled
population’s limited knowledge of what the drug policies were – with negative or
suspicious sentiments coming out only in direct response to highly publicized issues, and
only for short periods of time. Otherwise, the notion of the US as an idealized lifestyle
tends to pervade everyday life, from the fashion trends, to product choices, to desired
travel destinations, education opportunities and immigration options.
In Jamaica, the negative perception of the US is much stronger, yet more
Jamaicans that Trinidadians migrate to the US every year.187 Within the country the US is
seen as the harbinger of economic decline for the island due to harsh tied loan
arrangements. It is also seen as a consistent infringer on Jamaican sovereignty to which
Jamaicans have now become inured. As such, public opinion and local media coverage
tends to paint the hegemon in negative terms and political parties, while expressing the
high level of partnership with the US, also assert that they will not be dictated to by ‘big
brother,’ in order to maintain their alignment with civil society.
Both countries have a history of good relations with the US, with scattered
instances of strain. The biggest issue for Trinidad came from the lease of land in
Chaguaramas to the US for the construction of a naval base. This land had been
contracted as a 99-year Lend-Lease Agreement between the US and UK in 1941, while
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Trinidad was still under British colonial rule. Upon independence, the presence of the US
was felt to be that of a replacement hegemon. Eric Williams pushed for the termination of
this land contract to bring ‘full independence’ to the islands. Williams reacted to the
American comments during the negotiations to end the lease agreement, that the base
contributed to the economic and political stability of Trinidad by saying that, “It is you
Americas who fear aggression…You should move Cuba to the Pacific…You can do it,
you are all powerful...But let Castro mind his business and we will mind ours…We won’t
tolerate interferences from anybody.”188 To his credit, Williams did initially hold a soft
stance towards the presence of the naval base and did not begin the proceedings to end
the lease agreement himself. The issue of Chaguaramas was first taken up by the
Standing Federation Committee (SFC); a committee within the West Indian Federation
grouping. These government leaders making up the SFC took the issue to task since
Chaguaramas was the proposed capital for the West Indian Federation regional
arrangement. Therefore, the leaders felt that it was necessary that the land be returned.
However, the PNM had agreed pre-independence that they would honor the terms put in
place by the colonial government so Williams abstained from voting as it was a clear
conflict of interest for him and his government. However the motion still passed which
meant that the SFC would attempt negotiations with the US to end the lease. Williams
further abstained from becoming involved in these negotiations with the US until he had
been given assurances (by the US) that he was not in violation with the pre-independence
agreement. Armed with these assurances, he began to actively participate in the
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negotiations, which had up to that point been spearheaded by Jamaica’s Norman Manley.
In response to the US having up to that point been unwilling to negotiate, unmovable and
described as ‘laying it down,’ Williams finally “broke his angry silence and altered the
entire tenor of the meeting, shattering the complacency of the American delegation.”189
Since his leadership, there has never been a more or even equally vocal advocate for the
maintenance of Trinidadian sovereignty at the head of government.190
In Jamaica, the most glaring point of breakdown in relations was during Michael
Manley’s administration. His social democratic experiment came at the time when Cold
War tensions were still very much a part of inter-state relations. This was in effect, his
playing the Cuban card and the response of the US was a show of what it would be like
without assistance from the hegemon. Under the Manley administration US assistance
declined significantly to $4.6 million. In the Seaga administration immediately following,
assistance went up to $75 million, an obvious showing of support for democratic
leadership in Jamaica.191 Of course, the second instance in which we can see a breakdown
in relations came during the Dudus Affair previously discussed in this dissertation.
However, as in the case of Trinidad, without the same caliber of leader which a strong
nationalist voice, this debacle, though descending into violence, eventually worked out
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favorably for the US with little effort on its part, showing that the small states at the end
of the day will defer to the hegemon.
According to Vaughan Lewis, the post Cold-War setting immediately gave way to the
post-September 11th setting and to a reframing of American interest in the region. During
and following the Cold War, the interest was in the development of the region itself given
first the need for the alignment of newly formed countries and second the new markets
and raw materials sources at the opening up of world trade. In the post-9/11 atmosphere
however, American interest instantly reframed to everything in security terms and as
indicated in the Inter-American Dialogue report that he quotes and other policy states
from the hegemon that he alludes to, this new non-Cold War security context with which
to address the region became the trafficking of illegal drugs and anything related to this
trade.192
With regards to illegal drug policies, the level of cooperation seems to be consistent
for both countries, with some differences in the way that this cooperation is framed.
While Jamaica media and public opinion will both reflect the need for assistance along
with dissatisfaction with US policy guidance, Trinidadians are mostly unaware of US
influences. More likely, they tend to express the need for the outside assistance and not
know if/what assistance arrangements already exist. This may indicate that Trinidadians
are less politically aware than Jamaicans in respect to international politics and policy.
Both governments note and emphasize a high level of cooperation with the US on matters
relating to illegal drugs. However, the Jamaican government asserts this as a partnership
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between ‘equals’ while the Trinidadian officials noted that despite the overall desire to
cooperate, there was little other option outside of cooperation anyway.
For this reason, there are more moments in history where Jamaica has reacted against
a US policy relating to drugs. The examples discussed here were the Shiprider agreement
and the Dudus extradition debacle. Therefore there is some level of difference when it
comes to the notions of perception of the other and self-projection for these two
countries. The notion of self-perception however seems to be more similar across both
cases.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SIMILARITIES & DIFFERENCES
From the findings, it is possible to find lessons from the behavior of these small
states in the Anglophone Caribbean with regard to their relationships with the US
hegemonic state. These lessons are premised on the notion that the reaction to policy
influence or directions originating in the hegemonic state will indicate whether or not
there is an impact on the small state’s nationalism in response to the particular policy
influence. This reaction and the corresponding effect on nationalism will have a further
corresponding impact on the bilateral relationship between said small state and the
hegemon. Trinidad follows a weak-reactionary style of behavior with no effect on the
relationship with the hegemon, in which nationalist sentiments are expressed following
external stimuli but these sentiments are short lived and do not affect the international or
domestic dynamics which created said stimuli, nor does the base form of nationalism
strengthen. Additionally its base nationalism tends to be worn down by notions of the
ideal type represented by the hegemonic state, meaning that the nationalism, which
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existed in the push towards nationhood for Trinidad, is now vastly changed and veritably
subdued. Moreover, Trinidad never held such geopolitical importance to the US in the
drug trade so as to make a shift in its nationalist sentiments noteworthy. Its limited role in
the drug trade in comparison to rest of the region is paradoxical since at the inception of
the Caribbean Basin Initiative’s security component, Trinidad’s then PM was tasked with
handling the security issues brought about by the illegal drug trafficking.193 In fact,
Trinidad has often pushed to be the poster child of US-Caribbean relations, for example,
by campaigning to be the headquarters of the FTAA, should it ever be agreed upon.
Jamaica follows a strong-reactionary style of behavior in that there is fervent
nationalist response resulting from external stimuli, which has cyclically affected the
relationship with the hegemon. This external stimuli (case in point, the Dudus affair) can
even spark such strong sentiments that they result in violence. However, these reactions
do not significantly affect the strategies of the hegemonic state since the country no
longer possesses the same geopolitical importance it had during the Cold War and then
again at the height of the Caribbean maritime drug trafficking time period (late 1980smid 1990s).
At the basis of this conclusion is the idea that the impact of US drug
policy on nationalism rests on the relationship between government and civil society in
the case countries. According to Post and Rosenblum (2002), civil society can be viewed
as a source of stability for a government but is necessarily also a challenge to “arbitrary,
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oppressive, and overweening” actions.194 Thus civil society for them acts as an indicator
of the strength of the nation, and the symbiosis of the government/civil society
relationship is an essential part of democracy. The civil society/government relationship
theme in the present study arose as an intervening variable in the examination of how US
drug policy affected nationalism. In Jamaica, because the civil society relationship is
stronger, the nationalist response to drug policies is stronger. However, in Trinidad the
response is weaker due to a gap between government reactions and civil society voice
and reactions. Thus, the relationship between civil society and government is
significantly different in both countries. While the Jamaican government has a tendency
to use the civil society heuristically, the disconnect between the Trinidadian government
and the civil society is very apparent. The Trinidadian government thus has difficulty in
mobilizing/operationalizing public opinion in one way or the other. This is due to the
high level of internal division along ethnic lines which not only characterizes political
party composition, but voting patterns as well. Moreover the high level of perceived
corruption has become somewhat of a running joke in the country making the citizenry
hard-pressed to truly feel passionate about their political party of choice or the reactions
of their political party (or government) to outside policy influences. Trinidadian
nationalism in that sense seems to be more muted than Jamaica’s.
This raises the question of why civil society-government relationship in Trinidad
is so weak, resulting in such limited responses to outside influences. Many possible
explanations exist – the ethnic divide in politics prevents civil society from having a
unified voice with which to communicate with the government, the absence of a social194
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democratic experiment in its history of political leaders has meant that the relations with
the hegemon has never seen the same type of struggle nor warranted a response from the
public.
In light of the heuristic use of civil society by the Jamaican government to get a
nationalist response to US policies, the question can be raised of whether it is in fact
government strategy that drives the strong-reactionary behavior of the population. This
would imply that the promotion of nationalist responses is consciously built in to
government strategy. The evidence of that seems insufficient however since information
that has been leaked to the public to generate a nationalist response in the past was leaked
either by the opposition or anonymous sources (though the speculations abound that the
sources may have come from within the sitting government body). Further exploration of
the civil/society government relationship is one avenue to broaden this study.

What these findings mean in terms of broadening drug policy literature
The findings suggest that US drug policy directions/directives are more likely to
be accepted and followed in a country that followed the weak-reactionary mode (i.e.
Trinidad) where nationalism and the responses of civil society do not markedly impact
decision-making at the official level. Since Caribbean nations are former colonies which
had many transplanted populations they (by rote) promote a sense of anti-colonialism and
anti-racialism in their individual foreign policies. But this is voiced at a macro level like
at the UN or to other countries rather than on the internal or bilateral level.195 Braveboy195
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Wagner notes that Caribbean islands are “small” in every interpretation of “small state” –
geographical size, population size, economic/political strength – but, some are arguably
less small than others. Noting Trinidad’s oil resources, for example, which give it some
level of influence beyond the region. She further points out that it has become a necessity
for our small states to “carefully balance their interests” with those of the US – the larger,
more powerful neighbor. This implies that there will be negative side effects for the
individual nations if this foreign policy avenue is not followed.
Examining the similarities and differences in each case is the first step in
understanding the relationship between drug policy and nationalism. In a major way,
history has determined the relationships that both countries will have with a more
powerful partner and subsequently how their nationalism is expressed in response to the
policies of this more powerful nation. This is precisely the reason that the most similar
case method was applied – to control for factors present in both countries that would
influence relations with the hegemon so they could be discussed together as a similarity
but put aside when navigating the nuances of drug policy. In the case of Trinidad and
Jamaica, they are the larger, more developed countries in the Anglophone Caribbean and
also the ones which received a significant number of indentured laborers from
somewhere other than Africa. This makes their ethnic composition, a supposed building
block of nationalism, more diverse than the average Caribbean nation. Technically, this
should make their nationalism harder to establish, but from what this research has
revealed, nationalism in the Caribbean post-slavery time period was a political rather than
cultural movement, built more on the shared sentiments towards the colonial rulers than
on the shared characteristics or practices of the people. Even language, Benedict
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Anderson’s prime nation-building ingredient was not a factor in this context since the
dominant language was that of the hegemon imposed on the transplanted people. Only in
modern slices of nationalism can language now become part of the nationalism given that
accents, slang and vestiges of previous language systems have been incorporated into
English in order to give each country’s English a particular creolized form. However,
merely that they spoke English was not truly a unifying factor for these people. Nor was
there the adherence to one religion a possible unifying factor, since the introduction of
indentured populations resulted in the observance of multiple religions in both
countries.196 Especially with regards to Hindus in Trinidad, since Hinduism is a nonproselytizing religion, this community tended to isolate itself in the rural areas and
initially tried to create living conditions that mimicked the original Indian homes as
closely as possible in their new setting. Therefore, when the nationalist drive towards
independence was occurring as early as with the labor movements in the 1930s, they
were largely left out of this process and were therefore unable to access that sense of
collective membership which is necessary for a strong sense of nationalism to be
established.
Therefore, nationalism appears stronger in Jamaica than in Trinidad implied by
the existence of strong relationship between the civil society and the government. This
relationship allows cohesive nationalist sentiments to emerge, which challenge outside
influences – in this case US drug policies. Yet, in spite of greater nationalist responses
against US drug policy influences in Jamaica, the country’s actual capability of opposing
or resisting the policy influence is very low given its overall geopolitical situation.
196
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Trinidad does not have the capability to resist policy influence either, but it also does not
have the political will to do so.

US Drug Policy-Nationalism Relationship
The big question that is raised at the end of this study is why is the impact on
nationalism an important variable to examine. For these small countries, their political
power is not so strong that their nationalism can affect happenings in the global arena in
any truly significant way. So why would their nationalism matter? The answer is simple.
These countries represent the most developed independent countries in the Anglophone
Caribbean. They are the in their own right, the strongest economies in their region, and
possess the biggest political voice within CARICOM. Thus their projections on how to
deal with US policies sets the tone for how the rest of the region will perceive and react
to the US. While there is no real threat to US interest posed by either of these nations on
their own, as a group of nations, the Anglophone Caribbean occupies a significant portion
of the Caribbean Sea and together hold a high enough level of geopolitical importance to
US interests to warrant their nationalisms not fomenting any anti-US policy ideas. The
Third Border Initiative, spearheaded by Bush circa 2000, outlined justice and security as
its main thrust, specifically itemizing illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration and
financial crime as the main threats for the US and the regional security. However,
criminal deportation, small arms trafficking and drug demand reduction which remained
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the main Caribbean concerns, were left off the main agenda showing that the US vital
interests were still given precedence in this regional arrangement.197
Bryan and Flynn argue that, “despite the Third Border concept, the US has paid little
policy attention to the Caribbean countries as an integral part of its perimeter defense
structure.”198 This harkens back to Pastor’s whirlpool imagery which has been used as an
underpinning contextual theme throughout this thesis, showing that the importance and as
such policy attention given to the region is directly related to the level of threat it poses to
the hegemon. Arguably, when there is a greater nationalist response or opposition to a US
policy, the nations receive a greater level of policy attention (in both carrot and stick
form) in order to bring things back on track. Therefore, these small states can hope to
temporarily place themselves back closer to the center of the whirlpool only if they
choose to follow the strong-reactionary model.
Thus the causal relationship between US drug policy and small state nationalism that
was originally hypothesized at the beginning of this research was revealed to be much
more complex than a simple unidirectional type of causality. Instead, it is that US drug
policies do in fact have an impact on nationalism, while nationalism simultaneously has
an impact on the reaction to US drug policies toward the small states. Thus there is a
sense of circularity in the relationship between the variables because they feed into each
other. What emerged in the investigation is that more importantly in this relationship was
the intervening variable of the government/civil society relationship which determines the
level to which US drug policies can weaken nationalism in the small state. Where the
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government/civil society relationship was weaker, the impact of US policies on
nationalism was stronger, while a stronger government/civil society connection yields
greater nationalist responses to US policies. Given this information, it is possible to
extrapolate that should US drug policy influences or strategies towards the region change
in any way, there will also be a corresponding change in the relationship to nationalism.
If policy influence were to be relaxed, then there would be no pressure point for these
countries to react against therefore; nationalism may become a less overt observable
characteristic for them.

CHANGING IDEAS
US domestic drug policies have recently begun a trend of relaxation as the
discussion on harm reduction and decriminalization has opened up. Washington and
Colorado have legalized the use and sale of cannabis while many other states have
enacted legislation to decriminalize and allow for the medical use and sale of marijuana.
The recent shift in the views of Dr. Sanjay Gupta, prominent CNN correspondent, has
opened the discourse even further, showing that the clamor in the US for relaxed
marijuana legislation has reached a critical mass which necessitates some action or at the
very least policy attention for the issue. The foreign policy approaches of the US when it
comes to illegal drugs has not substantively changed to reflect these domestic changes
however, despite numerous calls in the past from op-ed journalists and former South
American heads of government for such a relaxation as a means of reducing the levels of
violence associated with the international illegal drug trade. This now raises the question
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of how relations with other countries will be affected if US domestic drug policies take
this turn across the board.
For the past 40-odd years, the ‘war on drugs’ has been fought not only to keep
heroin and cocaine, but also marijuana from crossing the border into the US. The policy
pressures placed on countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Jamaica have in
many instances caused political leaders and public opinion in these countries to take on
an almost anti-American dynamic. Arguably, the reason for the rise in populist leaders in
South America is due in part to the heavy US presence and pressure to reduce cultivation
of drug crops since the 1970s. In Jamaica since the early 1990s, the country has certainly
felt the threat of decertification when it comes to creating its own counter-drug strategies
and in the mid-90s the proposed Shiprider Agreement caused a national outcry for its
potential infringement of Jamaican sovereignty. With this history of policy pressure on its
so-called third border states, what message is the US now sending with its internal trend
of relaxation? Is this in fact another way for the US to create a monopoly for itself in yet
another agricultural market?199 This movement towards legalization of marijuana opens
up a new economic venture for the US given that it will now be able to tax the sale of
marijuana as a legitimized product. However, the continued illegality of international
transshipment from countries like Mexico, Colombia and Jamaica acts as a form of infant
industry protectionism which prevents any other players entering this fledgling market.
But yet another issue comes up when thinking about this as a new economic
venture, should it be allowed to occur on an international scale – what will happen to the
cartels? Will they become semi-legitimate economic actors given that a portion of their
199

This was suggested by some respondents in Jamaica.

192

trade will become legitimized or will there be some kind of transfer of service providers
from cartel to legitimate sellers in these supplier countries? How will the trade of illegal
drugs and “less illegal” marijuana co-exist? And will it mean increased opportunity for
illegal drugs to cross into the US alongside marijuana?
If drug policies were to mimic the US trend in Jamaica and Trinidad, then the
results may not be quite as positive. Despite a small following of people behind the idea
of decriminalizing marijuana, the wider society does not share this idea. The likely
progression if marijuana were to be decriminalized in Trinidad would be that the price for
the consumer would increase given that the government would now be able to tax the
product and since it is mostly imported, the accompanying tariffs and duties would also
contribute to raising prices. This would take distribution out of the hands of the current
sellers who tend to be in the lower socio-economic classes, which would leave these
people without an alternate means of subsistence. More than likely, the trade will become
concentrated among the upper class that allegedly already controls the transshipment of
marijuana into the island. In cutting off the distributer, it means that this segment of the
population left without other moneymaking options will have to find some other means
of survival. Given their comfort with distributing illegal goods, it is likely that they will
diversify the types of drugs that they offer and in so doing, enhance the supply of cocaine
in the country. It is unlikely that marijuana production will drastically increase for
legitimate use in the country since there is already an aversion to agricultural work which
some have argued is a vestige of the end of slavery. Therefore, it will continue to be a
mostly importer country. Even if domestic production were to increase, it likely would
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not be sufficient to satisfy demand and would not be considered a worthwhile job
opportunity since farming tends to be such a low income sector.
In Jamaica, it is likely that building a legitimate marijuana industry would create a
short term economic boost given that the country already has a significant amount of
locally grown marijuana. However, in the long term, it would create and opening for
product coming from the US to enter the Jamaican market. The US product as discussed
in Chapter 4 (Jamaica chapter) has a higher potency level and is likely to win out over the
locally produced grade, thereby reducing the income that is currently earned by the sale
of this product on the Caribbean black market.
It is unlikely that small-state leaders will take kindly to a complete turnaround in
US drug policies given that the strong policy influence that has pervaded the issue of
illegal drugs since the beginning of the war on drugs has set a precedent for interactions
with the hegemon. It has also led to a certain degree of internal framing of the drug
situation for these case countries and has become an integral part of foreign aid that
comes to these countries in each financial year. A relaxation of US drug policy at the
international level, would likely lead to a significant scaling back of federal funding
attributed to these small states, a change that they would most definitely find unwelcome.

CONCLUSION
In his article on national role perceptions, Holsti alludes to the importance and
under-recognition of “the alter” in foreign policy analysis.200 He argued foreign policy
analyses tend to emphasize the self conceptions of policymakers as the bases of national
200
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interest. While he acknowledges that this in fact is a salient part of policy formation, he
does give some acknowledgement to the notion that considering perceptions of what he
terms “the alter,” and this thesis has referred to as the Other, do have an impact on the
positionality, role conception, and ultimately the national role performance of a country
(i.e., the overall foreign policy behavior of its government comes from the country’s
understanding of itself and its status in the international system). Holsti’s point highlights
a gap in the literature on drug policies in the case countries that my research sought to fill
– looking at the impact of the Other and the relative policy relationship on
conceptualizations of self.
This project undertook to explain the relationship between US drug policy and
nationalism in small states using Trinidad and Jamaica as its cases. It was revealed that in
spite of the hypothesized causal relationship existing, the intervening variable of
government/civil society relations was an important factor in the level of impact that
could be observed. The major findings are therefore:


US drug policies have the effect of wearing down nationalism when there
is already a weak government/civil society relationship – visible in the
Trinidad case



They have less of an impact when the government/civil society
relationship is stronger – visible in the Jamaica case



The government/civil society relationship is an important part of
establishing a cohesive form of nationalism in these small states.

From the lessons on small state behavior emerging from this research, it indicates
that the strong-reactionary behavior evident in Jamaica results in more overt reactions
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against policy influence, while in Trinidad, the weak-reactionary behavior does not. From
these findings there is the indication that US drug policies, while accepted as having been
unbalanced, with undue emphasis on the supply countries, does not necessarily have the
level of sovereignty encroaching effects argued by some scholars. Even these small states
are able to react to the policies in ways which have made them at times more relevant to
the US security concerns. This is not to say that there is no need to alter drug policy,
since it has arguably become a dated, monolithic, and expensive part of US foreign policy
in general. Additionally, by all accounts, this ‘war on drugs’ strategy has been a failure.
What must be the focus now, which would both ameliorate any mal-effects on
nationalism and change the current policy discourse – which has thus far just pushed the
illegal drug trade into different parts of the region – should be establishing a greater level
of substantive multilateral cooperation in the construction of drug policies for the region.
Policies that address both the internal concerns of small states, as well as the larger
security objectives of the US are more likely to strengthen the “fight” against illegal
drugs. This is because focusing on what small states have notably been lacking, like
institutional development and capacity, would go a long way in making them more able
to arrest control of the situation from the hands of illegal traffickers.
The cases of Trinidad and Jamaica indicate that considering nationalism in the
drug policy relationship could in fact be helpful since strong reactions against policies
have led to internal turmoil in Jamaica, while there has been mostly acceptance of very
similar policies in Trinidad. It is not the intention of the author to claim that the
weakening of nationalism is a positive quality, but to acknowledge that it has been
favorable for US interests in this respect. However, there is no guarantee that nationalism
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will continue to weaken in Trinidad since nationalism by its very nature is a fluid process
which will indelibly continue to evolve. The same is true for Jamaica that its own
nationalism will also continue to evolve. Therefore, US policy could benefit by not
encountering strong anti-US nationalist reactions to drug policies, if it were to alter its
strategic objectives to engage with a greater level of multilateralism.

Recommendations for Future Research
More research on the relationship between US drug policies and nationalism in
the region can only be helpful in establishing which policy strategies provoke greater
nationalist responses that are against the US. This would likely lead to the creation of
policies which yield a higher level of cooperation from the small states in the region.
This project focused only on two countries in the Anglophone Caribbean.
By only focusing on Jamaica and Trinidad, the study is limiting in how well it can
describe the policy/nationalism relationship in other countries in the hemisphere which
play a larger role in the illegal drug trade. Expanding the study to include countries such
as Colombia and Mexico, which have been embroiled in the battle against illegal drugs,
can bring valuable attention to where the policy discourse is lacking for these countries.
Adding these countries will bring in an entirely new dimension since their roles in the
drug trade are considerably different. Current research on the shape of drug policy tends
to focus on the fact that it has habitually emphasized supply side policies and created
balloon effect through its strong militarization strategies. While this stance has been
acknowledged as a flaw in US drug policy by the policymakers themselves, there really
has been no viable alternative. Shifting focus to nationalism and tangentially, the
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government/civil society relationships in these case countries will uncover the gaps that
have long existed in the ‘war on drugs’ because the problem of how states’ nationalist
reactions to policy influence affect their actual implementation of these policies will
come into question. This will uncover where the gaps in effective policymaking have
been and possibly yield policies which can bridge these gaps.
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APPENDIX I
Questionnaire
The purpose of this questionnaire is to gather information about each participant. This
information will not make you specifically identifiable to anyone.
1. What is your age category?
 18-25 years
 26-35 years
 36-45 years
 46-55 years
 56-65 years
 65+ years
 No answer
2. What is your ethnicity?
 Black
 Chinese
 East Indian
 White
 Mixed
 Other ______________________
 No answer
3. How do you primarily identify yourself?
 By nationality
 By ethnic group
 By religion
 Other ________________________
 No answer
4. Do you consider yourself aware of the illegal drug situation in your country?
 Very aware
 Somewhat aware
 Not aware
 No answer
5. Do you consider yourself aware of methods to address the problems caused by
illegal drugs in your country?
 Very aware
 Somewhat aware
 Not aware
 No answer
Thank You
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APPENDIX II
Focus Group Questions
1. How do you feel about the government’s approach to dealing with the problems
associated with illegal drugs?
a. What else, if anything, should be done?
2. Do you think that the government should have more foreign assistance to deal
with the issue?
a. What kind of foreign assistance?
3. Do you think the United States has a role to play in addressing the illegal drugs
problems in the country?
a. What is/should be their role?
b. What is your impression of their current involvement?
c. What do you think their goals are in the country or region?
4. Do you think that [country’s] image is affected by the way it deals with the illegal
drug problem?
5. Do you think the government is doing enough to fight illegal drug problems in the
country?
6. Do you believe that government approaches to dealing with the problem victimize
or privilege a particular group of the population?
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APPENDIX III

Delphi Study Questions
1. When constructing drug policies, what are the problems that are prioritized (e.g.
maritime interdiction, distribution, drug-related crimes, public health etc.)?
2. Do you believe that more foreign assistance is necessary to combat this problem?
a. What kind of foreign assistance and from which source?
3. Do you believe there is a significant level of pressure from the United States in
particular to create complementary drug policies?
a. If yes, what effect does this have on domestic policy actions taken?
4. Do you think that the country’s image is affected by the way it deals with the
illegal drugs problem?
a. Do you think that nationalism is affected and how?
5. Where do you think current drug policies are most lacking?
a. Is there a reason that this policy direction has not been followed?
6. What impact do you think these policies have on nationalism?
a. (If there is some impact) Is this positive or negative?
b. (If negative) What measures could be taken to address this impact?
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APPENDIX IV

Consent Form for Focus Group Participants

ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
Does US Counter Drug policy Affect Nationalism in the Anglophone Caribbean? A
comparative study on the impact of counter-drug policy on nationalism in Jamaica
and Trinidad and Tobago
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Your participation is kindly requested for this study, which is necessary for the
completion of a doctoral thesis. The purpose of this study is to determine the impact, if
any, of United States drug policies on nationalism in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
NUMBER OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS
If you decide to participate, you will be one of 80 people in this research study.
DURATION OF THE STUDY
Your participation will require 1 hour.
PROCEDURES
If you agree to participate, these will be the tasks:
1. Fill out a preliminary questionnaire.
2. Participate in a guided discussion on the research topic with 5-8 other participants.
The researcher will play the role of moderator and provide the questions. You are
encouraged to respond to and build on the responses give by others in your group.
The discussion will be recorded using a digital audio recorder.
RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS
There are two possible risks that may arise if you participate in this study. First, given the
style of group discussion that will be used, the researcher cannot guarantee that you will
not be recognizable to the other participants in your group after the exercise is completed.
However, your personal material, such as your name or any contact information collected
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by the researcher will be kept completely confidential and no data that can specifically
identify you will appear in the written product of this study.
Second, the topic of illegal drugs may be a cause for anxiety, but this study is not focused
on the criminal aspect of the illegal drugs trade. You will not be asked to identify persons
involved in illegal activities and are discouraged from doing so. This study focuses solely
on the effect of drug policies on the nationalism in your country. If you have any
information regarding criminal activity, please contact the relevant authorities and do not
bring up this information in the discussion group. If you cannot adhere to this request,
kindly refrain from participating in this study.
Finally, although participants in the group are asked to keep views shared in the session
confidential, you should be reminded that other participants in the group may share with
others the views that you have expressed.
BENEFITS
This study will not provide any direct benefit to you. However, the aim of this project is
to potentially revise policy formation which may in the long run improve policy relations
in the area of illegal drugs between your country and the United States.
ALTERNATIVES
There are no known alternatives available to you other than not participating. However,
any significant information that comes up during the course of the discussion session that
might influence your willingness to continue participation will be provided to you.
CONFIDENTIALITY
All information relating to your participation will be stored on the researcher’s computer
and encrypted using the program TrueCrypt. It will also be kept in a locked location
which is only accessible to the researcher. Any written products of this study will not
contain information that can specifically identify you. However, if for any reason Florida
International University, the researcher’s institution, must audit your information, they
will be bound by law to maintain your confidentiality.
COMPENSATION & COSTS
As compensation for your participation, refreshments will be provided at the end of the
group session. Any costs outside of those you regularly face, which have been incurred
due to your participation, will be reimbursed. Please make these costs known to the
researcher so you may receive your reimbursement. If you decide to withdraw early from
the study this will not affect the compensation or reimbursement due to you, but you are
asked to wait until the session has ended to receive them. If you decide to withdraw early,
you will not be able to wait for compensation or reimbursement inside the discussion
room.
RIGHT TO DECLINE OR WITHDRAW
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You are free to participate in the study or

214

withdraw your consent at any time during the study. Your withdrawal or lack of
participation will not affect any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. The
investigator reserves the right to remove you without your consent at such time that they
feel it is in the best interest.
RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues relating to
this research study you may contact Krystel Ramdathsingh at the Department of Politics
and International Relations, Florida International University, SIPA Building, Room 440
11200 SW 8th Street, Miami, FL 33199; or by telephone at either 868 780 0462
(Trinidad) or 305 321 7295 (US); or via email at kramd001@fiu.edu.
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION
If you would like to talk with someone about your rights of being a subject in this
research study or about ethical issues with this research study, you may contact the FIU
Office of Research Integrity by phone at 305-348-2494 or by email at ori@fiu.edu.
PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT
I have read the information in this consent form and agree to participate in this study. I
have had a chance to ask any questions I have about this study, and they have been
answered for me. I understand that I am entitled to a copy of this form after it has been
read and signed.

________________________________
Signature of Participant

__________________
Date

________________________________
Printed Name of Participant
________________________________
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent

__________________
Date
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APPENDIX V

Consent Form for Delphi Study Participants

ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
Does US Counter Drug policy Affect Nationalism in the Anglophone Caribbean? A
comparative study on the impact of counter-drug policy on nationalism in Jamaica
and Trinidad and Tobago
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Your participation is kindly requested for this study, which is necessary for the
completion of a doctoral thesis. The purpose of this study is to determine the impact, if
any, of United States drug policies on nationalism in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
NUMBER OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS
If you decide to participate, you will be one of 80 people in this research study.
DURATION OF THE STUDY
Your participation will require 1 hour.
PROCEDURES
If you agree to participate, these will be the tasks:
3. Participate in a guided discussion on the research topic with 5-8 other participants.
The researcher will play the role of moderator and provide the questions. You are
encouraged to respond to and build on the responses give by others in your group.
The discussion will recorded using a digital audio recorder.
RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS
There are two possible risks that may arise if you participate in this study. First, given the
style of group discussion that will be used, the researcher cannot guarantee that you will
not be recognizable to the other participants in your group after the exercise is completed.
However, your personal material, such as your name or any contact information collected
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by the researcher will be kept completely confidential and no data that can specifically
identify you will appear in the written product of this study.
Second, the topic of illegal drugs may be a cause for anxiety, but this study is not focused
on the criminal aspect of the illegal drugs trade. You will not be asked to identify persons
involved in illegal activities and are discouraged from doing so. This study focuses solely
on the effect of drug policies on the nationalism in your country. If you have any
information regarding criminal activity, please contact the relevant authorities and do not
bring up this information in the discussion group. If you cannot adhere to this request,
kindly refrain from participating in this study.
Finally, although participants in the group are asked to keep views shared in the session
confidential, you should be reminded that other participants in the group may share with
others the views that you have expressed.
BENEFITS
This study will not provide any direct benefit to you. However, the aim of this project is
to potentially revise policy formation which may in the long run improve policy relations
in the area of illegal drugs between your country and the United States.
ALTERNATIVES
There are no known alternatives available to you other than not participating. However,
any significant information that comes up during the course of the discussion session that
might influence your willingness to continue participation will be provided to you.
CONFIDENTIALITY
All information relating to your participation will be stored on the researcher’s computer
and encrypted using the program TrueCrypt. It will also be kept in a locked location
which is only accessible to the researcher. Any written products of this study will not
contain information that can specifically identify you. However, if for any reason Florida
International University, the researcher’s institution, must audit your information, they
will be bound by law to maintain your confidentiality.
COMPENSATION & COSTS
As compensation for your participation, refreshments will be provided at the end of the
group session. Any costs outside of those you regularly face, which have been incurred
due to your participation, will be reimbursed. Please make these costs known to the
researcher so you may receive your reimbursement. If you decide to withdraw early from
the study this will not affect the compensation or reimbursement due to you, but you are
asked to wait until the session has ended to receive them. If you decide to withdraw early,
you will not be able to wait for compensation or reimbursement inside the discussion
room.
You will also receive a token of appreciation for your participation and expert opinions
in this study. These tokens will be given at the end of the study. If you decide to withdraw

217

early, you may still receive this token as a show of gratitude, however, you will be asked
to wait away from the discussion room until the session has concluded.
RIGHT TO DECLINE OR WITHDRAW
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You are free to participate in the study or
withdraw your consent at any time during the study. Your withdrawal or lack of
participation will not affect any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. The
investigator reserves the right to remove you without your consent at such time that they
feel it is in the best interest.
RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues relating to
this research study you may contact Krystel Ramdathsingh at the Department of Politics
and International Relations, Florida International University, SIPA Building, Room 440,
11200 SW 8th Street, Miami, FL 33199; or by telephone at either 868 780 0462
(Trinidad) or 305 321 7295 (US); or via email at kramd001@fiu.edu.
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION
If you would like to talk with someone about your rights of being a subject in this
research study or about ethical issues with this research study, you may contact the FIU
Office of Research Integrity by phone at 305-348-2494 or by email at ori@fiu.edu.
PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT
I have read the information in this consent form and agree to participate in this study. I
have had a chance to ask any questions I have about this study, and they have been
answered for me. I understand that I am entitled to a copy of this form after it has been
read and signed.

________________________________
Signature of Participant

__________________
Date

________________________________
Printed Name of Participant
_________________________________
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent

__________________
Date
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